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Transitions: Evidence from Burundi
Cyrus Samii
In these three essays, I study important facets of the transition to peace after Bu-
rundi's 1993-2005 civil war. The rst essay studies the eects of quota-based ethnic
integration within Burundi's army on expressions of prejudice and ethnic salience
among soldiers. Exploiting a natural experiment within the army, I nd that expo-
sure to quota-based integration reduced prejudice and had no eect on ethnic salience,
countering a prevailing view in the literature that quota-based integration is likely
to exacerbate ethnic tensions. The second essay studies individuals' preferences over
transitional justice alternatives. I nd that support for punishment and truth-seeking
is more tepid than the advocacy literature has suggested, that ethno-political motiva-
tions seem to dominate expressed preferences for punishment and truth-seeking, and,
using a persuasion experiment, that simple forms of deliberation may actually polarize
people. The third essay, co-authored with Michael Gilligan and Eric Mvukiyehe, ex-
amines the impact of Burundi's ex-combatant reintegration program on the economic
and political reintegration of demobilized rebels. Exploiting another natural exper-
iment, we nd that the program provided substantial economic benets, but that
these economic benets did not seem to contribute to political integration, at least in
the short-run. The essays enrich our understanding of Burundi's dicult transition
to peace. They also essays just how one may bring high scientic standards to study
policies in the otherwise challenging context of post-conict transitions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In these three essays, I study important facets of the transition to peace after Bu-
rundi's 1993-2005 civil war. Burundi is a small, impoverished, and land-locked coun-
try of approximately 8 million people (ca. 2010) in central Africa. Burundian politics
is marked by two key structural features: (i) a caste-like division between an his-
torically privileged minority group, the Tutsi, and an historically oppressed majority
group, the Hutu, and (ii) clan-based and regional aliations nested within the Tutsi-
Hutu divide.1 Since independence in 1962, Burundian society has endured a violent
cycle of contestation organized around these cleavages. Protagonists in the conict
as well as commentators have characterized Burundi's bloody history in terms of two
competing master narratives: on the one hand, a contest between certain Tutsi elite
seeking to maintain extreme privilege and Hutus struggling for liberation from barri-
ers to mobility, and on the other hand, and a contest between Tutsis seeking to pro-
tect their legitimately gained property and Hutus seeking to expropriate them under a
genocidal rallying cry of purging \alien" Tutsi.2 Another prominent perspective views
1In Kirundi, the national language, the appropriate manner to refer to the segment of society
identied as Tutsi would be \Batutsi," and Hutu, \Bahutu." To keep the text lighter and to conform
with conventions in Western texts, I simply use the shorter \Tutsi" and \Hutu."
2See, e.g., Lemarchand (1996) on the rst perspective, and Chretien (2003) on the second.
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the conict in terms of elite manipulation in the service of zero-sum inter-regional and
inter-clan resource competition under conditions of extreme scarcity (Ngaruko and
Nkurunziza, 2000). The latest bout in Burundi's cycle of post-independence violence
was a 1993-2005 civil war that touched all regions of the country and is estimated
to have resulted in some 300,000 war-related deaths.3 The essays in this dissertation
examine in close detail the challenges that individuals faced, the strategies employed,
and the medium-term results experienced in three crucial processes following the end
of this latest civil war: (1) managing a painful legacy of inter-ethnic violence in con-
structing a new national army, (2) deliberating the appropriate manner for dealing
with past human rights perpetrators, and (3) nding a way to reintegrate into post-
war civilian life rebels who fought in a brutal, decade-long struggle. The essays rely
on rich micro-level data collected a part of an original survey of over 3,000 Burundian
adults, including current and former members of the army and rebel groups, as well
as civilians who did not ght in the war.
My goals with these essays are two-fold. First, I seek to document in high res-
olution Burundi's societal reconstruction after the civil war. The reasons for doing
so are not only to provide an historical record, but also to uncover potential lessons
that might be applicable to cases elsewhere that face similar challenges. Indeed, the
challenges of overcoming legacies of mass exclusion, inter-ethnic violence, and rebel
reintegration are shared by many countries in transition.
Second, I seek to demonstrate how state-of-the-art quantitative social scientic
methodology can be applied to addressing policy questions in this dicult research
context. This research context is dicult not only because of the complexity of the
3I refer to 2005 as the end of this latest civil war. The date corresponds with the year of the general
elections that consolidated the terms of the peace settlement between the incumbent regime and the
major rebel factions. Nonetheless, I do recognize that splinter rebel factions have remained active
in their ghting, even to this day. Nonetheless, relative to the violence from the previous decade,
violence since 2005 has been much smaller scale and contained to very small enclaves around the
capital city, Bujumbura.
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issues, but also because of the dearth of readily-available administrative data as well as
the risks to researchers and subjects alike associated with operating in an environment
aected by violence. Nonetheless, by applying some ingenuity and patience, and by
steeping oneself in the social and political nuances of the setting, I believe that it is
possible to carry out policy studies that stand up to serious scientic scrutiny. In this
way, I see myself as among the growing number of researchers that seek to work in
the area of conict studies while adhering to the strict principles of what quantitative
methodologists, Angrist and Pischke, have labeled the \credibility revolution" in the
social sciences (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).
A brief overview of the contents of these essays is as follows. The rst essay studies
the eects of quota-based ethnic integration within Burundi's army on expressions of
prejudice and ethnic salience among soldiers. The essay exploits a natural experiment
within the army, whereby exposure to quota-based ethnic integration in the army was
based on an age cut-o. To measure prejudice, I use an experimental measurement
technique, based on the random assignment of enumerators with dierent ethnicities.
I nd that exposure to quota-based integration reduced prejudice and had no eect
on ethnic salience, countering a prevailing view in the literature that quota-based
integration is likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions.
The second essay studies individuals' preferences over transitional justice alter-
natives. It studies why some individuals may prefer to \forgive" or \forget" rather
than aggressively pursue punishment of oenders or truth about past abuses. Using
a method that seeks minimize social desirability bias, I nd that support for pun-
ishment and truth-seeking is more tepid than the advocacy literature has suggested.
A correlational analysis shows that individuals tend to express preferences that are
politically advantageous for their ethnic group, and that such apparent political moti-
vations moderate the association between victimization and demands for punishment
or truth. A persuasion experiment shows that simple forms of deliberation may actu-
ally polarize people. The results suggest the need for transitional justice practitioners
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to be cautious about upsetting hard-won political compromises.
The third essay, co-authored with Michael Gilligan and Eric Mvukiyehe, examines
the impact of Burundi's ex-combatant reintegration program on the economic and po-
litical reintegration of demobilized rebels. We exploit a natural experiment within
the program, whereby a contractual dispute resulted in about a third of beneciaries
from having their benets withheld. Using these unfortunate ex-rebels as a pseudo
control group, we nd that the program provided substantial economic benets, par-
ticularly to those who would otherwise have been among the worst o. These results
stand in contrast to previous studies, however we note that these previous studies did
not have an exogenous source of variation in program accessibility in the manner of
our study. Nonetheless, we do not nd that these economic benets contributed to
political integration, although our results can only speak to short-term eects.
Since the time that I began work on this dissertation, the community conducting
quantitative micro-level research on conict processes has grown from a small and
tight-knit group to an expansive, multidisciplinary, and international research com-
munity. More and more high resolution data on violence and post-conict processes
comes online each month.4 But data without a research design can say little. Find-
ings from a research design that is not linked to well articulated theory cannot travel
far. Finally, micro-level research designs and theories that are not well-adapted to
the nuances of a local context can mislead. The challenge for the \microdynamics of
conict" research program is to apply the principles of the \credibility revolution" for
robust causal empirical analysis, test well articulated and generalizable theory, and
operationalize such theory in a way that is sensitive to nuances of the local context.
My hope is that the essays contained in this dissertation are a step in that direction.
4See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a relevant review.
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Chapter 2
Do quotas exacerbate or reduce
ethnic conict? Micro-level
evidence from Burundi's military
Summary
An important issue in political development is why conict between ethnic groups
endures and how such conict might be transcended. Using original survey data
from post-war Burundi, I examine whether quota-based integration of ethnic groups
in the military exacerbated or reduced the kinds of prejudice and ethnic salience
necessary for ethnic conict to endure. Among members of the incumbent armed
forces, eligibility for the new integrated armed forces was based on an age cut-o.
By comparing those just above and below the cut-o, I isolate the eects of being
exposed to involuntary ethnic integration in the military versus being demobilized.
Then, using tests for changes in other variables at the cut point, I examine what
these eects suggest about the eects of exposure to ethnic integration per se. I
nd that participation in the quota-integrated military is associated with decreases
in prejudicial behavior and appears to be benign in terms of eects on ethnic salience.
I nd that these results are not likely due to adverse shocks associated with being
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demobilized.
The results have important implications for policy. They suggest that pessimism
about quota-based integration, based on a presumption that they intensify or \freeze"
conicting ethnic identities, may be unjustied. In Burundi, Hutu and Tutsi identities
have divided society for generations and have been central in a decades-long cycle of
violence. The evidence in this paper weighs slightly in favor of quota-based integration
as a strategy for overcoming legacies of exclusion and inter-group conict.
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2.1 Introduction
An important issue in political development is why conict between ethnic groups
endures, and how such inter-group conict might be transcended. Quota-based ethnic
integration is a commonly used policy, based on the apparent necessity of using pro-
active measures to overcome legacies of ethnic exclusion. However, detractors have
proposed that such quotas may exacerbate the very conict they are intended to
transcend. I use original survey data collected in Burundi after the end of their 1993-
2004 civil war to study the eects of exposure to quota-based ethnic integration in
the national military on soldiers' expressions of ethnic prejudice and ethnic salience.
The analysis allows me to test competing claims about whether exposure to such
quotas reduce or intensify the kind of behaviors and perceptions that contribute to
the endurance of ethnic conict. I use a research design that takes advantage of a
natural experiment on exposure to quota-based integration as part of participation
in Burundi's reformed military.
Hutu and Tutsi identities have divided Burundian society for generations, provid-
ing the master cleavage for a cycle of massive violence since independence. At the
heart of this violence has been the problem of an \ethnicized" military. The rebel-
lion initiated in 1993-1994 was led by Hutu soldiers who defected from the military
in order to destroy what they labeled a \mono-ethnic," Tutsi-dominated army. The
1993-2004 civil war resulted in a peace agreement that redistributed power and called
for the ethnic integration of the military. The agreement established a 50-50 Hutu-
Tutsi ethnic quota. Among members of the former national military, an age-based
cut-o (below 45 years of age in 2006) was used to determine eligibility to serve in
the new national military. By comparing those just above and below the cut-o, I
isolate the eects of being exposed to ethnic integration in the military versus being
demobilized. I examine the extent to which my estimates may be tainted by other
dierences between the experience of participation in the integrated military versus
being demobilized. The results show that participation in the quota-integrated mil-
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itary is associated with less prejudicial behavior and appears to be benign in terms
of its eects on ethnic salience. It does not seem that these dierences are due to
shocks associated with demobilization. Thus, the evidence suggests that exposure to
ethnic integration may reduce tendencies necessary for ethnic conict to endure, and
at worse do little to exacerbate them.
There are a number of reasons that levels of ethnic harmony or disharmony within
the military are crucial in political development. Accounts of the erosion of political
order and the outbreak of mass conict often point to \ethnicization" within the mil-
itary as a fundamental factor, for example in the onset of the Biafra War in Nigeria
(Luckham, 1971) and the First Liberian Civil War (Adebajo, 2002). The responsive-
ness of military members to ethnic appeals by politicians is aected, at least at the
margins, by the degree of solidarity across ethnic lines within the army. Ethnic rela-
tions among members of the military aect the ease with which \subjective control"
of sections of the military might be achieved by political entrepreneurs who use eth-
nic appeals (Huntington, 1957). Constraining ethnic factionalization in the military
is especially important in developing countries, particularly countries in Africa. In
these contexts, military intervention and political manipulation of the military along
ethnic lines has been a central feature of the dynamics of political order and disorder
(Horowitz, 1985; Hutchful, 1997). Given its dominance in the institutional land-
scape, militaries in developing countries have enormous symbolic value. Therefore,
levels of harmony within the military are likely to inuence mass attitudes about the
potential for inter-ethnic cooperation. In Burundi, this has certainly been the case.
A history of ethnically-colored army repression provided a focal point for genocidal
mass mobilization in response to a bungled 1993 coup (United Nations, 1996). The
ethnically charged interpretation of the army's actions facilitated in no small part the
organization of genocide in neighboring Rwanda some months later.1 With respect
to political order, inter-ethnic relations among members of the military are among
1See Samii (2010a) for a detailed discussion.
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the most important in society.2
This study contributes to political scientists' understanding of how policies en-
acted as part of peace processes may in themselves contribute to either the perpetua-
tion or transcendence of ethnic conict. Ethnic quotas are common features of peace
processes, although little research has been done to evaluate their eects. If we nd
that quotas contribute to entrenching or exacerbating conict, then we would want
to consider alternatives or ways to complement quotas with policies to mitigate these
eects. If the eects are to reduce prejudice, then the recommendation would be to
highlight these eects, setting an example that might inspire easing of ethnic tension
more generally in society. Some may argue that such \optimal design principles" are
irrelevant for peace negotiations, based on the presumption that if lines of conict are
preserved in a peace agreement, then this is probably intentional as a way for one or
another party to maintain the credibility of a threat to resume ghting should their
counterparts renege. This view suggests there can be little scope for the independent
tinkering to design transitions that reduce the scope for conict. I think this view is
misrepresents what happens in peace processes. External mediators exert consider-
able inuence on the shape of peace agreements. Parties to a dispute often approach
mediators searching for suggestions on institutional arrangements that can help to
translate a ceasere into a more durable peace. In the case of Burundi that I study
here, South African mediators and technical experts provided many ideas and greatly
inuenced the institutional reform process.3
2Krebs (2004) takes a mostly contrary view, proposing military integration is unlikely to con-
tribute to reducing inter-group conict in society at large. But his argument is based mostly on a
lack of solid evidence on the eects of socialization, rather than clear evidence pointing to no eect.
This paper is attempting to provide more credible evidence. In addition, Krebs acknowledges that
if military members have inuence in politics, then socialization from within the military may be
societally important. In Burundi and in cases like Burundi, this condition certainly holds.
3I provide a more detailed account of the military integration process, highlighting South Africa's
role, in Samii (2010a).
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The context of this study is contemporary Burundi. There are two reasons
that Burundi is an important case for students of current transitions from war to
peace. First, structurally, Burundi's Hutu-Tutsi ethnic structure is part of the class
of \ranked ethnic systems" that have provided the setting for violent conicts that
have been especially dicult to untangle (Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2006). The priv-
ilege aorded to segments of the minority Tutsi segment and the severe constraints
to mobility for majority Hutu provide a ready narrative for ethnic mobilization that
has colored Burundi's, and neighboring Rwanda's, violent post-independence history.
Lessons from this case may be applicable to other contexts where the we face the
challenge of transcending the legacy of mass exclusion and perceived minority ethnic
domination. Second, Burundi's location in Africa's Great Lakes has unfortunately
been host to an enormous fraction of war-related death in recent decades. In addition
to Burundi's fragile peace, there continues to be much worry about the stability of
Rwanda's post-war political order. The nearly decade-and-a-half of violent disorder
in the east of neighboring Democratic Republic of of Congo is partially a result of
spill-overs from Rwanda and Burundi. Understanding the nature of contemporary
civil conict is, to no small extent, a matter of understanding this particular set of
intertwined conicts.
This paper begins with a discussion of hypotheses on the eects of quotas, focusing
on schools of thought associated with the contact hypothesis and various theories of
hierarchy maintenance. I follow with a discussion of the context of post-war military
integration in Burundi, explaining how the conditions provide for an interesting test
of these hypotheses. I then present the methods used in the study, explaining the
sample survey and regression discontinuity design used to identity causal eects. I
follow with the data analysis and results, as well as a discussion of robustness of the
ndings. A conclusion summarizes.
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2.2 Quotas and ethnic conict
There exists a theoretical debate in the social science literature about the conse-
quences of quotas for ethnic conict. Quota-based integration of institutions is a
commonly employed strategy in addressing legacies of ethnic exclusion and ethnic
conict, due in part to their transparency and to the appreciation that legacies of
exclusion may not disappear without proactive measures (see, e.g., Fryer and Loury,
2005). Aside from the philosophical debate over quotas, the behavioral science litera-
ture features debate over the likely consequences of quotas. This includes an emerging
literature on the eects of quota-based representation in elected bodies, where results
suggest that quotas and other types of \descriptive representation" may contribute to
enhanced attention to marginalized groups' welfare (Duo, 2005) and less prejudicial
attitudes and behaviors among constituents (Dunning, 2010; Chauchard, 2010). I
focus here on theories about how individuals subject to quota-integrated institutions
may react and the implications of such reactions for ethnic conict more generally.
We can distinguish between those who are optimistic about the contribution of quotas
to reducing ethnic tensions from those who are pessimistic, suggesting instead that
quotas may exacerbate tensions.
Optimistic theories derive mostly from the theoretical tradition tied to the inter-
group \contact hypothesis" (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). The contact hypothesis
suggests that increased contact in the presence of four enabling conditions will lead to
a reduction in negative aect toward an out-group and a consequent reduction in prej-
udice and parochialism. These enabling conditions, as applied to a quota-integrated
institution, are that (1) the integrated groups are aorded equal status in the insti-
tution, (2) members of the institution work toward common goals, (3) attainment of
those goals must require cooperation, and (4) integrative aims must have the sup-
port of authorities, law, or custom. The supposed psychological mechanisms through
which the reduction in negative aect occurs are that subjects correct misheld views
about out-group members by learning about each other, develop a sense that work-
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ing with out-group members is normal, form emotional bonds to individuals across
group boundaries, and learn that in-group norms are not necessarily optimal or even
superior to those of the out-group. In a meta-analysis of 515 studies, Pettigrew and
Tropp (2006) nd that the hypothesis holds in a broad array of contexts. Political
scientists have applied contact theory in a number of settings, including in analyzing
the possible eects of integrative policies in post-apartheid South Africa (Gibson and
Gouws, 2003) and in interpreting how a reconciliatory media intervention helped to
reduce inter-group prejudices in post-war Rwanda (Paluck and Green, 2009). Ethnic
integration in the military provides a good test of these hypotheses, as the formal
terms of integration typically establish enabling conditions (1) and (4), and the na-
ture of military activity establishes enabling conditions (2) and (3). Thus, by working
together as \brothers in arms" in an integrated military, contact theory leads us to
expect that soldiers would become less ethnically prejudiced and less parochial.
Other theoretical approaches suggest reasons to be more pessimistic. In the so-
cial psychology literature, theories of hierarchy maintenance and status preservation
suggest that quota-based integration will generate resentment among those whose
status is threatened, causing such individuals to withdraw cooperation, become more
adversarial, and even work to undermine the quota-integrated institution (Blumer,
1958; Coser, 1956; Levine and Campbell, 1972; Spilerman, 1970). In the political
science literature, hypotheses along these lines have been used to explain the origins
of violent inter-group conict, sometimes pointing specically to status shifts within
major state institutions such as the military as precipitating causes (Gurr, 1970;
Horowitz, 1985, 2001; Petersen, 2002). In a similar vein, theorists of civil conict
have proposed that the use of quotas may freeze the salience of ethnic identities that
political entrepreneurs had used instrumentally during wartime to divide people and
seek political advantage (Aitken, 2002; Simonsen, 2005). If this is true and if soldiers
are really the muscle of ethnicized political tendencies, then we should expect soldiers
to be especially adamant about the importance of their ethnic identity.
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Each set of hypotheses is plausible, and so this study aims to assess the relative
strength of integrative versus oppositional eects of quota-based ethnic integration.
The overall eect of quota-based integration is likely an aggregate of both positive
and negative eects. At the end of the day, our interest for policy is to determine
whether one or another tendency dominates.
2.3 Context
The context is the ethnic integration of Burundi's military after the 1993-2004 civil
war. Integration of mostly Hutu rebels into the Tutsi dominated army began after
a 2003-4 ceasere which drew into the peace process the largest rebel group in the
country, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense
of Democracy (CNDD-FDD, by its French acronym).4 Some historical background
is necessary to understand why ethnic integration was such a landmark step in Bu-
rundi's political development. Burundi is a small, impoverished, land-locked country
of approximately 8 million people (as of 2010) in the center of Africa. It has been
wracked by a cycle of political violence since independence in 1962. Like neighboring
Rwanda to the north, Burundian society is marked by a caste-like stratication that
has historically privileged a Tutsi minority relative to majority Hutu and a very small
third group, the Twa.5 Also like their neighbours in Rwanda, Burundians have strug-
4This section provides only a brief overview of the context. A detailed account, based largely on
my own interviews with Burundian military and political leaders as well as technical advisors to the
process, is given in Samii (2010a).
5Conventionally, Tutsi are said to constitute 14% of Burundian society, Hutu 85%, and Twa
1%. These gures are from a 1956 colonial-era census of dubious quality. The current distribution is
likely to dier, not least due to imbalances in mortality rates in the various crises since independence.
Analysis of survey data collected by my research team in 2007 suggests that the distribution may
slightly overstate the Hutu proportion, although the margins of error are quite large. Nonetheles,
to the extent that electoral results from 1993 and 2005 largely reect ethnic preferences, the 14-85-1
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gled to escape a conict pitting custodians of this \ranked ethnic system" (Horowitz
1985; Lemarchand, 1970) against those ostensibly seeking to remove barriers to Hutu
mobility.
Burundi's national army, known as the Forces armees burundaises (FAB) until
2004, has featured centrally in the country's bloody political drama since indepen-
dence in 1962. In the rst four years after independence Burundian politics suered
a series of assassinations, an abortive coup by Hutu ocers, repressions, and reprisal
massacres. The events culminated in a purge of high ranking Hutu ocers and a 1966
military coup led by the minister of defense, Captain Michel Micombero, a Tutsi from
Bururi province. Thus began a period of de facto military rule and intensied con-
centration of economic opportunities and power, particularly within the army, into
the hands of a Tutsi clique from the southern Bururi province. The clique over-
saw a dramatic intensication of Hutu exclusion as well as a degree of exclusion of
non-southern Tutsi. A 1972 insurrection coordinated by Hutu expatriates and Hutu
army members escalated to involve massacres of Tutsis, mostly in the southern part
of the country. This triggered a barbarous crackdown by the army, which went be-
yond restoring order and sought to prevent future uprisings by \decapitating" Hutu
society. A more thorough purge of Hutu members of the army and police followed.
Competition among clan-based factions of southern Tutsi military ocers shaped the
next 20 years of Burundian politics.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, then-President Pierre Buyoya, also a Tutsi from
Bururi, presided over a process of ostensible national reconciliation. Buyoya oversaw
the promulgation of a national unity charter and new constitution in 1992, setting the
stage for elections in 1993. Some places in the national ocer academy, the Institut
superieur des cadres militaires (ISCAM), were opened to Hutu candidates. But the
gesture masked a more general resistance to army reform among the Tutsi elite. The
1992 national unity charter declared that \the truth is that there is no discrimination
distribution may not be so far o.
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within the army," a rather absurd claim (Lemarchand, 1996:139). One of the ben-
eciaries of this process, a Hutu from Bururi named Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye,
was a member of one of the integrated ISCAM classes. He would eventually defect
to become a leader in the rebellion that broke out in 1993.
In peaceful and generally fair elections in 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, a civilian Hutu
who had returned from exile in Rwanda, defeated the incumbent Buyoya by a large
majority in the presidential race. Ndadaye's administration called for the rapid pro-
motion of some Hutu ocers within the military, ostensibly to better align the military
ocer corps with the interests of the civilian government. After only 3 months in
power, Ndadaye was assassinated in a bungled coup attempt on October 21, 1993.
The assassination triggered what a United Nations commission described as genoci-
dal reprisals by Hutu mobs against Tutsi men throughout the countryside, followed
by massacres of Hutus by the mostly Tutsi army and police (United Nations, 1996).
Hutu members of Ndadaye's government ed the capital, Bujumbura, to establish
a rebel movement, the CNDD, and its military wing, the FDD. Explicit in their
stated goals was the defeat and dismantling of the so-called \armee mono-ethnique,"
so-called because the ocer corps was the near-exclusive domain of southern Tutsis.
The army (FAB), CNDD-FDD, and some smaller rebel factions fought in a civil
war that lasted until 2004. Fighting touched most regions. It resulted in deaths
estimated at about 300,000 out of a population of 6-8 million. Burundi's pre-war
socio-economic development levels were already among the world's lowest, although
for its income level, the country did have relatively well-developed infrastructure
and institutions. The war severely stalled development for over a decade, resulting
for example in an estimated 20% decline in real GDP over 1993-2002 (World Bank,
2004).
A peace process had begun in 1996 and discussions of military integration featured
prominently from the start. Agreements signed by the warring parties in Arusha in
2000 and Pretoria in 2003 ushered in genuine peace. The FDD forces were largely suc-
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cessful on the battleeld, although the FAB forces were not defeated outright. These
rebel successes are reected in the agreements, whose provisions constitute a near
revolution in the country's distribution of power. Key among them was integration of
the army and police. The peace agreement established a rule of \ethnic balance" such
that posts would be allocated to Hutus and Tutsis in a 50-50 manner, and the overall
composition of the security forces was to be balanced in this way \in view of the need
to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d'etat" (Arusha
Accords, Protocol II, Chapter 1, Article 11). The agreement called for the integra-
tion of members of the rebel groups into a reconstituted national military. Technical
experts from South Africa provided substantial input into the process, drawing on
their own integration experience.6 Precise details of integration were nally set in
a \Forces Technical Agreement" signed in Pretoria in November 2003. It called for
an integrated army top ocer echelon with 60% FAB ocers and 40% CNDD-FDD
ocers, and a 65-35 FAB to CNDD-FDD breakdown for the integrated police top
ocer echelon. Throughout the ranks of these combined security forces, the principle
of \ethnic equilibrium (50/50)" would be observed.
A two-phase integration process was set in motion in 2004. The rst phase was the
\assembly" phase, which ran from 2004 to late 2005. During this phase, some 26,000
members of the rebel armies were gathered in cantonments, with a contingent of 7,000
CNDD-FDD soldiers immediately merged into integrated units with members from
the 40,000-strong FAB. During this period, 14,000 soldiers were demobilized, of which
about 5,000 came from the FAB and 9,000 from the rebel forces. The second phase,
beginning in late 2005 was the \rationalization" phase. It was during this phase that
full integration took place, including bridging training for rebel combatants and full
mixing of ex-national army members and the remaining 10,000 ex-rebels into common
units. During this time, the military was also trimmed toward a target of 25,000
6The peace process was ushered forward by sustained intervention by no less than Julius Nyerere,
Nelson Mandela, Bill Clinton, and Thabo Mbeki.
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army troops and 20,000 police. Among FAB troops, the rst wave of demobilization
in 2004 was mostly voluntary, as the military was too pre-occupied with the task of
\assembly" to process retirement. Then, the 45-year age cut-o was applied in with
regularity only in the later phases, starting in late 2005.
[Figure 2.1 here.]
The mixed units trained together, stayed in the same barracks, and fought together
in both counter-insurgency operations against factions that remained active as well
as in contributions to peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia.7 Figure 2.1
shows the sample proportions of Hutu and Tutsi military members from each of the
barracks that from which samples were drawn for this study (the sample is described
in detail below). We see that the ethnic integration called-for in the peace agreement
was apparent across the barracks at the time of the eld research. This integration
process was a highly salient feature of the post-war transition in Burundi. Indeed, in
a survey of Burundi civilians conducted in 2007 in parallel to this study of military
integration, 63% of respondents listed military integration as among the main points
of the peace agreement, despite not having been prompted to do so.8
Ethnic integration and the resulting forced inter-ethnic contact are the dominant
thing that distinguishes the post-late-2005 military from that which preceded it. As
discussed in Samii (2010a), the Forces Technical Agreement that governed the creation
of the new military called for the retention of the old FAB rank structure training
protocols, and formal doctrine. Conict resolution training programs were issued
to members of the new army, but these were also delivered to demobilized soldiers.
A special reconciliation program, the Burundi Leadership Training Program (Wolpe
and McDonald, 2006), was limited to upper echelon ocers. This study focuses on
rank-and-le members of the military, and so I am doubtful that any eects that we
7See Samii (2010a) for more details.
8These data are analyzed in Samii (2010b).
CHAPTER 2. DO QUOTAS EXACERBATE OR REDUCE ETHNIC
CONFLICT? MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI'S MILITARY 19
measure here can be attributed to those eorts.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Sample
The data on soldiers and are drawn from the multi-purpose Wartime and Post-
Conict Experiences in Burundi survey.9 The survey includes data from interviews
with civilians, as well as ex-rebels and ex-army, both demobilized and those inte-
grated into the new security forces. This paper works with only data on men who
were professional rank-and-le members or non-commissioned ocers in the national
army|the Forces armees burundaises (FAB)|during the war.10 Substantively, this
is not such a major compromise, as it is FAB members who oer the most interesting
test of the hypotheses given above. It is for them that the integration process spelled
a major loss in relative standing. Therefore, it is for them that we can genuinely
assess the relative strength of \resentment" versus \contact."
The sampling strategies were slightly dierent for demobilized FAB versus those
in the integrated military. Demobilized FAB were selected through a multistage ran-
dom sample from lists of demobilized ex-combatants registered to receive reintegration
benets through Burundi's national demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
(DDR) program. The rst stage involved randomly selecting 66 out of Burundi's
129 communes|Burundi's second-tier administrative unit|from a list of communes
stratied by Burundi's 17 provinces. We then set a target number of ex-combatant
interviews to complete in each commune, with targets proportional to the national
9Details on the survey are available at www.columbia.edu/cds81/burundisurvey/
10It is only for them that the age-based cut-o that I exploit was binding to any signicant degree.
While I would like to study outcomes associated with members of the former rebel forces, doing so
would require identifying some other source of plausibly exogenous variation in participation in the
integrated armed forces. Not having that, I limit the scope to FAB members.
CHAPTER 2. DO QUOTAS EXACERBATE OR REDUCE ETHNIC
CONFLICT? MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI'S MILITARY 20
proportion of ex-combatants registered with the DDR program in the commune. Tar-
gets ranged from 2 to 33. Then, we obtained from the national DDR oce the com-
plete lists of ex-combatants registered as residents of each of the selected communes.
We then drew a simple random sample (with a random number generator in the soft-
ware package, R) of the desired number of interviews from each of these commune
lists. We created a randomly selected reserve list for each commune to use in the case
of non-response. Selected participants were contacted and brought to the respective
Provincial Bureau by DDR program sta for interview on a scheduled date by our
enumeration team. Active members of the military were selected through a separate
multistage process. In the same 66 communes as described above, enumerators ap-
proached police station chiefs with a letter from the Ministry of Interior explaining
that they were to list all ocers stationed in the commune. Then the enumerators
randomly selected a target number of police which was proportional to the population
size of the commune. The reason is that police assignments are given in a manner
proportional to commune population. This creates as close to a self-weighting, rep-
resentative sample as possible with available information. For the active members of
the military, we identied all camps listed in the 66 selected communes. Enumerators
then approached the barrack with a letter from the Minister of Defense instructing
them to cooperate with the enumeration team to use interval sampling to select non-
commissioned ocer and rank-and-le soldiers from the camp's register, with the
number selected in each camp proportional to the total in the camp, as inferred from
information provided by the Defense Ministry. The rate at which rst choices were
interviewed in each of these samples was very high|around 90% for each|and so I
assume no need for further adjustment to account for non-response.11
11This very high response rate was likely due to a few factors: (1) respondents probably took
the interview to be a requirement given the formal manner in which they were approached; (2) we
accommodated schedules by setting dates for interviews well in advance; (3) the eldwork was con-
ducted during the idle interim period between planting and harvesting seasons, and so respondents
working in the agricultural sector faced few competing demands on their time; and (4) for the de-
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One can get a sense of the general relevance of the results presented in this paper
by considering the location of the sample members in Burundian society. As discussed
in the previous section the army was dominated by a Southern, Tutsi ocer corps.
The rank-and le included some Hutus, many of whom joined formally for sustainable
employment after they completed a military track for Burundi's mandatory two-year
public service requirement. However, the ethnic distribution is dominated by Tutsis:
892 out of 1086 (82%) of the FAB soldiers in our sample are Tutsi. Entrance into
the rank and le, both in peacetime and during the war, was obtained as part of re-
cruitment calls that were issued at least once a year|and sometimes more frequently
during periods of more intense ghting during the war. To gain admission, one needed
to pass an exam that included written components. Given the level of illiteracy in the
country, this meant that even the rank-and-le excluded the ultra-poor segments of
society. At the same time, because of the relative hardship of military life, few in the
upper socio-economic strata would likely join the army, meaning that most members
were drawn from a middle socio-economic segment.
2.4.2 Exogenous variation in exposure to ethnic integration
in the new military
[Figure 2.2 here.]
Figure 2.2 shows survey respondents by military/demobilization status and dis-
tance from the age eligibility cut-o. The \treatment" here is participation in the
integrated military and the \referent" or \control" condition is being demobilized
and thus not serving in the integrated military. I appreciate that there are factors
mobilized soliders, while participation was voluntary, a \transport allowance" of about 2 US dollars
was provided to each respondent after they completed the interview, thus making it worthwhile for
respondents to sit through the entire interview. (Enumerators purchases cases of soft drinks for
police stations and army camps.)
CHAPTER 2. DO QUOTAS EXACERBATE OR REDUCE ETHNIC
CONFLICT? MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI'S MILITARY 22
associated with demobilization status that mean that the comparison to those in the
integrated military is an imperfect way to test hypotheses about quota-based inte-
gration per se. I address strategies for isolating the eects of exposure to the quota
below.
At the bottom of Figure 2.2, I display a jittered rug plot of members of the
sample participating in the intergration military over an eligibility-cutpoint-centered
age variable. At the top of Figure 2.2 is a jittered rug plot of demobilized soldiers
over the age variable, broken down into those who self-reported that they voluntarily
demobilized (Demob vol.) versus those who self-reported that their demobilization
was not voluntary (Demob invol.). Also plotted in Figure 2.2, with the gray dots,
is the proportion of sample members, by age, that had been demobilized, computed
within 5-year bins whose boundaries are marked on the bottom axis. We see that
the demobilized proportion drops smoothly until the point marked 0, where it then
shoots up discontinuously. Using a linear regression estimated within a 5-year window
on either side of the cut-point, the estimated magnitude of the jump at the cut-
point is 0.58 (robust s.e., 0.11).12 This jump at the point marked zero provides the
basis for identifying causal eects of being in the integrated military versus being
demobilized. It is evident from the graph that no other such jumps exist in the
demobilized proportion over the range of the age variable.
At the time of eldwork in June-August 2007, eligibility for participation was
restricted to those below the age 45 as of September 2006, the timing of the last
application of the eligibility threshold for demobilization prior to eldwork. Those
who were less than 45 years of age had not yet been subject to the eligibility cut-
o from the previous year. Those aged 45 and in the military would be subject to
the eligibility criterion sometime shortly after eld work as part of the rationalization
process. Some of these people would have turned 45 in the months between September
2006 and the eld work period of June-August 2007, and so the maximum age among
12Using a triangular kernel inside the same window, the estimate is 0.48 (robust s.e., 0.13).
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those deemed eligible by the rules should be 45, and the youngest age for which
there should be no ambiguity of ineligibility is 46, with some indeterminacy about
ineligibility for those aged 45. I set the cut-o at 45.5 years to account for the
coarseness. Looking at the data, we see that this results in some fuzziness at the
cut-point. Focusing for a moment on fuzziness above the cutpoint, part of this is
due to the type of timing issues for 45-year-olds mentioned. But some of it cannot
be explained that way, and must be due to some idiosyncratic application of the
eligibility cut-o. However, the numbers are very few.
Individuals in the military at the time of eldwork would have been subject to
about 18 months of experience in the integrated army. As discussed above, the
eligibility threshold was only applied with regularity during the transition as of late
2005, just at the onset of integration. Our sample includes individuals who were
demobilized as part of a wave of applications of the eligibility threshold in October-
November 2005 (accounting for 55 out of the 85 retirements in the sample), with a
second, smaller wave occurring in March 2006, and sporadic retirements otherwise.
Thus, a few of the 45 and 46 year-old demobilized soldiers in the sample had the
chance to participate in the integrated army for some period up to mid/late 2006,
implying that they would have had some 6-9 months of exposure, although this would
have ended at least 6 months prior to eld work. Nonetheless, to make the estimation
more straightforward, I consider these to be on the \non-treated" side of the eligibility
cut-o. This coding will dilute the eect estimates to a certain extent, but the payo
is to make the estimation much more straightforward.
Potentially a larger concern is that anyone could either volunteer to demobilize or
be selected for demobilization due to judgments of being \unt to serve," irrespec-
tive of age. Interestingly, however, we see that the rate of demobilization decreases
smoothly in age until the cut-point. As indicated as well on the graph, the vast ma-
jority of younger demobilized soldiers chose to exit the military voluntarily. The likely
reason for the pattern is that voluntary demobilization would have been more attrac-
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tive for younger combatants, given that they may have seen themselves as having
more chances in starting a life outside the military. For this reason, voluntary demo-
bilization would become less appealing as one grows older, with only forced retirement
being the way to get an older person out.13 This is apparent on the graph, as the
ratio of voluntarily demobilized approaches zero as we reach the cut-point from the
left. On the other side of the cut-point, we do see that the proportion of voluntarily
demobilized increases a bit. Based on interviews with demobilization program sta,
I understand that this was due to the temporal coarseness with which demobilization
waves were carried out. The national demobilization program made opportunities to
demobilize available at certain discrete moments, based on practical reasons. Soldiers
who had not yet been forcibly retired but were approaching the age for this to hap-
pen could elect to demobilization during these opportunities, appreciating that they
would still qualify for pension benets. Because of the sparseness of the number of
demobilized to the left of the cut-point, there is no way to tell whether the rate of
voluntary demobilization to the right of the cut-point is unusual. But because they
represent a minority of cases (about 24% when looking within the 5-year bin above
the cut-point) and because there is a good explanation for it, there does not seem to
be reason for concern about sorting on this basis around the cut-point.
2.4.3 Identication of the eects of participation versus de-
mobilization
My research design allows me to identifying the causal eects of participation in the
integrated military relative to demobilization. Below, I discuss how I use auxiliary
analyses to try to isolate the eects of exposure to quota-based integration per se.
The research design is a \fuzzy" regression discontinuity design (Imbens and
13In Gilligan et al (2010), my co-authors and I study impacts of demobilization and reintegration
program assistance in detail.
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Lemieux, 2007). A fuzzy regression discontinuity design is a generalization of the
\sharp" regression discontinuity design. The sharp design is applicable when a cut-
o on a numerical index, called the \forcing variable," deterministically establishes
what units are in or out of treatment. Examples of sharp designs in the political
science literature include the use of electoral margins to determine which candidate
in a two-candidate election is promoted to oce. In those examples, the treatment
is promotion to oce, being assigned deterministically by whether one's vote share
minus one's opponent's vote share is greater than 0 (Lee, 2008; Hainmueller and Eg-
gers, 2009). A fuzzy design is a generalization of this, in that treatment assignment
is not deterministically set by the position relative to the cut-o. Rather, treatment
assignment is probabilistic over values of the forcing variable, but exhibits a substan-
tial \jump" at the value of the cut-o. Such is precisely what we can see in Figure
2.2.
Given such a discontinuous jump in the treatment assignment probability, we can
identify the eect of the treatment, for people dened by the value of the forcing
variable at the cut-point, so long as a few assumptions hold.14 First, expected values
of the outcomes of interest for the treated, on the one hand, and the controls, on
the other, are smooth in the immediate vicinity of the cut-point. Second, in the
immediate vicinity of the cut-point, treatment status is unconfounded relative to the
outcomes of interest, conditional on the forcing variable.15 When these conditions
hold, we can use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the average treatment
eect for individuals dened by the value of the forcing variable at the cut-point. The
excluded instrument is an indicator variable for whether the person is above or below
the cut-point. The treatment, in our case participation in the integrated military, is
14For formal statements of these assumptions, refer to Hahn et al (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux
(2007).
15The second assumption is necessary for nonparametric identication with heterogenous treat-
ment eects. See Hahn et al (2001), Theorem 2.
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treated as an endogenous regressor. Treatment eects can then be estimated with
two-stage least squares, with robust standard errors providing the appropriate basis
for inference (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007:15-17).16
Given these identifying assumptions, the analyst must decide on a way to model
the smooth relationship between the forcing variable and outcomes and must also de-
cide on the size of the window within which to t the model to measure eects. Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2009) have proposed a purely data-driven method to select an
\optimal" bandwidth to use for using local linear regression. The method relies on
asymptotic properties, which may not be well-motivated given the moderate sample
size with which I am working. An alternative approach is to pick a window based
on substantive knowledge about what ranges of dierences in the value of the forcing
variable are meaningful. In a suciently small window, one may reasonably claim
local linearity in the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcomes and
t a linear model. With a wider window, a common strategy is to t high order poly-
nomials, reducing the order of the polynomial on the basis of statistical signicance
tests on higher order coecients. Green et al (2009) studied the performance of these
methods in recovering an experimental benchmark. They nd that local linear regres-
sion with optimal bandwidth selection, linear regression within a small substantively
chosen window, and the polynomial specication search strategy in larger windows
all performed rather well, although their tests used a very large dataset (over 13,000
observations).17 Based on the outcome measures that I use (discussed below), the
16For further robustness, I compute standard errors that account for clustering at the level of the
commune, which was the primary sampling unit above that of the individual respondents.
17Imbens and Lemieux (2007) also propose a \cross-validation" based technique for selecting a
window. However the technique requires the rather arbitrary choice of a maximum window size,
Green et al (2009) do not nd that this method delivers any gains over either the data driven
\optimal" window selection or substantive window selection, and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)
propose that the \optimal" method should dominate over cross-validation. Thus, I do not employ
the cross-validation technique.
CHAPTER 2. DO QUOTAS EXACERBATE OR REDUCE ETHNIC
CONFLICT? MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI'S MILITARY 27
Imbens-Kalyanaraman selects 3 years on either side of the cut-point as the optimal
window.18 This leaves me with a very small sample size (65 observations below and 45
above the cutpoint). Based on substantive considerations, a window of 5 years ought
also to be tight enough to invoke local linearity, and this allows me to work with much
more ample sample size (92 observations below and 68 observations above). I present
results in both of these windows. To check whether nite sample size variability is
aecting the analysis, I also present results for a wider window (10 years), using the
polynomial specication search strategy. Imbens and Lemieux (2007:11) argue that
given a suciently tight window, a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel
(that is, an ordinary linear regression within the window) should be adequate. Some
modicum of bias reduction may be gained with a more sophisticated kernel|e.g. a
triangular kernel, equivalent to using weights that decrease linearly in distance from
the cut-point|although at some cost to eciency. Because eciency concerns pre-
dominate in my analysis, I present results for the rectangular kernel, indicating in the
text how things dier when a triangular kernel is employed.19
Regression discontinuity designs are heralded for their high internal validity rel-
ative to other observational study methods. Aside from the two assumptions given
above, no further assumptions of unconfoundedness are needed. This means that the
analyst does not need to search for a covariate set or specify a multivariate model.
A limitation is in external validity. Eects are identied only for those units dened
by the value of the forcing variable at the cut-point. For the purposes of this study,
this would mean for former-FAB soldiers aged between 45 and 46 years of age. While
this is a limitation, I think it also provides estimates for an especially interesting
subgroup in the context of Burundian politics. It is these individuals who, because
of their age and experience, provide important role models to their neighbors and
peers. We should also expect them to be relative \set in their ways," and so this
18The method is implemented in Stata with a script made available by Imbens on his website.
19Results from the analysis with the triangular kernel are available from the author.
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group provides a rather hard test for theories of attitude change.
2.4.4 Isolating eects of exposure to the quota
The discontinuity ensures that exposure to the quota was not due to self-selection.
This is hugely important. Self-selection into or out-of the quota-integrated army
would likely be a large source bias in using a comparison of integrated versus demo-
bilized army members to estimate the eect of exposure to the quota. Presumably,
those who are more prejudiced or for whom ethnicity is of high salience would choose
not to participate, in which case such a simple comparison would overstate the eect
of exposure to the quota. The discontinuity that I exploit removes that important
source of potential bias.
But the regression discontinuity only narrows things down to a certain extent.
Other contextual factors may dier on either side of the cut-o. It may be that these
contextual dierences, rather than the consequences of the quotas, really explain any
dierences (or non-dierences) in outcomes that I measure on either side of the cut-
o. To make a convincing case that I am providing evidence about the eects of
exposure to quotas per se, I need to account for the possible eects due to these other
sources of variation.
My strategy for doing so is less than ideal, but I think it takes fullest advan-
tage of what this admittedly imperfect natural experiment can tell us. I exam-
ine whether demobilization was associated with any adverse or positive shocks that
might aect the ethnic sensitivities of subjects. Current theories of group threat
and prejudice (Brewer, 1999) suggest that if there are adverse shocks associated with
demobilization|e.g., a serious fall in material well-being or subjective perceptions
of one's well-being|then the estimates based on the regression discontinuity alone
would be biased in a manner that overstates the eect of participation in the inte-
grated military on reducing prejudice and ethnic salience. The same theory suggests
that positive shocks would bias the analysis in the other direction.
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2.4.5 Outcomes and measurement
I study eects on two outcomes: prejudicial behavior and ethnic salience.
Prejudicial behavior
As discussed above, the debate over quotas suggests two contradictory hypotheses
about the eects of participation in a quota-integrated institution on prejudicial be-
havior. The contact hypothesis suggests that the revision of prejudicial beliefs will
cause a reduction in prejudicial tendencies. The resentment hypotheses suggests that
such participation may increase prejudicial tendencies. This study evaluates which
of these two eects tends to predominate among those participating in the quota-
integrated military in comparison to those who were demobilized instead.
I measure impacts on prejudice as the extent to which participation in the in-
tegrated army moderates the eect of the enumerator's ethnicity on a respondent's
willingness to respond to a set of politically or ethnically sensitive questions. Ethnic
prejudice is a term that is used to mean many things, including the conditioning of
behavioral responses conditional on ethnicity, or mere like or dislike of individuals of
another ethnicity (Paluck and Green, 2009). The denition that I apply is the con-
ditioning of cooperation on ethnicity. I assume that a survey respondent's decision
to answer a survey question is an expression of cooperation. Moreover, the willing-
ness to respond to sensitive questions is an expression of trust and comfort with the
enumerator. Prejudice then refers to the conditioning of such trust and comfort, and
thus cooperation, on the ethnic identity of the enumerator. I assume that the more
prejudiced a person is, the more likely is that person to condition such trust and
comfort, and thus cooperation, on the ethnicity of the enumerator, with higher trust
and comfort with a co-ethnic enumerator than with a non-co-ethnic enumerator.20
I chose to focus on non-response to sensitive questions as a minimally intrusive
20The assumption is consistent with ndings by Habyarimana et al (2007), who show that coethnics
may be more likely to trust each other because they can expect that reciprocity will be upheld.
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measure of prejudicial behavior. The \obtrusiveness" of a measure is based on the
extent to which subjects under investigation are aware that their behavior is being
assessed. Research in social psychology points clearly to the fact that subjects are
reactive to knowledge that they are being assessed (Kazdin, 1979). Obtrusiveness
compromises external validity, especially when measuring something like prejudice,
because of social desirability considerations (Paluck and Green, 2009).
To construct the measure, I rst calculate the degree of responsiveness to sensitive
survey questions. This required determining a set of \sensitive" questions. A rst
cut list was developed based on discussions with our enumerators before and after
eldwork. The enumerators were not aware that this assessment of sensitivity would
be used to construct a measure of prejudice. We did not change the questions either.
Rather, we emphasized to the enumerators that at the beginning of each module in the
questionnaire, they were to explain again that the respondent had the right to refuse
to answer or indicate \I don't know" for any question posed.21 I then narrowed the list
to a set that exhibited substantial non-response. (Questions with little non-response
provide no information, and so their exclusion does not contribute to bias.) The result
was a list of 23 \sensitive" questions. (The questions are given in the appendix.) I
then added three questions that were posed to the enumerator about whether they
thought the respondent appeared \distracted," whether the enumerator was reluctant
to answer questions, or whether the enumerator felt uncomfortable interviewing the
respondent. I constructed a \non-responsiveness proportion" score by adding the
number of questions to which a respondent failed to give an answer, plus the number
of enumerator questions that were answered in the armative, and then dividing
by the total, 26. Note that this measure, while rather easy to interpret, provides
21In constructing the non-response measure I do not distinguish between \refuse" and \don't
know" responses, because as our enumerators explained, a common way for a respondent to dodge a
question would be to say \don't know." This introduces a bit of measurement error. I see no reason
to think that the error would bias the analysis, although it does contribute to some loss of statistical
power.
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equal weight to all questions. This may not be the optimal way to draw information
on non-responsiveness, as there may be substantial correlation in the non-response
likelihood for dierent clusters of questions. Thus, as a secondary measure, I used
a two parameter logistic item response model to construct a factor score from the
non-response patterns.22
The next step was to use the responsiveness scores to estimate ethnic prejudice.
Our enumeration team consisted of seven enumerators who identied as Hutu, and
17 who identied as Tutsi. The ethnic distribution of our enumeration team diers
greatly from the ethnic distribution of the population, in which Hutus are the large
majority (popularly believed to make up 85% of the population).23 Given that we
recruited enumerators from among the university-educated, the disparity between
our team's ethnic distribution and that of the population is a testament to the deep
legacy of Hutu exclusion in the education system.24 Our enumerator assignment pro-
tocol was such that enumerators were to be randomly assigned to respondents, who
themselves were randomly selected. In this way, the protocol provided for the ran-
dom assignment of enumerator-respondent pairs to be either ethnically concordant
(both having the same ethnicity) or ethnically discordant (ethnicity of enumerator
and respondent dier). Because we were not present to monitor enumerators at all
times, there is some question as to whether enumerators may have violated this pro-
tocol, and sorted their interviews on the basis of ethnicity or some other factor that
may confound the concordance/discordance assignment. I assessed this possibility by
performing a randomization test. Our respondent data contain 1086 total interviews
with still-active and demobilized FAB soldiers. Of them, 902 identify as Tutsi, and
22The model was t with the \ltm" package in R, and factor scores were drawn using an empirical
Bayes method (Rizopoulos, 2006). An ANOVA test indicated that a two-parameter model would be
preferable to a one-parameter model.
23Refer to fn 5.
24Jackson (2000) provides an excellent look at ethnic and regional exclusion in Burundi's education
system.
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184 as Hutu. Given those proportions, as well as our 7 to 17 ratio of Hutu to Tutsi
enumerators, purely random assignment would lead us to expect 64% of enumerator-
respondent pairs to be ethnically concordant. In my sample, the gure is 65%. An
exact binomial test indicates that probability of seeing this large of a departure given
random assignment is 0.38, well within reasonable bounds. I think it is reasonable to
believe that the scope for sorting on ethnicity was limited. We trained our enumer-
ators extensively on the protocol, and emphasized that compensation and retention
in the project would be based on their abiding by the protocol.
With the responsiveness scores and the concordance assignments set, prejudice
is measured in terms of the dierence in non-response rates across concordant and
discordant pairs. In the total sample, the non-responsiveness score for ethnically con-
cordant pairs is 0.12, while it is 0.13 for discordant pairs, suggesting only the slightest
ethnic discrimination, if anything, in the overall sample. However, this small dier-
ence may mask substantial heterogeneity across groups, and it is this heterogeneity
that I use to assess the impact of participation in the integrated military: the impact
on prejudice is measured as the extent to which participation in military moderates
prejudice, as measured via ethnic discordance eects. Eectively, I compute the eth-
nic discordance eect above and below the age eligibility cut-o. Then, I measure
the impact of participation in the integrated army with a \dierence in dierences,"
estimating how the discordance eect diers for those above and below the cut-o.
This dierence is then weighted by the inverse complier proportion. In practice, this is
done using a two-stage least squares estimator, where the interaction of ethnic concor-
dance assignment and position relative to the eligibility cut-o is used to instrument
the interaction of concordance assignment and participation in the military.
There are two technical issues that I also need to address in the analysis. First
is that there may be non-linearities due to \ceiling" or \oor" eects, given that the
raw non-response measure is truncated between 0 and 1. This would be especially
problematic if the baseline non-response proportion (that is, the average non-response
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proportion among subjects who were not in an ethnically concordant pair) diered
greatly on either side of the discontinuity. The logistic factor scores from the logistic
item response model helps to alleviate this problem. The factor scores are a pro-
jection onto the logit scale, which in principle provides a linearizing transformation
of a variable bounded between 0 and 1. Thus, the factor scores should provide for
more reliable estimates of non-responsiveness eects in the case that baseline non-
responsiveness rates dier signicantly. Second, because the proportion of Hutu and
Tutsi enumerators was not 50-50, the probability of being in a ethnically concordant
or discordant pair varies depending on the ethnicity of the subject. For Tutsi subjects,
the randomization procedure implies that the probability of being in a concordant
pair is 17=24 and in a discordant pair is 7=24. For Hutu respondents, these proba-
bilities are reversed. In order to ensure an unbiased estimate of the sample average
eect of ethnic concordance, units are weighted by the inverse of their probability of
being assigned to the concordance or discordance condition that they received.
Because the measure depends on the identity of the enumerator in the enumerator-
respondent pair, it is useful to have more information on the prole of the enumera-
tors. All enumerators were recruited through Iteka{Ligue Burundaise des Droits de
l'Homme (Burundian League for Human Rights), a non-partisan, nationally promi-
nent, and nationally syndicated human rights organization. The organization enjoys
a reputation in Burundi of being a neutral advocate for human rights, taking stances
at times in opposition of all political tendencies in the country. Iteka members hail
from all parts of the country, although their operations are centered in the capi-
tal, Bujumbura. The enumeration sta included individuals from all regions of the
country, although they were all recruited at Iteka's central oces in Bujumbura. The
enumerators ages ranged from 25 to 45, and included 8 women (of which 1 was Hutu).
All enumerators had at least a university degree, which is a rare accomplishment in
Burundi.25
25Samii (2010b) estimates that about 1% of Burundian civilians have a university degree.
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Putting all of this together yields the following model for estimating eects of
participation versus being demobilized on prejudicial behavior,
Non-resposivenessi =0 + 1militaryi + 2eth. conc.i + 3militaryi  eth. conc.i
+ 4(agei   45:5) + 5below cutpoint  (agei   45:5)
+ higher order termsi + i;
where \militaryi" is an endogenous indicator variable for participation in the new mil-
itary. I use \below cutpointi" as an excluded instrument for \militaryi" and the inter-
action, \below cutpointieth. conc.i" as an excluded instrument for \militaryieth.
conc.i." The coecient, 3 is the estimate of the moderating eect on the ethnic con-
cordance eect. Thus, 3 measures the eect of participating in the military versus
being demobilized on ethnically prejudicial behavior. The (agei   45:5) term is cen-
tered at the cut-point, and so I t the model using two-stage least squares, weighted
to account for the unequal ethnic concordance probabilities. Inference is based on the
usual frequentist least-squares principles, with standard errors asymptotically robust
to clustering at the level of the sampling location.
I believe that this is a measure with a good deal of external validity, particularly
relative to survey-question alternatives. Nonetheless, there are some reasons to believe
that it may understate the true amount of prejudice. One reason is that, despite
the myths, it is actually quite dicult to discern ethnicity based on appearance or
name (which enumerators provided to respondents) in Burundi. For a given level of
prejudice active in the mind of a respondents, erroneous judgments by the respondent
as to the enumerator's ethnicity will cause the discordance eect to understate the
actual amount of prejudice. I acknowledge this possibility. This possibility, combined
with the rather small sample size and the fact that the measure requires the estimation
of an interaction eect mean that this is a rather low powered test. But with no
ability to increase the sample size, I accept this trade-o for the sake of improving
the external validity of the measure.
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Perceptions of ethnic salience
In addition to prejudice, ethnic conict typically requires that ethnicity be understood
as a salient feature of one's identity. Ethnic salience is related to \ethnocentrism,"
which involves not just co-identication, but also the tendency of individuals to view
their own ethnic identity as requiring them to work in the interest of their co-ethnics
in competition with other ethnic groups (Levine and Campbell, 1972; Brewer and
Campbell, 1976). A combination of ethnocentrism and scarcity may result in ethnic
identities dening salient lines of conict (Brewer, 1999; Green and Seher, 2003;
Posner, 2004). Such conict may manifest itself overtly through practices of exclusion
and outright inter-group ghting. There are also attitudinal manifestations, wherein
masses of individuals perceive their ethnic identity as important, relative to other
possible modes of self-identication, not only as a means of describing oneself, but
also as a likely determinant of one's life prospects and an important marker on which
to condition cooperation (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Chandra, 2006; Eifert et al,
2010; Fearon, 2003).
Brewer (1999:435-436) notes that a heightened sense of threat is likely to man-
ifest itself is stronger expressions of ethnocentrism, and that this pattern has been
documented in a study of ethnic attitudes among groups in South Africa. To the
extent that soldiers perceive ethnic integration as threatening, we should record more
intensely ethnocentric expressions. The contact hypothesis runs in precisely the op-
posite direction: it proposes that recategorization and the fostering of a common
identity will result in our recording of less ethnocentric expressions. The soldiers
studied in this paper provide an excellent test of these competing claims, as it is for
FAB soldiers that quota-based integration represented a status demotion and, thus,
a threat.
I use a set of three yes-or-no survey questions to measure perceptions of ethnic
salience. The questions are as follows:
1. \According to me is it necessary to support ideas of other [respondent's ethnic
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group] even if I do not fully agree with them."
2. \The wellbeing of [respondent's ethnic group] people in Burundi has more to
do with politics than their own hard work."
3. \Things that happen to other [respondent's ethnic group] people in Burundi
has an impact on my life."
\Yes" responses were coded as 1 and \no" responses as 0. I used the responses
to construct a factor score, also based on a two-parameter logistic item response
model.26 Higher scores on the factor correspond to higher perceptions of ethnic
salience. Responses to these scores exhibit missingness for 31 (3%), 57 (5%), and 62
(6%) respondents, respectively, with item missingness on at least one of the variables
for 106 (10%). The missingness rate is low enough such that I simply omit the missing
observations from the analysis. Note that these questions were not included in the
construction of the non-responsiveness score. They were not considered particularly
sensitive, and the low non-response rates attest to that.
Thus, the model that I estimate in this case is given by,
Ethnic saliencei =0 + 1militaryi + 2(agei   45:5) + 3below cutpoint  (agei   45:5)
+ higher order termsi + i;
where again \militaryi" is an endogenous indicator variable for participation in the
new military, \below cutpointi" is used as an excluded instrument for \militaryi," and
(agei 45:5) is centered at the cut-point. I t the model using two-stage least squares.
In this case, the coecient, 1, measures the eect of participation in the military
on ethnic salience. Again, inference is based on the usual frequentist least-squares
principles, with standard errors asymptotically robust to clustering at the level of the
sampling location.
26See fn. 22.
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2.4.6 Examining the cross-validity of the outcome measures
[Figure 2.3 here.]
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between the non-response-based prejudical be-
havior measure and the salience score for subjects with ages within 10-year and 5-year
windows around the cut-point. The upper (red) line in both graphs is the regression
t for subjects in the ethnically discordant interview condition, and the lower (blue)
line is the regression t for subjects in the ethnically concordant condition. A few
things are apparent. First, we do see that predicted marginal relationships are ev-
ident: the non-response proportions rise (albeit slightly) in levels of salience, and
we see that those in the ethnically discordant condition have higher rates of non-
response. The \salience" eect is not signicant at even the 60% level, although the
concordance eect is signicant at the 6% level in the 10-year window, and only at
the 23% level in the 5-year window. Second, were it that the prejudicial behavior and
salience measures were measuring a common underlying trait, we would expect that
the magnitude of the discordance/concordance eect would be larger at higher levels
of salience. This is not evident, as there is no apparent interaction eect (from the
regressions, the interactions are not signicant at even the 90% signicance). Thus,
the ethnic concordance/discordance eects and salience scores are both picking up
on latent sources of reluctance to answer sensitive questions, although in ways that
are partially distinct. This is not as tidy a result as one might want, although it may
be indicative of the complexity of the relationship between latent attitudes, behavior,
and expressed attitudes when it comes to prejudice and ethnic salience.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Eects on prejudicial behavior
[Figure 2.4 here.]
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Figure 2.4 graphs the raw data (jittered to show masses of data) for the non-
response proportions and non-response factor scores in the left column, and then plots
estimates of the eect of ethnic concordance in enumerator-respondent pairs over the
age variable in the right column. The gray areas in the graphs show the region below
the cut-point, demarcated by 0 on the lower axis. These outcomes are \unadjusted" in
that they do not account for the fact that treatment status (whether one is a member
of the military or not) is not determined perfectly by the cut-point. The two-stage
least squares regressions that I discuss below perform that adjustment. The ethnic
concordance eects graphed in the right column of Figure 2.4 were estimated by with
ordinary least squares regressions within each of the 5-year bins demarcated in the
graphs. The dots show the point estimates of the concordance eect, and the bars
show 90% condence intervals from the OLS regressions. The quantity of interest here
is the amount that the ethnic concordance eect varies on either side of the cut-point.
We observe a substantial downward jump in the estimated eect. For those just to
the left of the cut-point, the ethnic concordance of the enumerator-respondent pair
has little or no eect, whereas for those just to the right of the cut-point, concordance
has a substantial eect. In other words, prejudicial behavior is greater among the
latter.
As Imbens and Lemieux (2007) suggest, it is important to examine whether there
are jumps elsewhere in the graph, away from the cut-point. While such jumps do not
invalidate the causal identication strategy per se, signicant jumps elsewhere in the
graph may cast doubt on whether what we see near the cut-point is genuine evidence
of a causal eect. We note that there is a slight deviation in eect size trends for
those in the bin between -10 and -5 years from the cut-point. This deviation is not
nearly as large as the jump at the cut-point, but it does beg for some explanation.
One possibility comes if we return for a moment to Figure 2.2. We note that going
from the [ 10; 5) bin to the [ 5; 0) bin, there is a substantial drop in the proportion
of military versus demobilized, although the drop does not deviate terribly from the
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overall trend. Nonetheless, to the extent that prejudicial behavior is the result of some
interactive relationship between age and demobilization status, we might expect that
the graph of prejudicial behaviors over age to exhibit a curvilinear relationship, given
that dierences between members of the military and demobilized soldiers are being
integrated in dierent proportions. The only other major deviation that we see is
in the highest bin, [10;1], but the noisiness of the estimate for this bin means that
little can be inferred.
To quantify the eects of participation in the integrated military on prejudicial
behavior, I use two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression. The results are displayed
in Table 2.1.27 Because the age variable is centered at the cut-point, the coe-
cient \Military" estimates the local (i.e. at the cut-point) average treatment eect
of participation in the military for respondents in ethnically discordant pairs, the
coecient on \Ethnic concordance" estimates the local average treatment eect of
ethnic concordance for those not in the military, and the coecient on \Military 
Ethnic concordance" estimates the local average moderating eect of being in the
military on the eect of ethnic concordance. It is the latter that we are interested
to test the hypotheses about prejudicial behavior. I present estimates for the raw
non-responsiveness proportions in the rst three columns of estimates, and then for
the non-responsiveness factor score in the last three columns. As discussed above,
the former are easier to interpret, but the latter make more ecient use of the in-
formation. Estimates are given for local linear regressions within a 3-year window
and 5-year window, and a quadratic regression within the 10-year window. For the
latter, the specication search strategy outlined above was used, and no higher order
coecients had p-values less than 0.10.
The contact hypothesis would lead us to expect the that eects of ethnic con-
cordance would be weaker among the members of the integrated military, implying
27Note that the strong rst stage with respect to treatment assignment has already been demon-
strated in the section above on \Treatment denition."
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less prejudicial behavior in the military. The resentment hypothesis would lead us
to expect that the concordance eect would be stronger. The 5-year and 10-year
estimates show that the concordance eect is signicantly less than zero for those not
in the military, indicating measurable prejudicial behavior. However, the coecient
on \Military  Ethnic concordance" eectively cancels out this eect, implying that
among members of the military, ethnic concordance has no eect. For the 5-year and
10-year windows, the p-values on the interaction eect are quite small, suggesting
strong evidence. The 3-year window estimates are extremely noisy, but the point
predictions are quite consistent with the 5-year and 10-year window estimates. Esti-
mates using a triangular kernel also result in very similar point estimates, although
as expected, the p-values are substantially larger. Thus, I nd that the data are
consistent with the expectations of the contact hypothesis: participation in the inte-
grated military is associated with a reduction in the general prevalence of prejudicial
behavior in comparison to those who do not participate.
The estimates in Table 2.1 show that the estimated level of nonresponsiveness
among military participants at the cut-o is substantially lower among those in eth-
nically discordant enumerator-respondent pairs than is the case for their demobilized
counterparts. This may raise concern about other lurking dierences on either side of
the cut-o that may also be confounding the analysis. In order to investigate this, I
examined plots of the non-response proportions and non-responsiveness factor scores
within the 3-year and 5-year bandwidths, and placed over these plots linear regression
ts within the 3-year and 5-year bandwidths. (These are shown in Figure 2.7 in the
Appendix.) What one discovers is that apparent dierences in \baseline" levels of
non-responsiveness are in part due to the fact that the ethnically discordant condition
is being coded as the \baseline" condition. However, if we reverse this coding and set
the ethnically concordant condition as the baseline condition, then the two baselines
do line up quite well. (This is evident in looking at the position of the red regression
lines on either side of the cut-point in Figure 2.7 in the Appendix.) Thus, I re-ran the
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regressions that appear in Table 2.1, but I used \1 eth. conc." as the independent
variable, and adjusted the inverse probability weights appropriately. The results (Ta-
ble 2.5 in the Appendix) were such that the coecient on \military" is considerably
smaller than was the case in Table 2.1, and in no cases is the coecient signicant
at conventional levels. The coecients on the \military X ethn. conc." interaction
term does not change appreciably, and with the exception of the rst column esti-
mate, obtain p-values below 0.10. Thus, the re-coding has us maintain our conclusion
that there is an appreciable moderating eect on the non-response proportion while
also showing that these dierences are not a result of signicantly dierent \baseline"
responses.
2.5.2 Eects on ethnic salience
[Figure 2.5 here.]
Figure 2.5 graphs,in the left panel, the raw data for the ethnic salience factor scores
by age, and then in the right panel average values within the ve-year bins marked
on the graph. Visual inspection of the graphs shows no evidence of a substantial
jump at the cut-point. Rather, what one observes is a rather smoothly increasing
relationship, starting at the [ 5; 0) bin and continuing through the cut-point into
higher age values. We do notice that the slope relating age and ethnic salience is
at for the age range below the cut-point but begins to rise steeply above the cut-
point. This may be indicative of a \suppression eect" among those in the military,
although the causal identication strategy that I am use here does necessary permit
such inference.
Table 2.2 presents TSLS estimates for the eect of participation in the military on
ethnic salience scores, adjusting for the probabilistic nature of treatment assignment
on either side of the cut-point. The coecient on \Military" is our estimate of the
local average treatment eect on the ethnic salience score. There is nothing to suggest
a substantial or signicant eect either way. We do note that the estimates on the
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\Below cutpoint  Age" interaction are suggestive of the dampening eect that we
observed from the graphs, at least for the 3-year and 10-year windows. But again,
the identication strategy does not provide us with anuy special reason to attribute
this to participation in the military per se. It may very well be that had those
participants below the cut-point not participated in the military, that their ethnic
salience scores would have looked the same. Results using a triangular kernel are
very similar, and no conclusions change. While the components of the ethnic salience
score each exhibit low rates of missingness (less than 6% for all three component
variables), in combination they result in a missingness rate of just under 10% for
the salience score. I thus estimated the same models as above, but controlled for
\ethnic concordance," as we know that this is related to missingness. The coecients
change slightly, but the standard errors grow as well, and in no case is the p-value
on the military term less than 0.5. Thus, the evidence with respect to ethnic salience
provides no indication that eects anticipated by either the contact or resentment
hypotheses tend to dominate.
2.5.3 Enumerator xed eects
Chance imbalances in the distribution of particular enumerators or enumerator traits
may confound the analysis if enumerator-specic eects are present. In order to
assess this I re-estimated all of the models above with xed eects included for each
estimator. These estimates will be quite noisy, as xed eects estimation here requires
that we partial out mean values for each of 24 enumerators in rather small samples.
(Results are shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 in the Appendix.) Three of the surveys in the
dataset did not have enumerator identication information entered, and so these were
simply omitted. For the regressions of the prejudicial behavior measures, estimates
become appreciably noisier and the coecient estimates on the \eth.conc." term
and the \military X ethn. conc." interaction term are slightly closer to zero.28 Thus,
28F -tests reject the hypothesis of jointly insignicant xed eects in all models.
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controlling for enumerator xed eects weakens the statistical conclusions drawn from
the unadjusted analysis for the analysis of prejudicial behavior, although it does not
cause us to reverse our conclusion completely. The coecients on the salience scores
change rather erratically for the regression in the \optimal" 4-year bandwidth and
change only slightly for the other two. In none of the cases would we reject the null
at reasonable signicance levels, and so there is no change in our inferences.
2.6 \Placebo" tests using pre-treatment variables
In addition to the checks that we performed above on the behavior of the treatment
variable and the outcome variables, Imbens and Lemieux (2007) recommend conduct-
ing \placebo" tests by analyzing variables that could not possible have been causally
aected by treatment. One wants to do this on pre-treatment variables that have
strong potential to confound were they to exhibit discontinuities near the cut-o. I
located ve such variables in the survey data:
Non-commissioned ocer status Our data consist of rank-and-le and NCOs.
We might imagine that NCOs, being of higher rank, would be more likely to
react with resentment to the integration of \irregular" rebel forces into the new
military.
Years in the military A similar argument as above may be said for those with
more time in the military.
Years of education, pre-war Years of education may be associated with a more
tolerant world view, on the basis that ignorance and intolerance go together.
Alternatively, pre-war education levels are a reliable measure of socio-economic
status prior to integration. It may be that higher socio-economic status is
associated with less tolerance in post-war Burundi, as it is those who were more
privileged before the war that face a greater \threat" from the redistributive
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changes brought about as a result of the war.
Unit death rate Those from units that suered higher death rates may be more
ethnically intolerant, as violence during the war was ethnically colored.
Family death rate The same argument as above may apply for those whose families
suer higher rates of wartime mortality.
Table 2.3 shows the results of these placebo tests on pre-treatment variables. Tests
are shown for the preferred window (5-year) from the analysis above, based on TSLS
regressions using the same specication as used in the analysis of ethnic salience
scores. For none of the variables do we nd compelling evidence of a confounding
discontinuity. Models t to either 3-year or 10-year bandwidths (not shown), with
the latter using higher order terms, do not yield dierent results.
2.7 Alternative interpretations
[Figure 2.6 here.]
The results above show that when we compare those who participated in the
new military versus being demobilized, we see less ethnically prejudicial behavior on
average and no apparent change in expressions of ethnic salience. Relating this to our
discussion above, one may conclude that there is more to recommend the optimistic
\contact" theory about the eects of quota-based ethnic integration over the more
pessimistic theories of hierarchy maintenance or \freezing" of conictual identities.
These results are in line with nding from hundreds of other studies, as reviewed in
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006).
However, as discussed above, this natural experiment is not \clean" in its identi-
cation of the eects of quota-based integration per se. This is depicted in Figure 2.6.
The gure displays graphs of two causal pathways. Graph (i) on the left displays a
causal pathway showing that participation versus demobilization may cause changes
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in other relevant variables that ultimately aect expressions of ethnic prejudice or
salience. It may be that it is these other relevant changes that are important, and
that the pathway that ows through \exposure to integration" is of little importance.
For example, participation in the military may cause exposure to military norms or
training that would mute expressions of prejudice or salience even were there no expo-
sure to integration. Alas, the current data do not allow me to assess this possibility.
Alternatively, demobilization may result in changes to one's material well-being or
psychological state that heighten expressions of prejudice or salience, in which case
our \optimistic" interpretation of the ndings above may be invalid. This is some-
thing that I can study to a certain extent, and I do so below. Graph (ii) on the right
displays an alternative causal pathway. Here, exposure to integration is the primary
thing that determines whether military participants will dier from their demobilized
counterparts in their expressions of ethnic prejudice or salience. It may also be the
case that such exposure aects other outcomes, but this is of no consequence for our
interpretation. If the latter graph accurately characterizes what is actually happen-
ing, then the \optimistic" interpretation of the ndings thus far is valid. The latter
graph entails an \exclusion restriction," whereby there are no pathways circumvent-
ing \exposure to integration" that link participation/demobilization to expressions of
ethnic prejudice or salience. In reality, it is unreasonable to believe that the exclusion
restriction holds exactly. While the discontinuity ensures that exposure to the quota
was not due to self-selection|a hugely important step in narrowing the scope for
confounding|there are certainly other dierences in military versus demobilized life
that have nothing to do with exposure to ethnic integration. The question is whether
these other dierences are of sucient magnitude to overturn the \optimistic" inter-
pretation of the ndings thus far.
The problem is that the data do not allow us to measure exclusion restriction
violations. The situation is very similar to the classic \mediation" problem in statis-
tics, and as Green et al (2010) have demonstrated, isolating exogenous variation in a
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treatment variable (in our case, participation versus demobilization) is not sucient
to identify whether treatment eects operate via one or another causal pathway. The
robust solution to the problem is nothing short of a new study based on exogenous
variation on precisely the factor of interest. In principle, this could be done for the
current analysis, if for example ethnic integration was randomly phased-in, unit by
unit, and one had data on members of both integrated and non-integrated units. But
such is not the case with the data available.29 Thus, I am limited to second-best
tests that merely allow me to assess the plausibility of whether any exclusion viola-
tions are suciently mild as to retain the current interpretation. The tests involve
studying whether there are substantial dierences in other, potentially confounding
post-treatment outcomes around the cut-o. If the evidence shows that there are no
such dierences, then the exclusion violation shown in graph (i) is less plausible, in
that it greatly restricts the range of possibilities for how such an exclusion violation
may occur.30
I test whether there are any changes in subjective or material well-being at the
cut-o. One may propose that those who have been demobilized may now strug-
gle more for subsistence than those who remain in the military. As Brewer (1999)
notes, such vulnerability may translate into a stronger need for in-group solidarity.
To the extent that one views this uncertainty in terms of competition between groups
29This is something I am trying to look into for future research in other post-conict transition
processes.
30As Green et al (2010) show, an estimated average \non-relationship" cannot distinguish between
exclusion and the possibility that heterogenous causal eects still provide for an operative causal
pathway that violates exclusion. For example, suppose that demobilization causes higher income
for some and lower income for others. But, suppose that for those whose income decreases from
demobilization, this negative income shock increases prejudice. In contrast, for those whose income
increases from demobilization, this positive shock increases prejudice. Then, demobilization's average
eect on income may be about zero, but this causal pathway is operative in linking demobilization
to prejudice.
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over scarce resources, this may in turn translate into heightened prejudice toward
out-groups. To assess subjective perceptions, I used responses from the survey to a
question of whether respondents considered their current economic conditions to be
very bad, bad, good, or very good. Given that there were very few responses in either
the very bad or very good categories (about 6% of responses in total), I constructed
a binary variable that distinguished very bad and bad responses from very good and
good responses. I applied the same specication as used above for the analysis of
salience and the placebo checks, except that I also included the \ethnic concordance"
treatment variable in the specication, as there was a non-trivial amount of missing
data (see the summary statistics table in the Appendix). The estimates show no
substantial dierences at the cut-point in these perceptions (Table 2.8 in the Ap-
pendix). I should say, however, that the survey data do contain demobilized soldiers'
responses to a question asking about whether they think things are better or worse
for them as compared to their counterparts who remain in the military. Looking
only at the responses of demobilized soldiers within the window of 45-50 years of age
(within 5 years of the cut-point), 56 out of the 61 demobilized soldiers in this sub-
group indicated \worse" (data were missing for 3 of the respondents), suggesting some
bitterness among this group. This question was only asked of demobilized soldiers,
however, so I cannot use it to construct a test for exclusion restriction violations.
That said, members of the military and demobilized soldiers alike respond frequently
that their current economic conditions are \bad" or \very bad." Limiting the analy-
sis again to respondents within 5-years of the cut-point, 50% of military respondents
indicated that their economic conditions were \bad" or \very bad," while the percent-
age was 58% for demobilized.31 One could chalk up demobilized soldiers' apparent
bitterness about not being the military to general dissatisfaction with their economic
conditions|a dissatisfaction that is also strongly felt among current soldiers.
31A Chi-square test fails to reject the null at 33% signicance.
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To assess possible exclusion violations due to changes in material conditions, I es-
timated changes in the natural log of (self-reported) monthly income at the cut-point,
again using the specication from the analysis of salience and placebo outcomes.32
Income is an interesting outcome to examine, in this case, because there is no reason
to believe that it would be aected by exposure to ethnic integration within the mili-
tary. Thus, any dierences that we measure must be due to income shocks associated
with being demobilized versus remaining in the military. The estimates show no such
shock at the cut-point (Table 2.9 in the Appendix). This is to be expected for reasons
specic to the Burundi case. Demobilized soldiers from the national army in Burundi
were aorded a combination of pension benets and \reintegration" assistance. An
income allowance was provided so as maintain a subsistence level comparable to that
of military members for 2 years after being discharged. In addition, a World Bank
supported reintegration program provided demobilized soldiers with nancial capital,
start-up materials, and training for establishing a civilian livelihood.33
2.8 Conclusion
A crucial issue in political development is why ethnic conict endures and what
actions might be taken to transcend it. It is incumbent upon political scientists
to study policies that might be used to achieve such transcendance. Among the
32The rate of missingness was about 5% overall for the income measure, and so I simply omit
those observations
33Gilligan et al (2010) study the impact of this assistance program on the economic and polit-
ical reintegration of former rebel soldiers. Former national army members qualied for this same
assistance as well as additional perks due from the national army pension scheme. Mvukiyehe et al
(2006), Uvin (2007), and Verwimp and Bundervoet (2008) have demonstrated, from dierent data
sources, that the reintegration benets were quite generous, with demobilized soldiers enjoying a
substantially higher standard of living than their civilian counterparts and at a level comparable to
their military counterparts.
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policy options, ethnic quotas are common features of transitional agreements. Despite
this, little empirical work has been done to measure the eects of such policies on
levels of ethnic conict, although there exists much theorizing about possible eects.
Remarkably, the theories point in two opposite directions, with one group of theories
optimistic about the how quotas may reduce conict, and another pessimistic about
how they may exacerbate conict.
In this study, I take advantage of an interesting natural experiment that arose
in the context of the military integration process in post-war Burundi. The peace
agreement that brought about an end to over a decade of terrible, ethnically charged
violence called for the ethnic integration of the military according to a 50-50 quota.
In practice, this was achieved largely by integrating members of the mostly Hutu
rebel forces with members of the mostly Tutsi national army. The integration process
saw the full mixing of former rebel and national army members into mixed units who
trained, lived, and fought together.
As part of the process, an age cut-o was used to determine eligibility. I use
this cut-o as a source of causal identication for the eects of participation in the
integrated army versus being demobilized. I examine eects on prejudicial behavior
and perceptions of ethnic salience among members of the defunct national army. I
test a hypothesis derived from the literature on \inter-group contact," which suggests
that enhanced contact due to integration should reduce prejudice and ethnic salience,
against theories of \resentment" and \freezing" of conictual identities, which suggest
that integration may increase prejudice and salience. To measure prejudicial behav-
ior, I use an unobtrusive measure based on rates of non-response to ethnically and
politically sensitive questions conditional on the ethnicity of the enumerator relative
to the respondent. To measure salience, I use questions that get at subjects' percep-
tions about whether their ethnic identity is important for conditioning their behavior
and interpreting their life prospects. Using a \fuzzy" regression discontinuity design,
I estimate that participation in the integrated army is associated with less prejudicial
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behavior, consistent with the contact hypothesis. This nding is also consistent with a
large body of research on the eects of \optimal" contact between groups (Pettigrew
and Tropp, 2006). I nd no substantial eects on ethnic salience, suggesting that
the changes in prejudicial behavior may not have to do with the reconceptualization
of one's own identity. To make the case that these estimates capture the eects of
integration per se, I examine whether there is evidence of confounding due to other
possibly important variables near the cut-o. I do not nd evidence of discontinu-
ities in potentially confounding pre-treatment variables at the cut-point. Neither do I
nd evidence that for confounding due to shocks to well-being associated with being
demobilized. I cannot rule out that other features of the experience of being in the
new military may be at work independently of inter-ethnic contact. Nonetheless, my
judgment that this is a large factor in explaining what we see in the evidence is based
on my appreciation that integration and resulting forced inter-ethnic contact are a
dominant factor that distinguishes the experience of former national army members
who participated in the new army as opposed to those who did not.
I hope this study will stimulate greater interest in studying the micro-foundations
of quota-based integration as a strategy to address legacies of exclusion and ethnic
conict. This study only looks at one small piece of a much larger puzzle. Do these
eects endure? To what extent do the local eects that I measure here reverberate so-
cietally? These are questions that future research ought to address. I have also taken
great lengths to explain how the natural experiment in this paper is far from perfect,
but that obvious possible confounders do not seem to taint the analysis. It should be
clear what kinds of situations would allow for a more rened analysis. Institutional in-
tegration processes often unfold in stages. If such a process can be designed such that
these units within an institution are subject to integration in stages in a more or less
random manner, then one may be able to assess the eects of such integration more
cleanly. Researchers should seize on such opportunities. Also, I should clarify that
the research design here does not allow me to study whether quota-based integration
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is more or less eective than other strategies|e.g., strategies that purposefully avoid
using ethnic categories|in reducing ethnic conict. That would require comparison
to cases where these other types of strategies are employed. All I can do here is to
comment on whether presumed micro-eects of reduction or exacerbation of ethnic
conict are manifest in response to exposure to involuntary ethnic integration. In
addition, this paper has attempted to develop an unobtrusive measure of prejudice.
The measure here was improvised during the surveying process, and the approach
could certainly be improved. While I think the measure is credible, clearly more
thought could go into designing questions to produce more reliable variation in non-
response patterns and also to better make use of enumerator identity to stimulate
latent tendencies in respondents. There would seem to be ample room for experimen-
tation, perhaps drawing on results from recent experiments on \race-of-interviewer"
eects.34
As for policy implications, quota-based integration of institutions is a commonly
employed strategy in addressing legacies of ethnic exclusion and ethnic conict. The
appeal of quotas is based on their transparency as well as on the appreciation that
legacies of exclusion may not disappear without quotas or armative action (Fryer
and Loury, 2005; Duo, 2005). Of course, there are principled objections to quotas.
But another important source of objection is the claim that they may have pernicious
eects that exacerbate the very conict that they are ostensibly meant to transcend.
To the extent that the evidence in this paper characterizes more general phenomena,
these ndings weigh against that latter objection.
34For recent contributions, with references to classic studies, see Davis and Silver (2003) and
Krysan and Couper (2003).
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Table 2.1: TSLS regressions of non-response proportions and non-response
factor scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-response proportion Non-response factor score
Military -0.25 -0.11 -0.12 -1.02 -0.81 -0.28
(0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.43) (0.31) (0.25)
MilitaryXeth. conc. 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.66 0.64 0.53
(0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.30) (0.28) (0.18)
Eth. conc. -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.46 -0.49 -0.57
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.17) (0.14)
Age (centered) -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03)
Below cutpointXAge (centered) -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
Age (centered) sq 0.00
(0.00)
Below cutpointXAge (centered) sq -0.00
(0.00)
Constant 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.62 0.47 0.33
(0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.33) (0.27) (0.20)
N 110 160 264 140 160 264
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 3 years, and models (2) and (3)
use 5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively. Model (4) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal
bandwidth of 4 years, and models (5) and (6) use 5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively.
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Table 2.2: TSLS regressions of ethnic salience factor scores
(1) (2) (3)
Salience factor score
Military 0.00 -0.04 -0.14
(0.41) (0.31) (0.16)
Age (centered) 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
Below cutpointXAge (centered) 0.04 0.01 -0.04
(0.10) (0.08) (0.02)
Constant 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.25) (0.20) (0.10)
N 125 142 238
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 4 years, and models (2) and (3) use
5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively.
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Table 2.3: TSLS regressions of pre-treatment (\placebo") variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NCO Military yrs. Pre-war ed. Unit death rt. Family death rt.
Military 0.15 4.48 0.92 -0.06 -0.03
(0.13) (3.57) (0.98) (0.07) (0.10)
Age (centered) 0.03 1.47 0.32 -0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.89) (0.25) (0.01) (0.03)
Below cutpointXAge -0.03 -0.40 -0.25 -0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.91) (0.27) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 0.88 21.75 6.66 0.09 0.17
(0.10) (2.76) (0.67) (0.05) (0.07)
N 138 152 160 143 160
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
All models are t using the 5-year bandwidth.
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Figures
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Figure 2.2: Treatment assignment
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Figure 2.4: Eects on prejudicial behavior (plots of reduced form results
on the raw data)
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Figure 2.5: Eects on expressions of ethnic salience (plots of reduced form
results on the raw data)
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Figure 2.6: Alternative mechanisms relating participation/demobilization


















Graph (i) on the left shows a causal pathway where eects other than exposure to quota-based integra-
tion may aect prejudice or salience. Graph (ii) on the right shows a causal pathway where exposure
to integration is a primary eect of participation, and prejudice, salience, and other relevant changes
follow from that.
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Appendix of Ancillary Tables and Figures
Questions used for non-responsiveness score
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Question id Question
dm26 In 1993, which political party or movement did you support?
dm27 Which political party do you currently support?
cm5 Where you live now, how wealthy are you compared to others?
cm6 …compared to other Hutus?
cm7 …compared to other Tutsis?
cm8 Before the war in your community, how wealthy was your faimly compared to 
others?
cm9 …compared to other Hutus?
cm10 …compared to other Tutsis?
deathroster1 Did anyone in your immediate family die during the war?
pf30 What was the main cause that the CNDD-FDD was fighting for?
pf31 …that the FNL was fighting for?
pf32 …that the FAB was fighting for?
tr3 Did you witness civilians being killed?
tr6 How many members of your family were killed in the war?
tr7 …friends were killed in the war?
uo1 What was the name of your fighting unit?
lb2intara Where did your last combat engagement take place?
re1 How do people in your community look upon former rebels?
re2 …former FAB?
re4 Some people say that former combatants who killed civil populations or who 
raped women should not be accepted in their families in any case and they 
should be punished. Some others say that they should be accepted and what 
happened should be forgotten. A third group says that they could be accepted if 
they beg for forgiveness. Which of the three groups do you support?
cp3 Comparing with the situation before the war, do you think you have more, 
fewer or the same political rights?
cp6 If there are persons who were rich before the war due to ethnical, regional or 
political exclusion, do you think that: [read the two options] 1. The government 
should seize their properties in order to use them for public interests. -- or -- 2. 
The government does not have the right to take those  properties, as is the case 
for any other person?
cp8 Which one of the following statements do you support? 1. The government 
should ensure equal access to higher education as well to government jobs for 
all ethnic groups according to the proportions of the populations in the country -
- or --
2. The government should not consider ethnicity when recruiting for jobs or 
higher education institutions?
qe1 [To enumerator] Did the respondent seem distracted?
qe2 [To enumerator] Was the respondent readily willing to answer questions?
qe3 [To enumerator] Were you uncomfortable with this respondent?
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Summary statistics
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics
Full sample Within 10-yr window Within 5-yr window
(N=1086) (N=264) (N=160)
Variable Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
Hutu 0.17 0.38 1086 0.07 0.25 264 0.07 0.25 160
Age (centered at 45.5) -13.17 7.64 1086 -1.96 4.81 264 -0.35 2.64 160
Non-response proprtn. 0.12 0.09 1086 0.13 0.10 264 0.14 0.12 160
Non-response factor scr. -0.08 0.64 1086 -0.07 0.65 264 0.00 0.67 160
Eth. salience factor scr. 0.02 0.61 980 0.01 0.59 238 0.01 0.59 142
Below cutpoint 0.91 0.28 1086 0.66 0.47 264 0.57 0.50 160
Ethnic conc. 0.65 0.48 1085 0.67 0.47 264 0.68 0.47 160
Military 0.68 0.47 1086 0.60 0.49 264 0.56 0.50 160
NCO 0.72 0.45 1017 0.97 0.18 234 0.99 0.12 138
Military years 12.68 6.82 1074 21.89 7.03 256 24.24 5.59 152
Pre-war ed. 5.83 2.22 1086 7.45 2.22 264 7.40 2.19 160
Unit death rate 0.09 0.14 1002 0.09 0.17 239 0.08 0.16 143
Family death rate 0.12 0.17 1086 0.14 0.17 264 0.15 0.18 160
Economic condns. \bad" 0.50 0.50 946 0.52 0.50 235 0.54 0.50 137
Log monthly income 10.55 0.77 1029 10.57 0.84 248 10.57 0.86 147
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Examining dierences in baseline non-responsiveness levels
CHAPTER 2. DO QUOTAS EXACERBATE OR REDUCE ETHNIC
CONFLICT? MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI'S MILITARY 73
Figure 2.7: Non-response proportions and non-responsiveness factor scores
for subjects in ethnically discordant (D, blue) and concordant (C, red)

































































































































































































































































































































































The red lines are local linear regressions for the subjects in ethnically concordant pairs, the blue lines
are for subjects in the ethnically discordant. The graphs to the left show results within the 3-year
bandwidth window, and the graphs to the right show results in the 5-year bandwidth window. The
points are jittered to show massing on common values.
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Table 2.5: TSLS regressions of non-response proportions and non-response
factor scores, reversing coding of ethnic concordance treatment variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nrprop nrprop nrprop prej prej prej
military -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.30 -0.07 -0.29
(0.22) (0.06) (0.05) (0.56) (0.38) (0.31)
militaryXethdis -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.55 -0.56 -0.40
(0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.32) (0.25) (0.19)
ethdis 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.49 0.54 0.54
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.19) (0.17) (0.13)
age c -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.05 -0.16
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
below cXage c 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.08
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
age csq 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
below cXage csq -0.00 -0.03
(0.00) (0.01)
cons 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.14 -0.06 0.11
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.33) (0.24) (0.22)
N 110 160 264 140 160 264
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 3 years, and models (2) and (3)
use 5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively. Model (4) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal
bandwidth of 4 years, and models (5) and (6) use 5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively.
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TSLS estimates with enumerator xed eects
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Table 2.6: TSLS regressions of non-response proportions and non-response
factor scores, with enumerator xed eects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nrprop nrprop nrprop prej prej prej
military -0.29 -0.12 -0.13 -0.93 -0.61 -0.72
(0.17) (0.07) (0.07) (0.47) (0.35) (0.40)
militaryXethconc 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.52 0.46 0.41
(0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.32) (0.32) (0.18)
ethconc -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.43 -0.59 -0.58
(0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.30) (0.27) (0.17)
age c -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 -0.13
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
below cXage c 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
age csq 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
below cXage csq -0.00 -0.02
(0.00) (0.01)
cons 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.94 0.93 1.00
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.37) (0.37) (0.31)
N 108 157 261 138 157 261
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 3 years, and models (2) and (3)
use 5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively. Model (4) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal
bandwidth of 4 years, and models (5) and (6) use 5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively.
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military 0.29 0.09 -0.18
(0.39) (0.31) (0.15)
age c 0.14 0.09 0.03
(0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
below cXage c -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.03)
cons 0.38 0.41 0.53
(0.32) (0.31) (0.16)
N 123 139 235
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 4 years, and models (2) and (3) use
5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively.
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Assessing the exclusion restriction for eects of quotas
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Table 2.8: TSLS regressions of subjective economic well-being
(1) (2) (3)
ecperbad ecperbad ecperbad
military -0.19 -0.09 -0.06
(0.33) (0.26) (0.16)
age c 0.05 0.08 0.01
(0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
below cXage c -0.12 -0.13 -0.01
(0.09) (0.06) (0.02)
ethconc 0.12 0.19 0.14
(0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
cons 0.40 0.30 0.45
(0.19) (0.15) (0.10)
N 120 137 235
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 4 years, and models (2) and (3) use
5-year and 10-year bandwidths, respectively.
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age c -0.04 -0.09
(0.09) (0.12)









Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Model (1) uses an Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth of 5 years, and model (2) uses a 10-year
bandwidth.
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Chapter 3
Who wants to forgive and forget?
Transitional justice preferences in
post-war Burundi
Summary
Original survey data from Burundi are used to study transitional justice prefer-
ences during a democratic transition to peace after civil war. The study focuses on
preferences toward punishing those who perpetrated human rights violations during
war and pursuing a commonly accepted truth about such violations. The study ac-
complishes three things. First, it employs a specially-devised questioning method to
measure the general extent of support for punishment and truth-seeking, with mini-
mal social desirability bias. It nds that most Burundians take a moderate position
on punishment and truth-seeking, contrary to claims in the advocacy literature. Sec-
ond, it assesses whether support may be motivated by political tendencies, insecurity,
or lack of knowledge. It nds support for all three, although the evidence speaks
most clearly in favor of political motivations. Finally, the study uses a persuasion
experiment to examine how responsive are people to attempts at persuading them
to change their views. The results show that people are not very responsive, and
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that if there is any reaction, it is that people become more resolute in their position.
The results suggest that the international community should proceed with caution
in pursuing transitional justice measures, paying due attention to how transitional
justice interventions may aect hard-won political compromises.
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3.1 Introduction
What informs public support or skepticism toward transitional justice after civil war?
What are the implications for post-conict transitional justice initiatives? To address
these questions, I use original survey data from Burundi. I focus on preferences toward
punishing those who perpetrated human rights violations during war and pursuing a
commonly accepted truth about such violations. I examine what a specially-devised
questioning method that minimizes the potential for social desirability bias reveals
about general levels of support for punishment and truth-seeking. I assess whether
variation in support may be motivated by political tendencies, insecurity, or lack of
knowledge. Finally, I use a persuasion experiment to study how responsive are people
to attempts at persuading them to change their views. Altogether, I nd that support
for punishment and truth-seeking is probably lower than what the advocacy literature
suggests, that political tendencies likely inuence expressions of support, and simple
attempts at persuasion may backre.
Transitional justice mechanisms are the subject of intense debate. Some have sug-
gested that aggressive pursuit of transitional justice via the International Criminal
Court has unduly burdened peace processes in Northern Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo.1 Controversy surrounds the use of amnesties as incentives in
many peace process (Freeman, 2010). In Liberia, controversy surrounds the work of
the national truth commission. When the Commission's work was done, it issued rec-
ommendations that included barring standing president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf from
holding oce again after her current term, causing some to conclude that the Com-
mission had damaged the consensus needed to strengthen the rule of law (Gettleman,
2009). In Burundi, the case under consideration in this paper, there has been con-
siderable controversy too. During the peace process, United Nations representatives,
non-governmental organizations, and representatives of minority-Tutsi-led opposition
1See the discussion in Thom et al (2008).
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parties have debated vigorously with the post-war government led by the former rebel
National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democ-
racy (CNDD-FDD, by their French acronym) over the establishment of a tribunal.
The latter has insisted that a public \pardoning" process precede any tribunal, with
amnesty from the tribunal being oered to those who confess and receive pardon.
International observers favoring tribunals have suggested that the CNDD-FDD has
been self-serving in halting an important step toward overcoming that country's cycle
of Hutu-Tutsi violence. The CNDD-FDD have rebutted such claims, suggesting that
the international community is being manipulated by an opposition of displaced elites
intent on shackling the popular CNDD-FDD.
The transition in Burundi, like many other contemporary transitions, is one in
which belligerent parties ended their ghting under an agreement to put a demo-
cratic process into place. Such processes may fail to produce \genuine" democracies.
Nonetheless, the democratic transition model is the standard that the United Na-
tions, major western donors, and regional organizations (e.g., the European Union
and African Union) have used in assisting recent war-to-peace transitions, for better
or worse (Newman et al, 2009). This study contributes to our working knowledge
on designing such processes, focusing on transitional justice. Arguably, preferences
of citizens ought to inform judgments of how transitional justice measures should be
incorporated. Victims voices may deserve the greatest weight, but opinions from non-
victims also help to obtain a full picture of likely consequences of transitional justice
measures. Consultation with citizens helps to ensure that the appropriate political or
psychological factors are taken into account. Also, it is the citizens, not international
policy-makers, who bear the costs if things go awry (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003).
At the same time, we might question whether a genuine canvassing of public prefer-
ences is possible after civil war. Many people may be under the duress of lingering
fear. Segments of the public may misunderstand what transitional justice processes
entail. If so, then citizens may not be able to express their \real" preferences over
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transitional justice alternatives.
Burundi provides a useful case for studying these questions. The timing of the
study was such that transitional justice questions were still open. No formal pro-
cesses had been established, although there calls to do so. Thus, the study oers a
glimpse at \unadultered" transitional justice preferences in an immediate post-war
context. Burundi is an important case for students of transitions from war to peace.
Structurally, Burundi's Hutu-Tutsi ethnic structure is part of the class of \ranked
ethnic systems" that have provided the setting especially dicult violent conicts
(Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2006). Privilege aorded to segments of the minority
Tutsi and the severe constraints to mobility for majority Hutu provide a ready nar-
rative for ethnic mobilization that has colored Burundi's, and neighboring Rwanda's,
violent post-independence history. Lessons from this case may be applicable to other
contexts facing similar challenges.
I begin with a discussion of theories about why people may prefer punishment
over forgiveness or truth-seeking over \just letting things go" after civil war. I dis-
cuss ndings from the current literature, which consists mainly of surveys meant to
facilitate transitional justice interventions. I explain how these may present a biased
view. I follow by discussing my methodology for minimizing such bias, and I describe
my survey data from Burundi. Next, I present results on general levels of support for
punishment and truth-seeking. I then present ndings on how political tendencies,
insecurity, and lack of knowledge may aect the aggressiveness of demands for pun-
ishment or truth. Following that, I present a persuasion experiment that studied how
responsive subjects' preferences might be to attempts at persuasion. The conclusion
draws out implications and proposes areas for future work.
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3.2 Public expressions of transitional justice pref-
erences
Transitional justice mechanisms are common in post-civil war contexts today, al-
though not ubiquitous (Thoms et al, 2008). A call for such mechanisms, including
calls by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and the International Center for Transitional Justice, accompanies
nearly all current peace processes. This is especially so for transitions based on ne-
gotiated settlements, most of which involve international mediation and assistance.
Transitional justice mechanisms may seek to establish a formally recognized truth
about abuses. They may seek to punish human rights abusers by executing them,
jailing them, or curtailing their rights to hold public oces. Transitional justice
mechanisms vary in the vigor with which they pursue punishment or truth. They
may also include measures for reparation.
Such mechanisms nd theoretical justication in the propositions articulated in
the United Nations (2004) policy document on The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conict and Post-Conict Societies. This is a focal document for inter-
national transitional justice practitioners. Key propositions are as follows. First,
punishment of abusers contributes to a norm of accountability that may prevent fu-
ture abuses and provide a lesson on how scores can be settled through a legal process.
Second, holding the main perpetrators accountable helps to separate them from larger
groups (e.g. ethnic groups) to which they belong, opening space for moderate leaders
to emerge and helping to end inter-group resentments. Third, the establishment of
a formal truth makes legitimate punishment and reparations possible. Fourth, the
establishment of such truth may also have a reconciliatory eect by lessening the
mistrust of the abused about whether their plight will be recognized and creating an
opportunity for forgiveness. Thom et al (2008) and Lie at al (2007) discussed the-
orized eects of transitional justice mechanisms from the social science, psychology,
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and legal literatures.
Pursuing transitional justice involves normative trade-os (Bass, 2001; Kaminski
et al, 2006; Lie at al, 2007; Pankhurst, 1999; Rotberg, 2000; Snyder and Vinjamuri,
2003; Thom et al, 2008). Opportunities to learn the truth may have to be traded o
against opportunities to punish. Opportunities to contribute to norms of account-
ability may have to be traded o against opportunities to get belligerents to buy
into a given peace process. Opportunities to establish common truths may have to
be traded o against risks of exciting tensions. The sources of these trade-os are
clear. The greater the threat of punishment, the less likely will perpetrators compro-
mise positions of power in peace negotiations, and the less likely are perpetrators and
their associates to volunteer important information about what happened. In seeking
a \formal" truth, one may come up against events that are highly ambiguous, and
delineations of perpetrator and victim may be inciting.
In a democratic context, the citizens who hold some claim to justice due to ex-
posure to abuses should expect to have their voices taken into account in managing
these dilemmas. Among this section of the public, though, there are likely to be con-
stituencies for and against the robust punishment or truth-seeking. Making matters
more complicated, there are reasons to suspect that public expressions in favor of
transitional justice processes may not reect privately held beliefs about what is just.
For example, support for punishment and truth-seeking may be based on agendas
to undermine the political standing of those that would be targeted by such mecha-
nisms. The ostensible objectivity of transitional justice processes does not imply that
they are politically neutral in their eects. A conviction of a leader will change the
political balance in a manner the disfavors the group represented by that leader.
Going in the opposite direction, expressed skepticism toward punishment or truth
processes may also be based on things other than justice perceptions. Resignation
of one's \right" to pursue punishment or truth may be due to a sense of duress
due to fear of imminent danger. This tendency may be reinforced by people's sense
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that by voicing demands for transitional justice, they may be creating an unwelcome
disturbance. If so, the lack of demand for transitional justice measures is more the
result of a \spiral of silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1984) or \preference falsication"
(Kuran, 1998) than the expression of true desires. Then, transitional justice ideals
may be worthy, but to be workable they need to be married to a strategy for ensuring
security. Another \illegitimate" reason that someone may not express a demand for
transitional justice could be a lack of understanding about what might be possible
(Sudharshan, 2003). If so, then there is no reason to question transitional justice
ideals per se; rather, there is the need to educate the public more.
Another possibility is that individuals tend to have good reason to prefer not to
pursue punishment or truth. Skepticism may be a \pragmatic" response to \political
realities" (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). Perhaps there are more remote concerns
about reigniting conict|not concerns expressed under duress as much as concerns
expressed under acceptable conditions that are not worth undermining. Or, political
and institutional changes brought about by the war may suciently endow former
victims with a sense of empowerment and rights protection.2 If so, those who were
formerly vulnerable to abuse may prefer to move on. There may even be costs:
pursuing punishment or truth may induce productive members of society to ee. Or,
the ambiguity of past events may be such that the attempts to delineate perpetrators
and victims may be tenuous at best, and may contribute on balance to undermining
cooperation.
In interpreting mass data on public attitudes toward transitional justice, one can-
not necessarily use responses of \for" or \against" as straightforward, context-free
measures of privately held preferences. Some attention to why people express these
positions is in order. If support constituencies are based primarily on motivations of
2Theidon (2006) discovered that a new sense of empowerment motivated a preference for rec-
onciliation and even forgiveness over punishment among communities in Ayaucho in in post-war
Peru.
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gaining political advantage, transitional justice professionals should proceed very cau-
tiously so as to be sure not to inadvertently undermine a hard-won political balance.
Skepticism due to fear or lack of understanding would lead us to propose strategies
for security-enhancement and education in the service of transitional justice ideals.
If such illegitimate sources of skepticism are not plausible, then the onus is on tran-
sitional justice practitioners to justify transitional justice ideals before a skeptical
public. The empirical analysis below examines these propositions.
3.3 Related literature
Social scientists have only recently begun to study public attitudes toward transitional
justice in post-conict settings.3 This is remarkable given the accelerated rise in re-
sources committed to post-conict transitional justice since the early 1990s (Thom
et al, 2008). But it is also quite understandable given the logistical diculty of
sample surveys in post-conict settings. Because of this diculty, nearly all quanti-
tative research in this domain has been done by researchers from a common network
that links United Nations agencies, particularly oces of the United Nations De-
velopment Programme, with non-governmental organizations advocating transitional
justice, including the International Center for Transitional Justice, the BBC World
Trust, Search for Common Ground, and the Human Rights Center at University of
California, Berkeley. Some the research is of very high quality, being submitted to rig-
orous peer review (e.g. Pham et al, 2004). But there is a potential conict of interest:
organizations advocating-for and depending-on the promotion of transitional justice
measures have incentives to paint a picture favorable to such measures. Other work
in this domain includes a survey conducted by the Afghanistan Independent Human
3Complementing the studies on public attitudes is a literature that studies the apparent impact
of transitional justice mechanisms. This literature has been recently reviewed in Thom et al (2008).
Questions about eectiveness are not the subject of this paper.
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Rights Commission (AIHRC, 2005) as part of national consultations on transitional
justice.
Among available studies, only Pham et al (2004) study systematically potential
motivations for taking more or less aggressive positions toward pursuing transitional
justice. Their key explanatory variables of interest are associated with exposure
to wartime traumas. They propose that trauma may reduce one's sense of \self-
ecacy" (Bandura, 1977) and thereby induce people to resign rights to transitional
justice. They propose that this eect is mediated by whether one is psychologically
resilient or succumbs to post-traumatic stress disorder. They nd mixed evidence for
the hypothesis. The other studies provide either basic percentages of respondents'
expression one or another opinion on transitional justice measures, or at most, cross
tabulations based on region, education, victim status, or gender. Table 3.2 summa-
rizes these studies. I report modal response percentages for questions relevant to the
current discussion.
The studies tend to nd support for accountability measures, although the salience
of transitional justice appears to be low: never was the pursuit of justice a priority
over basic needs and development. The nature of the support for \accountability" is
sometimes dicult to discern. In an impressive repeated cross-section study, Pham
et al (2005; 2007) show that respondents in war-aected districts of Northern Uganda
take opinions that would seem to contradict each other. While 66% of 2005 respon-
dents indicated that LRA oenders should be punished, 65% reported that they would
accept amnestied LRA leaders if they were to return home. The percentage of respon-
dents indicating that LRA oenders should be tried dropped to 32% in 2007, likely
due to a perception that the ICC's pursuit of LRA leader Joseph Kony derailed the
peace process (Pham et al, 2007:47). In the other cases, we see more ardent support
for punishment. Responses about truth-seeking tend to be more consistently in favor.
There are a few reasons to be cautious about the ndings of these surveys. First,
we need to be careful about generalizing. The nature of the sample universes dier
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from study to study, with some attempting to represent entire national populations
and others limiting themselves to groups most aected by wartime violence. Second,
none of the studies address in depth the types of motivations discussed above. A few of
the studies report some suggestive ndings. For example, Pham et al (2005) nd that
in Northern Uganda, respondents from non-Acholi war-aected districts were twice
as likely to prefer \peace with trials" over \peace with amnesty" as compared to
those from war-aected Acholi districts. UNDP (2007) nds that in Kosovo, Kosovar
Albanians are twice as likely to support the international tribunal over Kosovar Serbs.
In both of these cases, ethnic markers dene major political cleavages.
Third, the manner in which the issues are posed in the questionnaires may bias
results in favor of pro-transitional justice responses. The questions tend to be posed
in a one-sided \yes" or \no" manner, with respondents typically being asked whether
they would like to have a tribunal, truth commission, or some other mechanism put
in place. Respondents are not asked to choose between options presented in a more
neutral manner. The psychology of survey response suggests that this may be leading.
Survey respondents will respond to cues about what response is desired by those
issuing the survey. Thus, respondents may be inclined to say \yes" for reasons of social
desirability (Converse and Presser, 1986). An interesting exception was in Pham
et al's (2005) study in Northern Uganda, when respondents were given the choice
between favoring \peace with amnesty" or \peace with trials." On that question
responses were nearly split down the middle, with 56% of respondents in Acholi
districts expressing a preference for \peace with amnesty" and only 39% expressing
the same in non-Acholi districts.
Finally, it is hard to say from this research how deeply held are these attitudes
and how responsive they might be to events or persuasion. The Pham et al (2007)
study in Northern Uganda, which updates their 2005 study, suggests that opinions
may be quite responsive to events. Changes in aggregate opinions between the two
surveys could reect reactions to the controversy over Kony and the ICC. It would
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be useful to study such responsiveness more directly.
With survey evidence that I present below, I attempt to overcome a number of
these shortcomings. I use a questioning method designed to minimize social desirabil-
ity bias. I make a focused eort to study the motivations discussed above. Finally,
I use a deliberation experiment to assess the responsiveness of people's attitudes to
attempts to persuade them to change their mind.
[Table3.2 here.]
3.4 Case context
Burundi is a small, impoverished, and land-locked country of approximately 8 million
people (ca. 2010) in central Africa. Like Rwanda to the north, Burundian society is
marked by a caste-like stratication that has historically privileged a Tutsi minority
relative to majority Hutu and a very small third group, the Twa. Like in Rwanda,
Burundians have struggled to escape a conict pitting custodians of this \ranked eth-
nic system" (Horowitz 1985; Lemarchand, 1970) against those ostensibly seeking to
remove barriers to Hutu mobility. The country's history is marked by bouts of geno-
cidal violence and barbarous repression. Most notable are the events of 1972, when
a Hutu insurrection escalated to involve massacres of Tutsis, mostly in the southern
part of the country. This triggered a massive crackdown by the Tutsi-dominated army,
which went beyond restoring order and sought to prevent future uprisings by \decap-
itating" Hutu society. The estimated number killed in that violence|mostly Hutu,
it is thought|is 150,000-200,000, with massive outows of Hutus into neighbouring
Rwanda and Tanzania (United Nations, 1996). The ensuing decades involved increas-
ing concentration of authority in hands of the southern-Tutsi, military elite and short
bouts of insurrectionist violence.
A period of liberalization in the early 1990s led to elections in 1993. These resulted
in the triumph of a party that represented the aspirations of a long-oppressed Hutu
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majority. But under still-mysterious circumstances, members of the southern- and
Tutsi-dominated army led a bungled coup attempt in October 1993 that involved
the assassination of the recently-elected Hutu president. The event triggered massive
violence throughout the country, and the ensuing ferment gave rise to a formidable
rebellion. The ghting between the government and rebel forces was episodic over
the ensuing decade. It touched most of the country, resulting in an estimated 300,000
deaths. Major hostilities ended when the largest rebel group, the CNDD-FDD, signed
onto the peace process in Pretoria in 2003. In the 2005 elections, the CNDD-FDD
won an outright majority of national assembly seats (59% of 118 seats) and communal
councilor posts (55% of 3,225 posts) in the 2005 elections. The CNDD-FDD's political
head, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected to be president. Thus, the war resulted in a
near revolution in the institutionalized political context relative to the pre-war status
quo.
The survey interviews were conducted in Burundi in June-August 2007, two years
after the elections. A small splinter from another rebel faction, the Hutu \libera-
tionist" Front national de liberation - Parti pour la Libration du Peuple Hutu (FNL-
PALIPEHUTU), remained at large, although this did not impede the survey.
At the time of eld work, no formal transitional justice processes had been initi-
ated. The United Nations had put forward considerations for transitional justice in
Burundi as early as 1996 in a special commission report on the 1993 violence (United
Nations, 1996). The commission found reason to believe that organized, genocidal
Hutu-on-Tutsi violence had taken place. The commission also recognized that this
episode was part of a long cycle of violence, and that any measures should take this
into account. With the war raging, there was no possibility of action being taken.
The conversation about truth and justice processes was conned largely to elites in
Burundi's capital and donor capitals. Transitional justice measures entered the dis-
course again during the talks that led to the 2000 Arusha Accords. The Accords
called for establishing a truth commission and a \special chamber" to try those ac-
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cused of genocide. However, the CNDD-FDD were not party to the Accords. When
the CNDD-FDD signed onto the peace process in 2003, its leadership suggested that
questions of truth commissions and special chambers would have to be revisited after
elections. As discussed in the introduction, the issue was subject to ongoing debate
between the CNDD-FDD on one side and the UN and opposition parties on the other.
At the time of eldwork, the issue of whether and how to implement transitional jus-




Questions about transitional justice topics are normatively loaded, and thus likely
to be subject to social desirability biases unless careful attention is paid to minimizing
it. To reduce the potential for such bias, I designed questions and a question-delivery
approach that would create a perception of equal social legitimacy to alternative view-
points. The method has two elements: wording of the choices and gestures that ac-
company the verbal delivery. These elements are shown in Figure 3.1. The wording
of the questions that about preferences for punishment and truth-seeking are at the
bottom of the gure. The punishment question asks the respondent about his or
her preferences over three possibilities: punishing human rights violators, forgiving
them unconditionally, or forgiving them only conditional on their admitting having
done something wrong. Each choice is read as being favored by \some people," cu-
ing the respondent to appreciate that he or she would not be alone in taking any of
the options. To enhance the cue, enumerators were trained to use specic physical
gestures, as shown in Figure 3.1. The gestures allow the respondent to visualize the
dierent groups associated with each respondent. A gestured delivery such as this
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also bears resemblance to everyday conversational practices among Burundians. The
truth-seeking question is slightly dierent in its phrasing. Because truth-seeking in
the Burundi context typically refers to the events of 1993 and 1972, the question asks
about \what happened before the war." The respondent is asked to express a prefer-
ence for learning the truth versus \forgetting" the past. Both of the choices have the
same pre-amble, \In order to achieve peace and reconciliation...", cuing the respon-
dent to see either as a legitimate option for promoting these goals. The question is
delivered with accompanying gestures to cue the existence of two equally legitimate
options. Enumerators were trained extensively on the questioning procedure, includ-
ing the precise wording and the use of gestures. The question design takes seriously
the fact that a survey interview is a scripted social interaction.
Other data used below include demographic and geographic information. This in-
formation was collected in a more straightforward manner, given the non-vulnerability
to social desirability bias.
3.5.2 Persuasion experiment design
[Figure 3.2 here.]
I also embedded in the survey a persuasion experiment associated with the ques-
tion on punishment. The experiment was similar in design to that used by Jackman
and Sniderman (2006) to study the eects of deliberative discussion on attitudes to-
ward labor laws in France. The design of the experiment is displayed in Figure 3.2.
Each respondent was asked the punishment question, as described above. Then, de-
pending on the answer that was given, each respondent was randomly assigned to
receive either a \vacant" or a \content-laden" counterargument. To prevent error in
the implementation of the randomization process, the questionnaires were pre-printed
with either the content-laden or vacant counter-arguments, and then randomly shuf-
ed into the stacks given to the enumerators. Figure 3.2 shows that distributions
are mostly even across the treatment conditions. By random chance, it appears that
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some asymmetry emerged in the shuing of questionnaires for the counter-argument
conditions for choice 3.
In order to measure the possible extent of preference falsication, I sought to mea-
sure the extent to which the counter-arguments would cause respondents to change
their response. Furthermore, in order to assess the possible eectiveness of dier-
ence types of persuasion, I sought to determine whether persuasion would be more
eective in moving people toward more or less aggressive positions. Once the counter-
argument was delivered, the respondent was asked again about what choice he or she
preferred. The vacant counter-argument was the same for all choices. No matter
what choice the respondent gave, the enumerator followed with,
Vacant counter-argument: However this can lead to some diculties.
Then I would like to ask you again. Do you think it is good to (1) punish
them, (2) accept them when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for
forgiveness?
The content-laden counter-arguments were specic to the choices that the respondent
made initially. If the respondent chose option 1, to \punish", then the enumerator
would say,
Content-laden counter-argument 1: But there are people who say that
both sides have committed many crimes during the war, thus it is the
time for people to forgive so that we can progress. So I would like to ask
you again. Do you think it is good to: (1) punish them, (2) accept them
when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?
If the respondent chose option 2, to \forgive" unconditionally, then the enumerator
would say,
Content-laden counter-argument 2:But if we ignore what happened people
could be angry and take revenge. So I would like to ask you again. Do
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you think it is good to: (1) punish them, (2) accept them when they come
back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?
And nally, if the respondent chose option 3, to \forgive" only conditionally, then the
enumerator would say,
Content-laden counter-argument 3:But there are some people who think
that justice is not necessary, while others assert that both sides have
committed many crimes and that it is time for reconciliation. So I would
like to ask you again. Do you think it is good to: (1) punish them, (2)
accept them when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?
The dierent counter-arguments allow us to test the extent to which subjects might be
induced to taking a more or less aggressive position. The vacant counter-arguments
provide a control condition, to ensure that we do not confound persuasion with in-
timidation from merely receiving a counter-argument. To the extent that preference
falsication is taking place in the initial responses, the experiment will help to reveal
whether the falsication is masking more aggressive or more forgiving preferences.
3.5.3 Sample and post-stratication
The data are drawn from the multi-purpose survey of Wartime and Postconict Ex-
periences in Burundi. This survey was designed to serve multiple research purposes,
including studies on the eects of economic conditions on participation in revolt and
the impacts of security sector reform and ex-combatant reintegration programs.4 A
self-weighting sample representative of the population would be most useful for the
goals of the current paper. However, such a sample would not maximize power, for a
given sample size, for the other studies. Thus, the sample that we drew was based on
4Details on the survey and these various studies can be found at
http://www.columbia.edu/cds81/burundisurvey/
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an attempt to manage these trade-os. The sample was drawn from strata consist-
ing of civilians, demobilized combatants, and active members of the security forces.
This paper only looks at respondents from the civilian stratum, excluding any con-
sideration of ex-combatants or current security forces members. The population of
the latter are but a small fraction of the total Burundian population (less than 2%).
Therefore any biases due to their exclusion should be negligible. A key compromise
in our sampling plan was to set a civilian male-to-female sampling ratio of 4 to 1. The
other studies were concerned mostly with those who participated in rebellion or army,
and these were almost exclusively men. Thus, we needed a rich civilian male sample
to use as our comparison group. In the event, due to non-response and random error,
the male-to-female sampling ratio was a bit higher than 4-to-1, as shown in Table 3.3.
Geographically, the sample was chosen through a multistage process. Within each
of Burundi's 17 provinces, half of the province's communes were selected at random.
Communes are Burundi's second tier administrative unit, and they contain between
15,000 to 100,000 individuals (or about 3,000 to 20,000 households). Sample sizes
within each of the communes were determined on the basis of estimated population
sizes (given in the Institut Statistique et des Etudes Economiques du Burundi's 2006
statistical yearbook) as well as considerations of whether that commune oered special
analytical leverage for one or another of the impact studies undertaken as part of the
survey. Each commune in Burundi is further divided into somewhere between 5-30
collines (\hills") of approximately equal population size and containing a few hundred
households each. Within each of the selected communes, we chose as sampling sites
the commune's central colline plus seven other selected at random. Then, enumerators
were guided to position themselves in the middle of the colline, face a randomly pre-
selected compass direction, and to approach for interview respondents nearest to the
line of sight on that compass direction.
[Figure 3.3 here.]
The manner in which commune sample targets were set is a kind of \selecting on
CHAPTER 3. WHO WANTS TO FORGIVE AND FORGET? TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE PREFERENCES IN POST-WAR BURUNDI 99
independent variables." This poses no special problems with respect to bias when
the goal is to test hypotheses based on these independent variables (King, Keohane,
and Verba, 1994). However it does complicate the calculation of population-level de-
scriptive statistics. Some kind of adjustment is needed to correct for the departures
from equal probability sampling. A manner by which this can be done eciently
is weighting. One may derive adjustment weights from the sampling design or by
adjusting to known population distributions (Gelman, 2007). Because our sample is
not tremendously large, and because I was able to obtain good information on demo-
graphic distributions down to the commune level, I prefer to use direct adjustment
to population distributions via post-stratication. The post-strata interact commune
with ethnicity (Hutu or not) and gender.5 The geographic locations of survey respon-
dents is shown in Figure 3, and demographic features of the raw and weighted sample
are shown in Table 3.3.
[Table 3.3 here.]
3.5.4 Data analysis
All estimates are computed using the post-stratication weights described above. I
adjust all variance estimates with stratication at the province level and then clus-
tering at the commune level. The data analysis was conducted using the \svy" suite
in Stata version 11.
5Commune level population numbers for males and females are from the Institut Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques du Burundi's 2006 statistical yearbook. Commune level ethnicity proportions
are from smoothed estimates that use results of our survey, as explained in Samii (Nd.). The weights
were constructed by raking to gender and ethnicity proportions in each commune, using the \survey"
package in R (Lumley, 2010).
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The overall distribution of punishment and truth-seeking preferences is displayed in
Table 3.4. The results suggest considerable moderateness in overall preferences. The
modal expressed preference is for conditional forgiveness combined with a preference
to \forget the past." The two preferences are correlated (p-value, 0.03). This is mostly
with respect to the relationship between truth-seeking and the two less-aggressive
punishment preferences: those who express a preference to seek the truth about
the past are signicantly more likely to express a preference for conditional versus
unconditional forgiveness. The relationship does not carry through to a preference
for unconditional punishment, owing to extreme rarity of expressed preference for the
latter.
The picture that these results imply is dierent than one of mostly staunch sup-
port in the studies reported in Table 3.2. For example, the BBC World Services
Trust/Search for Common Ground (BBCWST/SFCG) survey conducted less than a
year after our survey (see row four of Table 3.2) suggests that 68% of respondents
were recorded as expressing a preference for bringing wrongdoers to trial, and 81%
were recorded as expressing an opinion that a TRC would be entirely or mostly good.
Those questions were asked in a yes/no format, and they did not present a set of
contrasting but equally legitimate options from which to choose. We would expect
that the BBCWST/SFGC survey would generate responses that veer on the side of
exaggerated support, and the results are consistent with that expectation. Of course,
this is only suggestive, as the BBCWST/SFCG questions referred to formal mech-
anisms, and we are comparing results from two separate samples. If anything, it
points to need to investigate the consequences of dierent questioning styles within
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new surveys that are elded.
3.6.1 Assessing motivations
To study potential motivations, I use regressions to approximate the relationships
between transitional justice preferences and proxy measures of political tendencies,
insecurity, and access to information.
As proxies for political tendencies, I use ethnicity, region of origin, and the inter-
action of the two. Before the war, elites allocated resources and opportunities on the
basis of ethnic and regional identity. The Southern provinces were historically privi-
leged in terms ties to ruling elite and access to publicly nanced goods in the pre-war
period (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000:381-384; Jackson, 2000:3; author's own eld
interviews). Generally speaking, Southern Tutsis were the most privileged. Southern
Hutus received some externality benets, but they were nonetheless subject to the
discrimination in schooling and access economic opportunities that Hutus throughout
the country suered. After the war, the ascendant CNDD-FDD has been considered
among Burundians to seek to unravel Tutsi and Southern privilege. The outcome of
the war thus assigns a status of political \losers" to non-Hutus and to those originat-
ing from the Southern provinces. For ethnicity, I use an indicator for whether one
characterizes oneself as non-Hutu, thus being associated with those whose privileges
may be threatened. For region, I use an indicator for whether one's home region is
one the Southern provinces of Bururi, Makamba, or Rutana. The south/non-south
divide cross-cuts ethnicity, at times serving as a line of fracture among the predomi-
nately Hutu rebel groups as well as the Tutsi elite (International Crisis Group, 2000).
I prefer to use these identity markers as measures of political tendencies rather than
endogenous behaviors such as, say, vote choice in the 2005 elections. The identity
markers provide a clear perspective on whether political contestation over rights and
redistribution inform transitional justice preferences.6 In line with the discussion
6Ethnicity and region are highly predictive of whether a respondent indicated that they \sup-
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above about motivations, I expect that both of these indicators should be associated
with more aggressive transitional justice preferences. The reason is that these indi-
cators distinguish those who have lost more as a result of the redistribution of power
that occurred after the war.
My proxies for insecurity include two measures. The rst is an indicator of whether
one experienced wartime victimization in terms of the death of an immediate family
member at the hands of the rebels or the army. The second is an indicator for whether
one's home commune has been host to any major insecurity-related events in the three
years prior to the survey. Such events are based on reports of violence associated with
banditry, ongoing rebel activity, and state human rights abuses from 2004-2007.7 I
use pre-war home commune, rather than commune of residence at the time of eld-
work, to address relocation due to either insecurity or economic opportunities. For
those living in their home commune (about 77%), this measure captures the possibil-
ity that one faces local insecurity but is somehow means constrained in one's ability
to relocate. For those who have relocated, this measure captures the fact that one
may not be able to return home because of ongoing insecurity. To use a measure
based on insecurity in one's current commune of residence would greatly understate
the level of current insecurity. My expectations for these variables are mixed. On
the one hand, victimization status is expected to increase one's desire to seek either
truth or punitive measures. On the other hand, on-going insecurity is expected to
ported" the victorious CNDD-FDD in the survey. (Asking about vote choice directly was deemed too
sensitive given the context, and so we only asked about which party the respondent supported.) For
non-Southern Hutu, approximately 67% are estimated to support the CNDD-FDD. Among South-
ern Hutu, the estimate drops to about 55%, although the dierence is not statistically signicant
at the .10 level. For non-Southern and Southern non-Hutu, the estimated percentages are 21% and
37%, respectively.
7The events data were compiled from Burundian and international news
sources as part of the Wartime and Post-Conict Experiences in Burundi project
(www.columbia.edu/cds81/burundisurvey/).
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have a \chilling eect", suppressing one's willingness to express one's preference for
punishment or truth-seeking. Thus, I include both indicators as well as their inter-
action. The chilling eect hypothesis suggests that the interaction coecient should
be negative. In addition, a further implication of the political motivations hypothe-
sis is that victimization by rebels should have a stronger association with aggressive
preferences than victimization by the army.
Finally, as a proxy for one's knowledge of what transitional justice processes may
entail, I use indicators for whether one's highest level of education is above primary
school. The expectation here is that more education should be associated with more
awareness about the possibilities for transitional justice measures, which may trans-
late into more aggressive preferences. Summary statistics for all variables are in the
appendix.
Regression specications account for the causal ordering of explanatory factors.
For example, since ethnicity is determined at birth, one should measure the \eect"
of ethnicity with a specication that excludes post-birth variables to avoid \post-
treatment bias" (King and Zeng, 2006).8 Ethnicity is then included in specications
that measure the eects of post-birth variables (e.g., education), in order to reduce
possible spuriousness. A similar logic is applied in specifying and interpreting all of
the regression models. The appropriate coecient to interpret substantively for each
variable is the rst one that appears as one goes from left to right in the regression
tables.
I use ordered logistic regression for the punishment question, with outcomes or-
dered from (1) unconditional forgiveness to (3) unconditional punishment. I use a
binary logistic regression for the truth-seeking question, with \seeking the truth"
8There is a methodological debate over whether immutable traits like ethnicity can be analyzed
in terms of \causal eects" (see, e.g., Morgan and Winship, 2007). Ethnicity is used here as a proxy
for political tendencies, which are manipulable if one may redene the conditions of privilege or
deprivation associated with identity.
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coded as 1 and \forgetting" as 0. The regression estimates use the survey weights
and variance corrections accounting for stratication and clustering. This is obser-
vational data and some of the variables are endogenous to unmeasured conditions.
Thus, the results only suggest causal interpretations, rather than providing clearly
identied estimates of causal eects.
[Tables 3.5 and 3.6 here.]
The regression estimates are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. I report odds ratios
for ease of interpretation. Odds ratios equal to 1 imply no relationship, larger than
1 imply more aggressive demands for punishment and truth, and between 0 and 1
imply less aggressive demands.
The \political motivations" hypothesis proposes that those who are non-Hutu and
originating from a Southern province would have more aggressive preferences, and
that victims of rebel violence would have more aggressive preference than of army
violence. Again, the logic here is that ethnic and regional identity dominate politi-
cians' and their followers' claims for how economic and political resources should be
allocated, due to the legacies of Hutu and non-Southern exclusion in Burundi. Army
victims are expected to have less aggressive preferences because post-war political
gains by the former rebel parties has provided political redress. The evidence on de-
mands for punishment are somewhat consistent with these expectations. Non-Hutu
identity is associated with about 61% higher odds of choosing a more aggressive posi-
tion on punishment, although contrary to expectations those with non-Hutu identity
originating from the South have about 50% lower odds of choosing a more aggres-
sive position. With respect to victimization, we see that victimization by rebels is
associated with 90% higher odds of expressing a more aggressive preference, whereas
there is no association with victimization by the army. With respect to truth-seeking,
non-Hutu identity is associated with 86% higher odds of expressing a preference for
truth-seeking, and being from a Southern province is associated with 59% higher odds,
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although the latter is estimated very imprecisely (p-value, 0.20). An unexpected pat-
tern emerges with respect to victimization, however, in that rebel victimization is
actually associated with 54% lower odds of expressing a preference for truth-seeking;
the opposite is true for army victimization, although this too is estimated very impre-
cisely. Further investigation suggests that this may be an exception that proves the
rule: I t another regression (not shown) including interaction terms between non-
Hutu identity and the two victimization variables. The thought was that the negative
relationship was due to self-suppression of demands for truth among Hutu victims of
rebel violence. The estimates show that this may be the case: the interaction term
coecient almost precisely canceled out the coecient on the rebel victimization co-
ecient, indicating that it is almost exclusively among Hutu victims of rebel violence
that the negative relationship is manifest. Army victimization is estimated to be as-
sociated with 37% higher odds of expressing a preference for truth-seeking, although
this is imprecise (p-value, 0.33). Finally, I t models (not shown) that included all
the specications as in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, but also included an indicator variable
for whether the respondent indicated that they \supported" the victorious CNDD-
FDD party. Those who indicated as such had about 30% lower odds of choosing
an aggressive position on punishment and about 30% lower odds of preferring truth.
These results correspond to the political motivations hypothesis. However, the statis-
tical signicance of these associations dropped considerably when the non-Hutu and
Southern region indicators were included, indicating high collinearity and also, in my
opinion, the primacy of political identities. Thus, the bulk of the evidence is con-
sistent with a version of the political motivations hypothesis emphasizing ethnicity,
That is, preferences for transitional justice measures appear to be based on whether
such measures constrain those pursuing political agendas that disfavor one's identity
group relative to helping those pursuing agendas that favor one's identity group. In
Burundi, ethnic identity dominates this calculation.
The \insecurity" hypothesis proposes that on-going insecurity in one's home com-
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munity is likely to suppress \rightful" demands for punishment and truth via a chilling
eect on conict victims. The evidence on this is mixed. With respect to preferences
for punishment, I estimate that conditional on being a victim of rebel violence, insecu-
rity suppresses the preference for truth-seeking by about 50%, although the estimate
is highly imprecise. This chilling eect is more precisely estimated for truth-seeking:
conditional on being a victim of rebel violence, insecurity reduces the odds of express-
ing a demand for truth by about 30%. Such eects are not evident with respect to
army victimization: preferences for both punishment and truth-seeking are estimated
to be higher for army victims facing insecurity. Thus, we nd that the evidence is
consistent with this hypothesis only for the subset of individuals having been exposed
to victimization by rebels. Those for whom this combination of conditions apply con-
stitute only an estimated 7% (s.e., 2) of the population under study. Thus, while
the insecurity motivation is a possibly important reason for non-aggressiveness at the
individual level, it cannot explain much of the overall non-aggressiveness that I have
recorded.
The \knowledge" hypothesis proposes that aggressive of transitional justice de-
mands should be increasing in education. This hypothesis receives no support with
respect to punishment: the odds ratio is almost exactly one. However, it receives
strong support with respect to truth-seeking: those with greater than primary educa-
tion have more than double (2.33) the odds expressing a preference for truth-seeking.
The nding may reect the fact that transitional justice is not all or nothing: indi-
viduals may prefer a process that seeks truth but not necessarily punishment.9
9The CNDD-FDD support indicator was also collinear with the higher education variable, al-
though when the support indicator was included, results did not change appreciably for the coe-
cient on the higher education variable.
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3.6.2 Persuasion experiment
The persuasion experiment studies (1) how responsive are people in general to counter-
arguments and (2) whether attempts at persuasion are more eective in pushing in-
dividuals toward more aggressive or less aggressive stances. The latter is especially
important given the political nature of transitional justice interventions. In a demo-
cratic context, those who stand to lose politically from the advance of transitional
justice mechanisms would likely try to persuade the public to resign demands for
punishment or truth-seeking.10 On the other hand, principled advocates of transi-
tional justice processes, along with those who stand to gain politically, would pose
arguments persuading people to support more aggressive positions.
[Table 3.7 here.]
The persuasion experiment was limited to preferences for punishment. Survey-
weighted results are presented in Table 3.7. The tables show row proportions|that
is, proportions choosing any one of the three preference options under the vacant and
content-laden counter-argument conditions. Outcome tables for each of the subgroups
is displayed separately. Recall respondents rst placed themselves into a subgroup
through their initial response to the punishment question. Then, respondents were
randomly assigned to receive either the vacant or content-laden counter-argument.
Overall, attempts at persuasion were usually unsuccessful. Responses remain stable
at least 75% of the time across the groups and treatment conditions. Surprisingly, the
eect of the content-laden counter-arguments were to make those who took positions
at the extreme ends of the choice spectrum more resolved to maintain their position.
This is evident among those who initially express a preference for unconditional for-
giveness: whereas under the control condition, responses remain the same 77% of the
10As discussed in the context section above, this has been the case in Burundi, where the dominant
and former insurgent CNDD-FDD party has issued statements suggesting that the priority should
be in promoting \pardon" rather than looking into the abuses that occurred during wartime.
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time, the rate increases to 83% under the persuasion condition. The dierence is
even greater for those whose initial response is unconditional punishment: the rate
at which people maintain their initial response goes from 75% in the control condi-
tion to 88% in the treatment condition. However, in the latter case we must note
that the subgroup sample is quite small. For those taking the moderate \conditional
forgiveness" position, the dierences are negligible.
Thus, expressed preferences are not so responsive to attempts to change them. In
assessing whether persuasion tends to work more in moving people toward more or
less aggressive positions, it would seem that it slightly favors aggressive positions, but
not because of persuasion eects. Rather, the bias in favor of aggressive positions is
due to an eect of making people more resolute in maintaining an aggressive position.
The implication is that simple attempts at persuasion may backre, possibility con-
tributing to polarization. Any attempt at a deliberation or sensitization intervention
should be sensitive to such possibilities.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper accomplishes three tasks. First, it uses a questioning method that tries
to minimize social desirability bias in eliciting expressed preferences over transitional
justice options. The results were as expected: expressed preferences were less aggres-
sively in favor of punishment and truth-seeking than has been found in a number of
recent surveys. Of course, this does not provide denitive evidence of bias in past
surveys. Doing so would require randomly assigning dierent questioning methods in
the context of one survey, and doing this on numerous populations. This ought to be
the subject of further work for transitional justice survey researchers. Nonetheless,
the results from this study raise the question of whether the apparently ardent sup-
port for transitional justice interventions suggested by recent surveys are an artifact
of the questioning method.
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Second, I tested propositions about whether dierences in people's expressed pref-
erences for transitional justice options are motivated by dierences in political tenden-
cies, levels of insecurity, or levels of knowledge. I nd some degree of support for each
of these propositions, although the political tendencies hypothesis is most strongly
corroborated, particularly with reference to the role of ethnic identity in Burundi's
post-war politics. The knowledge proposition nds support only with reference to
truth-seeking.
Third, I used an experiment embedded in the survey to study whether expressed
preferences were responsive to a simple attempt persuasion. For the most part, it
seems not. There was little switching of expressed preferences, and the only clear
eects was to make more resolved those who take more extreme positions|whether
in favor unconditional pardon or unconditional punishment.
These ndings suggest that transitional justice interventions ought to be pur-
sued with considerable caution. Gauging support for transitional justice interven-
tions should use methods that aim to elicit preferences with minimal bias. Such has
not been the case thus far, in my opinion. Those advocating for transitional justice
processes should be deeply aware of how support for such interventions may be based
on political calculations as much as principled justice considerations. On the basis of
this study, the inuence of political calculations appears to apply to both victims and
non-victims alike. Given the evidence for the political tendencies hypothesis, those
assessing transitional justice needs should also proceed with caution in collecting in-
formation on the human rights violations. If the collection of such data is known to
anticipate the establishment of punitive mechanisms, then the types of political cal-
culations considered here may aect who comes forward to register abuses. Finally,
attempts at persuasion have the potential to backre, making people more resolute
rather than more willing to entertain alternatives. More work should be done on
this phenomenon to ensure that deliberation and sensitization interventions do not
contribute to polarization.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Wgtd. Meana S.D. Possible values N
Punishment: 1,2,3 1162
i. Uncond forgive 0.36b 0.34b
ii. Cond forgive 0.56b 0.60b
iii. Uncond punish 0.07b 0.05b
Seek truth 0.39 0.31 0.49 0,1 1155
Non-Hutu 0.29 0.26 0.45 0,1 1169
Southern 0.19 0.15 0.39 0,1 1169
Non-Hutu X Southern 0.05 0.0 0.22 0,1 1169
Higher ed. 0.31 0.29 0.46 0,1 1169
Victim. Reb. 0.22 0.26 0.42 0,1 1169
Victim. FAB 0.24 0.23 0.43 0,1 1169
Insecurity 0.28 0.26 0.45 0,1 1169
InsecurityXVictim. Reb. 0.06 0.07 0.24 0,1 1169
InsecurityXVictim. FAB 0.09 0.09 0.29 0,1 1169
aMean with survey weights applied.
bProportions for the punishment preference variable.
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Table 3.2: Mass surveys on transitional justice attitudes
Authors Pub. Location Pop. Research Sample Sampling Percent stating
year year size method justice top priority General accontability Punishment Truth
AIHRC 2005 Afghanistan Adults 
nationwide
2004 4,151 Enumerator discretion in 
designated locations with preset 
criteria
4% say rule of law is top 
priority.
49%: justice means legal punishment.
76%: justice very important.
76%: punishment of war criminals contributes 
to security.
28%: only serious offenders and commanders 
should be tried.
61%: reject amnesty of war criminals.
95%: important to establish record of truth.





2007 Liberia Adults in 8 of of 
15 counties
2007 1,600 Villages/towns selected to 
reflect diversity, particularly 
ethnic diversity. Households 
selected by enumerators quasi-
randomly within villages/towns. 
Stratification by gender.
29% mention access to 
courts as one among a 
number of priorities.
92%: recall human rights abuses during 
wartime.
50%: resondents who could recall abuses 
thought that abusers should go to trial.
60%: commanders or faction leaders should be 
tried.
42%: of those aware of TRC thought it should 
use amnesty power.
44%: of those aware of TRC thought it should 
not use prosecutorial power.
79%: aware of TRC.
56%: of those aware of TRC think its 
contribution to reconciliation good or excellent.
46%: of those aware of TRC think its 
contribution to truth has been good or 
excellent.
36%: of those aware of TRC think its 





2008 Burundi Adults in 10 out 
of 17provinces
2008 1,648 Communities selected to reflect 
diversity.  Households selected 
by enumerator quasi-randomly 
within communities. Stratified 
by age group.
19% mention trying human 
rights offenders and 11% 
mention establishing truth 
as one among a number of 
priorities.
36%: Justice means fair treatment. 68%: wrongdoers should be brought to trial.
48%: aware of proposals for special court.
68%: aware of proposal for TRC.
81%: think TRC wold be entirely or mostly 
good.




2004 Rwanda Adults in 4 of 
154 communes
2002 2,091 Communities selected to reflect 
diversity.  Respondents selected 
randomly within communes.











2005 2,585 Districts selected based on high 
conflict exposure, and ethnic 
and language diversity.  IDP 
camps and other sites stratified 
by urbanness selected in 
districts. Respondents selected 
randomly within sites/camps.
Less that 1% saying justice 
is a concern over other 
development/security 
priorities.
31%: justice means trials.
76%: LRA human rights abusers should be 
held accountable.
76%: UPDF human rights abusers should be 
held accountable.
58%: lower level LRA offenders should not be 
held accountable.
66%: LRA rights offenders should be tried and 
punished.
51%: UPDF rights offenders should be tried 
and punished.
53-80%: rights offenders should have amnesty.
65%: accept amnestied LRA leaders if they 
returned home.
79%: sccept amnestied low level LRA if they 
returned home.
56%: Require amnestied LRA to apologize for 
forgiveness
56% vs. 39%: peace with amnesty preferred to 
peace with trials, in Acholi vs. non-Acholi 
districts.










2007 2,875 Districts selected based on high 
conflict exposure, and ethnic 
and language diversity.  IDP 
camps and other sites stratified 
by urbanness selected in 
districts. Respondents selected 
randomly within sites/camps.
3% say justice is top 
priority.
41%: justice is being fair
33%: prevent future comflict by pardoning 
LRA leaders
70%: important to hold human rights offenders 
accountable
50%: hold LRA leaders accountable
48%: hold all LRA accountable
40%: hold government accountable
18%: hold UPDF accountable.
32%: LRA rights offenders should be tried and 
punished.
55%: UPDF rights offenders should be tried 
and punished.
59%:agree important to have trials for LRA 
leaders
34%:important to have trials for lower 
rankinng LRA
78%: lower level LRA should be pardoned
80%: peace with amnesty preferred to peace 
with trials.
95%: establish written record.
90%: establish truth commission.
UNDP 2007 Kosovo Adults in 2007 1,250 Stratification on demographic, 
geographic, and ethnic features. 
Individual selection method 
unclear.
36-70%: satisfaction with ICTY for K-Serbs 
vs. Kalbanians
90%: punishment of perpetrators crucial 
element of justice
86-83%: believe establishing trust is important 
for K-Albanians vs K-Serbs
Vinck et 
al
2008 Eastern DRC Adults in areas 
most affected by 
war: Ituri, North 
Kivu, and South 
Kivu districts.
2007 2,620 Communities and individuals 
randomly selected.
3% say justice is top 
priority.
85%: important to hold offenders accountable.
82%: acountability necessary to secure peace.
51%: justice means establishing truth.
69%: war criminals should be punished.
38%: foot soldiers should be treated the same 
as leaders.
88%: important to know the truth about what 
happened.
56% - 24%: establish truth via judiciary vs. 
truth commission.
Modal responses to questions about TJ processes
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Table 3.3: Demographic characteristics of sample








Highest level of education
Primary not completed 43% 46%
Primary 37% 35%
Junior secondary 11% 11%
Senior secondary 7% 7%
University+ 2% 1%
Sample total: 1,169 civilians
Note: The male-female ratio was by design. Refer to the text.
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Seek truth about past 7% 22% 2% 31%
(1) (2) (1) (3)
 
Forget the past 28% 39% 3% 69%
(3) (3) (1) (3)
 
Total 34% 60% 5%
(3) (3) (1)          
Cell proportions displayed.
N = 1151
Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Rao-Scott F , 3.97; p-value, 0.03.
Note: The data contained missing values for seven respondents on the punishment question and 14
respondents on the truth question. These were simply omitted.
CHAPTER 3. WHO WANTS TO FORGIVE AND FORGET? TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE PREFERENCES IN POST-WAR BURUNDI 120
Table 3.5: Ordered logistic regression of preference for punishment, odds
ratio estimates
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-Hutu OR 1.61 2.00 1.95 1.69 1.60
(s.e.) (0.41) (0.55) (0.53) (0.45) (0.43)
p-val 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.09
Southern OR 1.01 1.02 0.94 0.91
province (s.e.) (0.29) (0.29) (0.25) (0.25)
p-val 0.95 0.95 0.81 0.74
Non-Hutu OR 0.26 0.25 0.3 0.31
X (s.e.) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23)
South. p-val 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.13
Higher OR 1.09 1.05 1.09
education (s.e.) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31)
p-val 0.76 0.86 0.78
Rebel OR 1.89 2.27
victimization (s.e.) (0.49) (0.67)
p-val 0.02 0.01
Army OR 1.04 0.9







Rebel vict. p-val 0.34
Insecurity OR 1.59
X (s.e.) (0.89)
Army vict. p-val 0.41
N 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162
Global F-test p-val. 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.17
Note: \OR" refers to \odds ratio." Standard errors are on the odds ratio scale, accounting for
stratication at the province level and clustering at the commune level. The data contained missing
values for seven respondents. These were omitted.
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Table 3.6: Logistic regression of preference for truth-seeking, odds ratio
estimates
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-Hutu OR 1.86 1.87 1.53 2.10 1.94
(s.e.) (.47) (.54) (.45) (.64) (0.56)
p-val 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.03
Southern OR 1.59 1.66 1.95 1.93
province (s.e.) (0.58) (.63) (.71) (0.74)
p-val 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.09
Non-Hutu OR 1.03 0.88 0.68 0.70
X (s.e.) (.53) (.46) (.32) (0.35)
South. p-val 0.95 0.81 0.42 0.47
Higher OR 2.33 2.47 2.55
education (s.e.) (.60) (.63) (0.63)
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rebel OR 0.46 0.61
victimization (s.e.) (.13) (0.21)
p-val 0.01 0.16
Army OR 1.37 1.20







Rebel vict. p-val 0.06
Insecurity OR 1.11
X (s.e.) (0.71)
Army vict. p-val 0.87
N 1155 1155 1155 1155 1155
Global F-test p-val. 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: \OR" refers to \odds ratio." Standard errors are on the odds ratio scale, accounting for
stratication at the province level and clustering at the commune level. The data contained missing
values for seven respondents. These were simply omitted.
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Vacant counter-argument 76.7% 18.7% 4.6%
(4.6) (3.9) (4.4)
 
Content-laden counter-argument 83.1% 16.8% 0.1%
(4.0) (4.0) (0.1)
 
Total 79.9% 17.8% 2.4%
(3.3) (3.0) (2.2)
Row proportions displayed.
Subgroup N  = 404
Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses.







Vacant counter-argument 6.5% 88.1% 5.4%
(2.9) (3.7) (2.6)
 
Content-laden counter-argument 9.4% 84.1% 6.5%
(2.9) (3.8) (2.8)
 
Total 7.9% 86.1% 6.0%
(2.1) (3.0) (2.4)
Row proportions displayed.
Subgroup N = 664
Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses.







Vacant counter-argument 0.3% 24.5% 75.2%
(0.3) (11.7) (11.7)
 
Content-laden counter-argument 0.0% 2.4% 97.7%
(0.0) (1.7) (1.7)
 
Total 0.1% 12.2% 87.7%
(0.1) (5.8) (5.9)
Row proportions displayed.
Subgroup N  = 78
Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Rao-Scott F , 10.20; p-value, 0.00
Initial response: Unconditional forgiveness
Initial response: Conditional forgiveness
Initial response: Unconditional punishment
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Figure 3.1: Gestures accompanying question delivery
1 2 3 4
Punishment question:
Gesture 1. Some people say that former combatants who killed civilians or raped women should not
be accepted in their home communities in any case and they should be punished [choice 1].
Gesture 2. Some other people say that they should be accepted and what happened should be forgotten
[choice 2].
Gesture 3. A third group says that they could be accepted if they beg for forgiveness [choice 3].
Gesture 4. Which one of the three groups do you support?
Truth-seeking question:
Of the following options, which is close to your point of view?
Gesture 1: In order to achieve peace and reconciliation, it is necessary to know the truth about what
happened before the war [choice 1].
Gesture 2: In order to achieve peace and reconciliation, it is good to forget about the past [choice
2].
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Figure 3.2: Persuasion experiment design and treatment group sizes
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Chapter 4




We use original survey data, collected in Burundi in the summer of 2007, to show
that a World Bank ex-combatant reintegration program implemented after Burundi's
civil war caused signicant economic reintegration for its beneciaries but that this
economic reintegration did not translate into greater political and social reintegration.
Previous studies of reintegration programs have found them to be ineective, but these
studies have suered from selection bias: only ex-combatants who self selected into
those programs were studied. We avoid such bias with a quasi-experimental research
design made possible by an exogenous bureaucratic failure in the implementation of
program. One of the World Bank's implementing partners delayed implementation
by almost a year due to an unforeseen contract dispute. As a result, roughly a third
of ex-combatants had their program benets withheld for reasons unrelated to their
reintegration prospects. We conducted our survey during this period, constructing a
control group from those unfortunate ex-combatants whose benets were withheld.
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We nd that the program provided a signicant income boost, resulting in a 20 to 35
percentage point reduction in poverty incidence among ex-combatants. We also nd
moderate improvement in ex-combatants' livelihood prospects. However, these eco-
nomic eects do not seem to have caused greater political integration. While we nd
a modest increase in the propensity to report that civilian life is preferable to combat-
ant life, we nd no evidence that the program contributed to more satisfaction with
the peace process or a more positive disposition toward current government institu-
tions. Reintegration programs are central in current peace processes and considerable
resources are devoted to them. Thus, our evidence has important policy implications.
While we nd strong evidence for the eectiveness in terms of economic reintegration,
our results challenge theories stating that short-run economic conditions are a major
determinant of ones disposition toward society and the state. Social and political
integration of ex-combatants likely requires much more than individually-targeted
economic assistance.
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4.1 Introduction
Are post-conict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs eective
in achieving their programmatic aims of economic rehabilitation? Does such economic
assistance make ex-combatant beneciaries more likely to reintegrate politically and
socially? We address these questions, exploiting quasi-experimental evidence from
an ex-combatant reintegration program implemented in Burundi after the 1993-2004
civil war.
These questions are important for policy and for the study of transitions from war
to peace. Post-conict DDR programs have become key features of most peace agree-
ments that end civil wars.1 According to the 2006 Uppsala Peace Agreement dataset,
36% of peace agreements struck in 1989-1999 period contained DDR provisions, while
in 2000-2005, the percentage rose to 59%.2 DDR programs are typically carried out
alongside economic reconstruction, refugee repatriation, and democratization. All of
these \peacebuilding" interventions aim to address the root causes of conict and
reduce the likelihood of another war (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Cousens et al, 2001; Paris,
2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). DDR programs are usually implemented under the
direction of international actors, especially the United Nations (UN) and the World
Bank. DDR programs encompass a set of activities designed to lay the foundation of
stable and self-sustaining peace. These activities entail the discharge of a large num-
ber of combatants who must be disarmed and reintegrated into civilian life (Walter
2001; Fortna 2008).
1Not all DDR take place in the framework of peace agreements. In several cases, like Rwanda
and Ethiopia, DDR was undertaken after the military defeat of one side. In Colombia, DDR was
launched while the civil war was ongoing. Some DDR programs take place as part of army reform
processes, such as those that followed World War II and the Cold War (Kingma and Pauwels 2000).
This paper focuses on internationally-sponsored DDR in post-conict settings.
2The Uppsala Peace Agreement dataset is available online at
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/.
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The disarmament and demobilization of former combatants|the rst two com-
ponents of DDR|take place before the reintegration phase in order to create secu-
rity conditions and trust necessary for implementing peace agreements (Spear 2002).
Disarmament and demobilization are a prerequisite for the roll-out of recovery and
development activities (Kumar 1997; Rubin et al. 2003; Feil 2004). A goal follow-
ing disarmament and demobilization is for ex-combatants to nd a livelihood and
submit to laws and norms that govern civilian society. The fear is that demobilized
combatants may have diculty in nding a productive position in the legal civilian
economy and may maintain an oppositional stance toward society and government.
Such marginalization may increase the propensity to engage in crime or even renewed
organized violence. As Alden (2002) remarks, \the spectre of former military person-
nel in criminal networks in the Balkans and Russia, the outbreak of violence inspired
by real and self-proclaimed war veterans in Zimbabwe, and the participation of for-
mer security force members from Eastern Europe and South Africa in mercenaries
in war-torn Angola and the Congo serve to underscore the destabilizing role played
by former combatants who remain outside of the economy and society as a whole."
Spear (2006) argues that among post-conict interventions, reintegration is the most
directly \linked to establishing a lasting peace" (emphasis in the original)|a con-
clusion echoed by Cavallo's (2008) argument that eective reintegration of former
combatants is a \sine qua non" for the consolidation of peace.
By providing a range of economic benets, reintegration programs try to make
civilian life more attractive to ex-combatants and thus reduce the risk of political
disorder. The presumption is that the former combatants cannot or will not achieve
productive civilian livelihoods automatically. This might be due to economic barri-
ers, such as lack of access to productive resources or a soft labor market, as well as
social factors, such as an oppositional disposition from the ex-combatants themselves
or discrimination by others. Reintegration programs usually include (i) short-term
measures such as the provision of cash assistance or in-kind material benets to ad-
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dress the immediate needs of former combatants and their dependents upon leaving
armed groups; and (ii) longer-term measures such as vocational training, skill devel-
opment and counseling, which aim to reintegrate former combatants into the social
and economic structures of society (Colletta et al. 1996; Bryden et al.2005; Muggah
2009). The literature that informs the design of current reintegration programs tends
to presume that ex-rebels form a class that, on average, exhibits material, human, and
social capital deciencies. If these deciencies are not attended to, the presumption
is that they would signicantly limit ex-combatants' ability to establish themselves
economically. making them susceptible to recruitment into armed groups or crim-
inality. That is, with few opportunities to establish a productive livelihood in the
legal civilian sector, ex-combatants will face diculties in releasing their conict-era
identities and may nd it dicult to resist the lure of using coercion and promotion of
instability to satisfy their material and psychological needs. Sometimes program de-
signers may appreciate that ex-combatants are no more vulnerable than their civilian
counterparts, but that they need extra incentives to be steered from the temptations
of banditry and extortion|activities that their combatant experience has trained
them to do. Finally, in some contexts (e.g. where rebels have won control of the gov-
ernment), reintegration assistance is justied as necessary for honoring the sacrices
of combatants who were not integrated into a new armed forces.
We continue below by discussing ndings from related literature. We then discuss
in more detail outcomes of interest and hypotheses pertaining to reintegration pro-
grams. We describe the context of rebel reintegration in Burundi after the 1993-2004
civil war, and explain the shock to program access that we exploit to measure program
eects. We describe the methods that we use to identify eects of the program|or
more correctly, eects of the non-availability of the program|and then present our
estimates of eects on economic and political reintegration. We discuss these results
and then conclude with suggestions for further research.
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4.2 Related literature
Despite the importance of reintegration programs, there have been few attempts to
measure their eectiveness. Some macro-level studies exist, particularly studies eval-
uating the reintegration programming of major international institutions like United
Nations agencies and the World Bank, and they typically focus on program perfor-
mance and outputs.3 There are several descriptive studies that focus on the practical
challenges that fraught the implementation of reintegration programs,4 a growing
critical literature that questions the assumptions that underpin these programs,5 as
well as numerous qualitative studies that oer detailed accounts of beneciaries' per-
spectives.6 While useful, these studies do not measure the benets of reintegration
programs in a manner necessary for assessing their gross value relative to the costs.
These costs include diverting resources from others in need. In addition, reintegration
programs are often understood as unjustiably \rewarding" former combatants for
engaging in violence.7
Two recent studies have tried to measure the benets of reintegration programs,
using large scale surveys of ex-combatants. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) in-
vestigate the eects of a UN-sponsored DDR program in Sierra Leone. They used
propensity score matching on ex-combatants who did and did not enroll or com-
plete the program. For both types of participation, these comparisons yielded ef-
fect estimates centered on zero for economic reintegration and political reintegration.
These authors qualify their results by stating that \no evidence of an eect" is not
3See, for example, Colletta et al (1996) and the studies contributed to the Government of Sweden's
Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (2006).
4 See Kingma (1997); UNDP, 2000; Alden (2002); Paes (2005); Baare (2006) and Specker (2008).
5See Pouligny (2004); Muggah (2005) and Jennings (2008).
6See Jennings (2007), Soderstrom (2010), and Uvin (2007).
7The introduction to Muggah (2009) summarizes the on-going debate among policy-makers and
academics about the utility of reintegration programs as currently designed.
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necessarily \evidence of no eect." Nonetheless, the ndings from this study have
raised questions about whether reintegration programs accomplish anything. Pugel
(2009) conducted a similar study among ex-combatants in Liberia. Using a regres-
sion analysis to control for background characteristics, Pugel found that those who
had completed the UN reintegration program were signicantly more likely to have a
\livelihood-producing activity," although no statistically signicant eects were ev-
ident for ex-combatants' likelihood of earning an income above the poverty line or
\exhibiting spending patterns indicative of excess earning capacity."8 Pugel found no
signicant eects associated with other forms of participation in the program. In a
re-analysis of Pugel's data using adjustment techniques similar to those of Humphreys
and Weinstein (2007), Levely (2010) found no eects of registration into the reintegra-
tion program on income (condence intervals were centered near zero), but he found
some indication that enrollment and completion of the program increased income (on
the order of a 10% increase), although among the many estimates he computed, most
of the 95% condence intervals overlapped with zero. These ndings raise questions
about whether reintegration programs, as currently designed, are eective in achiev-
ing the immediate goal of economic reintegration, much less the downstream goal of
political reintegration.
As the authors themselves admit, these studies cannot be denitive on the eec-
tiveness of reintegration programs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, much less in general,
because of the weak possibilities that they oer for identifying causal eects. The
weakness is by no fault of the authors, but rather by the nature of the programs.
The material benets oered by such programs makes the incentive to participate
very strong, meaning that those who do not participate are likely to dier in impor-
tant ways from those who do. In Sierra Leone, for example, rates of enrollment in the
UN-sponsored reintegration program at the time of Humphreys and Weinstein's eld-
work were around 90 percent (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007), in which case the
8Pugel (2009) only presents the signs and statistical signicance of his estimates.
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non-participants used to construct a pseudo \control group" are likely to be a highly
self-selected group. In Liberia, the rates of enrollment at the time of Pugel's eld-
work were lower|about 25%|but Pugel himself indicates that such enrollment was
voluntary. If self-selection is the main reason for variation in treatment assignment,
then even among subjects matched on observed covariates, there is strong reason to
remain concerned about bias due to unobserved prognostic factors associated with
program take-up.9
Sekhon (2009) argues persuasively that adjustment methods, such as matching or
regression, should be tied nonetheless to a discontinuity or exogenous shock to make
the causal story persuasive. A convincing causal interpretation of an adjusted esti-
mated requires that we can explain how two individuals who share similar observable
traits may dier in their program status for reasons that will not bias the analysis.
The clearer we can be about the source of such exogenous variation, the more con-
vincing the interpretation. In the absence of some random shock to program access,
identifying impacts of reintegration programs is a task that requires more assump-
tions than most people would be comfortable to make. In this paper we exploit such
a shock, which occurred during the reintegration program in Burundi. This allows us
to measure reintegration program eects with minimal taint from self-selection bias.
4.3 General hypotheses about reintegration pro-
grams
The United Nations denes reintegration as \the process which allows ex-combatants
and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life"
(United Nations, 2000). Reintegration is critical in peace processes because it links
\the more immediate requirements of disarmament and demobilization to the long-
9DiNardo and Lee (2010) discuss conditions under which matching can even exacerbate self-
selection bias.
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term imperatives of social and economic welfare" (Bryden et al.2005) and because it
is the set of activities that facilitate eective conversion from combatant to civilian
life. Eective conversion to civilian life is achieved not only when former combatants
are able to establish peaceful and sustainable livelihoods (\economic reintegration"),
but also when they longer see violence as a legitimate means to seek political or
personal gain and they submit to the laws and norms of civilian society (\politi-
cal reintegration"; World Bank, 2002; United Nations, 2000; Pouligny 2004; IDDRS
2010).10 The ability to establish good working relations with one's community or
family (\social reintegration") is often taken to be an important moderator of an ex-
combatant's economic and political reintegration prospects. The typical causal model
posited in reintegration program documentation is economic reintegration! political
reintegration, with family- and community-level social reintegration moderating the
process. Reintegration programs typically emphasize economic reintegration as their
main programmatic objective, but political reintegration is usually the ultimate goal.
Reintegration programs may also include reconciliation interventions that attempt
to facilitate social reintegration, but these are usually secondary. Political reintegra-
tion is not directly targeted but presumed to follow from the boost that a program
provides to social and economic reintegration. In this way, the programmatic eco-
nomic reintegration eects are presumed to have down-stream political reintegration
eects.11
The emphasis on enhancing ex-combatants' economic welfare draws in part on the
research program on the political economy of conict (Collier and Hoer 2004; World
10Rackley (2007) argues that donors have the mistaken idea that \as soon as you get guns out of
their hands, they are suddenly innocuous human beings again, but that is not the case at all" (cited
in Hanson 2007). To complete the conversion process, as Rackley discusses, former combatants must
be provided with an economic alternative to living by the gun.
11This implicit \theory" of reintegration is well articulated in World Bank (2004a), which layed
the foundation for recent reintegration programming in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda.
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Bank, 2002; 2004a; Spear, 2006). In its 2003 report entitled Breaking the Conict
Trap, the largest sponsor of reintegration programs, the World Bank, claimed that
\a structured DDR process, which demobilizes combatants in stages and emphasizes
their ability to reintegrate into society, may reduce the risk of ex-combatants turning
to violent crime or joining rebel groups in order to survive" (emphasis added). Ex-
combatants may lack human and social capital endowments necessary to establish
themselves in the peaceful economic sector.12 These deciencies may result from
characteristics that set apart those who decided to participate in ghting, or they
may be consequences of soldiering itself. Ex-combatants may face acute shortages of
material capital. Time spent away soldiering may have caused an ex-combatant to
have had his or her land taken over by someone else; or, time spent soldiering may have
made it dicult for the person to acquire land in the rst place. These deciencies
may put ex-combatants at an economic disadvantage and make them more likely to
shirk the law in nding ways to support themselves. This suggestion is consistent with
ndings from Collier's (1994) research on demobilization and reintegration of former
soldiers in Uganda.13 Some combatants may have joined armed groups because the
economic opportunity costs associated with doing so were low. Thus, as Spear (2006)
notes \an emphasis on [economic reintegration] recognizes that some of the motives
for ghting were economic and that if the economic dimensions of the problem are
12For broad-brush reviews on possible sources of vulnerability among ex-combatants, see Annan
and Patel (2009) and Tajima (2009).
13Some analysts suggest that the problem of postwar reintegration is not so much that ex-
combatants have human and social capital deciencies, but rather that the local economies they
reintegrate into have very few economic opportunities available for them. For instance, speaking
of the economic reintegration challenges faced by ex-combatants in Mozambique, McMullin (2004)
notes \post-conict states with impoverished economies oer little to reintegrate into. Mozambique,
where only a tenth of the population had formal employment, was not exception, giving rise to quip:
`the government told us \now you are all equally poor. You have been reintegrated back into basic
poverty" (emphasis in original).
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not addressed, any settlement of the conict may be short-lived." The absence of law
and order in conict situations may provide combatants with opportunities to enrich
themselves through illicit means, including robbery, racketeering and smuggling (Reno
1997). Ending the war is tantamount to giving up these opportunities. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that some combatants make these calculations. During the DDR
process in Liberia, a member of the armed group, Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy (LURD) told a reporter, \I still have my 81-mm mortar, but I just
come to see whether the UN was giving ghters who disarm something good, If they
don't give good money, I will not give the rocket" (Agence France Press, 8 December
2003; cited in Spear 2006). Finally, grievances over lack of access to opportunities may
have motivated a willingness to challenge the state. Providing opportunities in the
legal economy may remove this motivation and, as a result, an anti-state orientation.
In our empirical analysis we test two interrelated hypotheses:
Programmatic hypothesis The rst hypothesis is that reintegration programs sub-
stantially improve the economic welfare of ex-combatants, as they are program-
matically designed to do.
Downstream hypothesis The second hypothesis is that by improving economic
welfare, reintegration programs substantially increase ex-combatants' willingness
to respect the rule of law and adopt an orientation that favors societal stability.
This paper investigates these hypotheses with quasi-experimental evidence in Bu-
rundi. We look at the extent to which the reintegration program achieved its prox-
imate aims of improving income and livelihood outcomes. We then look at whether
the programs achieved its downstream aims of increasing ex-combatants' satisfaction
with civilian life relative to combatant life, inducing a more positive orientation to-
ward the peace agreement, and inducing a more positive orientation toward stable
government institutions.
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4.4 The Burundi context
We focus on the reintegration of adult (18 years old or more) male former rebel com-
batants in Burundi. Members of the national army were also demobilized and oered
reintegration assistance, but we do not study them. The reintegration experience of
former army members is likely to be quite dierent than for former rebels. Being an
army soldier is a legal, well dened career. Demobilization and reintegration support
is well institutionalized: certain members of the national army had access to a system
of pension-type benets that were separate to those put in place by the internation-
ally assisted reintegration program. The legality and institutionalized nature of an
army career implies that there are fewer questions about demobilized army soldiers'
\place in society." For these reasons, we do not think it is warranted to lump the
two subgroups together. We choose to focus on reintegration of former rebels, which
we believe to be of utmost interest to reintegration program designers. We focus on
men only because we think women's experiences are likely to be distinct, but our
sample of women is too small to study them adequately. Finally, we focus on former
rebels who were aged 18 years or older as of eldwork in 2007. Some of them were
recruited before adulthood,14 but they were all adults at the time of their demobiliza-
tion, which could have been up to 3 years prior to eldwork. Ex-combatants under 18
were treated by a dierent (UNICEF-managed) reintegration program than adults,
in which case outcomes associated with them would not necessarily be comparable to
those above the age cut-o.15
14The youngest ex-rebel in our sample is 19, and the years of recruitment for our respondents was
between 1993 and 2003.
15Such a strict age cut-o creates an opportunity for a possibly well-identied examination of the
benets of programming for those just under 18 relative to those just over 18. This is something that
could be pursued in further work. Those under 18 received considerably more support relative to
their counterparts over 18 in mending relations with family and community members. Thus, there
is a ripe opportunity for studying the impacts on social reintegration and the downstream benets
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4.4.1 Background to the reintegration program
The DDR program in Burundi was initiated following a 2003-4 ceasere that drew
into the peace process the largest rebel group in the country, the National Council
for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy, or CNDD-FDD
by its French acronym. At the time of our eldwork in 2007, one rather small rebel
faction|the Agathon Rwasa faction of the National Forces for Liberation, or FNL by
their French acronym|remained outside the peace process. The war had begun in
1993 in aftermath of a tumultuous attempt at democratization. Elections in 1993 had
resulted in the triumph of a party that represented the aspirations of a long-oppressed
Hutu majority. Under still-mysterious circumstances, members of the southern- and
Tutsi-dominated army led a failed coup attempt in October 1993; the coup attempt
nonetheless involved the assassination of the recently-elected president. The event
triggered massive violence throughout the country. The ensuing ferment gave way to
outright civil war. The war had a devastating impact on the tiny, landlocked central-
African country. Fighting touched most of the country. It resulted in deaths estimated
at approximately 300,000 out of a total population of 6-8 million. Burundi's pre-war
socio-economic development levels were already among the world's lowest, although
for its income level, the country did have relatively well-developed infrastructure and
institutions. The war severely stalled development for over a decade, resulting for
example in an estimated 20% decline in real GDP over 1993-2002 (World Bank 2004,
p. 6).
The outcome of the war and ensuing political developments are important features
of the environment into which ex-rebels were reintegrating. The war resulted in a
peace accord between the government and the CNDD-FDD that called for elections.
Signicantly, the 2005 elections resulted in the CNDD-FDD winning an outright
majority of national assembly seats (59% of 118 seats) and communal councilor posts
(55% of 3,225 posts). This gave the party the strength necessary to elect its political
of social reintegration on economic and political reintegration.
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head, Pierre Nkurunziza, to be president. As such, the outcome of the war brought
about a near revolution in the institutionalized political context relative to before the
war. As of 2005, the former rebels were elected to lead. Contrast this to outcomes
in the other countries where reintegration has been studied: in Sierra Leone, the
party of former rebels, the Revolutionary United Front Party, managed barely 2% of
votes, failing to win a single seat in the 2002 elections that punctuated the end of
the war. In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army is still an illegal organization, never
having had its popular legitimacy tested. Though the number of cases is too small
to test the claim rigorously, there is good reason to believe that conditions causing
rebel parties to fair well electorally are associated with reintegration prospects of
demobilized rebels. These considerations should be taken into account when trying
to generalize the ndings from this paper.
The 2000 Arusha Accords called for DDR, and these Accords set the parameters
of the 2003 Pretoria agreement, which brought the CNDD-FDD into the peace pro-
cess and set the stage for the 2005 elections. A February 2004 World Bank report
set specic DDR targets; a November 2004 Joint Operations Plan (JOP), which was
approved by a committee that included all key national and international agencies,
made these targets ocial (World Bank 2004; Republic of Burundi 2004; Bosho and
Vrey 2006, p. 15). The MDRP and national implementing agencies designed a pro-
gram that was intended to demobilize and reintegrate enough combatants to achieve
a new army (Forces de Defense Nationale) of 25,000 and police force of 20,000.16 The
16The original project proposal set a demobilization target of 55,000 combatants. However, this
target appears to have been an error: the size of the various forces prior to demobilization was
estimated to be about 80,000. The target army plus police force size was 45,000. If no new recruit-
ment was to take place, somewhere around 35,000 would need to be demobilized. Recruitment into
the new armed forces was to take place, but no where near the 20,000 that would make the 55,000
number realistic. The actual number demobilized as of June 2007 (the time of eldwork) was about
23,000; to date, the total is about 28,000, about half the 55,000 target proposed in 2004 This error
is acknowledged in World Bank (2009).
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World Bank's estimates for the sizes of the various forces is shown in Table 4.1. Both
members of the national army and the rebel groups would be demobilized. DDR
would occur in two phases, with the rst phase (2004-5) involving 9,000 former rebels
and 5,000 former army. Those not demobilized in the rst phase would then join an
interim integrated national army and police. Over the ensuing years, some 41,000 ad-
ditional combatants from the newly integrated security forces were to be demobilized
as part of a broader army and police reform program.
The DDR program in Burundi was part of the broader Multi-Country Demo-
bilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)17, which was intended to embody a
comprehensive strategy to \enhance prospects for stabilization and recovery in the
region." The program documentation for the MDRP's programs reected a strong
presumption that demobilized combatants would likely suer human and social capi-
tal decits that would have to be remedied, otherwise \disaected ex-combatants can
pose a threat to stability." The MDRP characterized economic reintegration as the
establishment of \sustainable livelihoods." Assistance was to do no more than would
be \necessary to help them attain the general standard of living of the communities
into which they reintegrate" (19). Social reintegration, in the form \reconciliation"
between ex-combatants and civilians in their communities, was taken to be an im-
portant pre-condition for achieving a sustainable livelihood. The program took an
\individual-oriented" approach|one that emphasized providing means to individ-
ual ex-combatants, as opposed to trying to do much at the level of communities;
this orientation was apparently due to an implicit agreement that would have other
agencies|namely UNDP|taking responsibility for community reconstruction.
17Participating countries included Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
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4.4.2 The \treatment": reintegration program benets
The reintegration program included a few components. The CNDRR directly ad-
ministered a reinsertion subsistence allowance of between 30,000 to 185,000 Burun-
dian Francs per month (FBu, with 500 FBu equivalent to 1 US 2007 dollar in PPP
terms), depending on rank.18 This assistance was provided over in 4 tranches over 18
months. Documentation from the program shows that at the time of our eldwork in
2007, receipt of at least the rst tranche was nearly universal among ex-combatants
(98.5%).19 Also, through oces set up in nearly all provinces and through \focal
points" appointed in nearly all communes,20 ex-combatants had access to various
forms of counseling, including psychological counseling. These too were universally
available. Thus, reinsertion allowances and counseling are not sources of variation in
our study.
The source of variation that we study was the major benet oered by the pro-
gram: the so-called \socio-economic reintegration package." The package provided a
menu of opportunities from which ex-combatants could choose. They could choose
to be admitted into secondary school or university, to take up a one-year or shorter
vocational-training program, or to take up a package to help begin \income-generating
activities." The latter would involve working with one of the reintegration program's
18The benets schedule was as follows: 31,446 FBU/month for infantry, 59,712 FBu/month for
non-commissioned ocers, 62,527 FBu/month for junior commissioned ocers, 101,252 FBu/month
for senior commissioned ocers, and 184,754 FBu for top brass (CNDRR, 2005).
19Interestingly, the allowance was administered through transfers to special bank accounts for ex-
combatants, giving many ex-combatants their rst exposure to bureaucracy and the formal banking
sector. Interviews in the eld revealed that some ex-combatants applied what they learned through
this by oering for-prot services to help other people deal with banks and government oces.
20Communes are the second-tier administrative units in Burundi, after provinces. A commune is
a collection of villages and communities similar to a \county" in the western world. If we exclude
the dense urban capital of Bujumbura, communes range in size from 15,000 to 100,000 individuals
(or about 3,000 to 20,000 households).
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implementing partners to devise a business plan, receiving basic training on running
a business, and being provided with in-kind start-up materials for the new business
(cash was not given). Regardless of the program chosen, the total value of benets
was to be 600,000 FBu or less. Program documentation shows that the \income-
generating activities" option was by far the most popular among the ex-combatants
that were online to receive benets at the time of eldwork in 2007: out of the just
over 13,000 ex-combatants online to have received benets by 2007, 96% took up
the income-generating activities option, 3.6% took up vocational training, and less
than 1% chose to resume formal education (MDRP, 2007). The income-generating
activities assistance would often take the form of starting a small shop, a \moto-taxi"
business, or buying agricultural assets to produce marketable farm goods. Thus, the
600,000 FBu in benets would cover the cost of business counseling, any required
permits, and the acquisition of materials, such materials to build a shop or kiosk,
goods to sell, a motor-bike, a cow, or agricultural tools.
4.4.3 The source of exogenous variation: a disruption in ac-
cess
The CNDRR and MDRP delegated the delivery of the socio-economic reintegration
package benets to NGO partners. Early in the program, when the number of bene-
ciaries processed and ready to receive benets was rather small, a large and rather
disorganized collection of local NGOs was contracted on an ad hoc basis to deliver
benets. In 2006, anticipating a surge in the number of ex-combatants who would
be coming online to receive benets, the MDRP decided to tighten up the system
and contracted three large NGOs to deal with the coming wave of ex-combatants.
These included Twitezimbere, a Burundian NGO, as well as PADCO and Africare,
two international NGOs. The work was divided evenly among the three NGOs.
PADCO was assigned to cover ex-combatants registered as residents in the south-
west provinces, Twitezimbere was to cover ex-combatants registered as residents in
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the northern provinces, and Africare was to cover ex-combatants registered as res-
idents in the center provinces. The assignments to the three NGOs were made by
the end of the summer in 2006, and programming was to begin as soon as possible.
The selection of Africare as one of the three partners was due to pressure by MDRP
donors to use international NGOs as implementing partners; the pressure was due
to certain procurement restrictions, it seems. This was the case despite the program
administrators' and the CNDRR's concerns about the readiness of Africare to im-
plement the program.21 Indeed, it came to be a major problem: while PADCO and
Twitezimbere were able to begin quite quickly, Africare's presence on the ground
was barely established by late 2006.22 This was followed by a contracting dispute
between CNDRR and Africare that caused further delays. As a result, designated
beneciaries in the Africare area were denied access to the reintegration package un-
til late 2007. This disruption in program access corresponded to the timing of our
eldwork: PADCO and Twitezimbere had begun reintegration programming by late
2006, whereas the problems with Africare's commencement of delivery would not be
resolved until August 2007. Our eldwork was conducted in June/July 2007. Thus,
the respondents in our sample from the PADCO/Twitezimbere areas had access to
reintegration programming, but those from the Africare areas did not, or at best,
were only just beginning to have access. So long as any other dierences between
sample respondents from \center" areas and other areas can be controlled for, this
bureaucratic breakdown provides us with a source of near-exogenous variation in pro-
gram access. Such is the cornerstone of our strategy for identifying the eects of the
reintegration program.
21Interview with Marcelo Fabre, MDRP, February 2009.
22Geenen (2007) notes that Africare had no presence on the ground in the area of her eldwork,
Ruyigi, in November-December 2006, and that they expressed concerns themselves about whether
they could implement the program.
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4.5 Causal identication
Two majors concern in the study of assistance programs such that is one are self-
selection by beneciaries into the program and targeting of beneciaries by program
managers. Self-selection and targeting are typically based on would-be beneciaries'
and program managers' predictions about how much beneciaries will gain by par-
ticipating. The conditions that inform such judgments are hidden to the analyst.
When program access is universal, non-participants will tend to be those who would
have little to gain from the program. Comparisons between those who had access
and participated to those who had access but decided not to participate will tend to
produce biased estimates of program eects. The bias is likely to be in the direction
of the null hypothesis.
In our case, we avoid the problems of self-selection and targeting because we have
a disruption in program access that had nothing to do with either beneciaries' or
program managers' choices. In the Burundi reintegration program, the disruption
in program access was due to an idiosyncratic failure at a high level in the bureau-
cratic process. The arbitrariness of the disruption relative to the conditions of the
beneciaries considerably reduces the scope for bias due to self-selection or targeting.
Nonetheless, we cannot take this shock to program access as an unproblematic
source of quasi-random assignment at the individual level. First, there may have been
incidental imbalances in the characteristics of ex-combatants in the Africare versus
non-Africare regions prior to the disruption to access. Also, there may have been
dierences in the types of communities in which would-be beneciaries resided in the
Africare and non-Africare regions. To reduce biases from these possible imbalances,
we use covariate information to identify individuals in the non-Africare regions that
resemble those in the Africare region in terms of their individual characteristics and
the communities into which they are reintegrating.
Second, the disruption in program access occurred after some ex-combatants in
the Africare region had already received a reintegration package during a preliminary
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phase of the program. An early cycle of the reintegration program was completed
prior the decision to hand operations over to Africare and, therefore, prior to the
disruption. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to identify these individuals,
although documentation from the program itself provides the true rate at which this
occurred. The rest of the section explains our strategy for identifying causal eects
in the face of these possible sources of bias.
4.5.1 Incidental imbalance
Because the shock to program access occurred at the region level (rather than the
individual level), incidental imbalances in the attributes of ex-combatants and the
types of home communities in the Africare and non-Africare regions threaten the
validity of causal inferences drawn from comparing the two groups. In the analysis
below, we study such possibilities by conducting balance checks on a rather large
set of pre-disruption covariates. We nd moderate to poor balance in covariates,
as would be expected. Nonetheless, we have more than double the number of non-
Africare recipients to Africare recipients. This creates the opportunity to construct a
matched set of non-Africare respondents to use as a pseudo control group. To do this,
we use a matching algorithm, GenMatch (Sekhon, n.d.; Diamond and Sekhon, 2005),
to match Africare and non-Africare ex-combatants on fourteen covariates likely to be
prognostic of economic and political outcomes. GenMatch uses an iterative \genetic
search" which rst species a modied Mahalonbis distance function, nds nearest
neighbors, and then modies the distance function to maximize covariate balance
between treated and control units. For the balance metric, it uses the smallest p-value
from t-tests (for binary variables) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (for polytomous or
continuous variables) of dierences in distribution between treatment and control
covariates. The process loops until it converges on a balance solution that cannot
be improved-upon within tolerance limits. Many such loops are initiated, and the
most balanced result is chosen. We match \with replacement," which means that
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we nd the best match for each Africare subject even if that means using the same
non-Africare subject more than once. This approach achieves the best covariate
balance. Using these matched data, we estimate program eects by with a regression
on an indicator for residence in the Africare region as well as all fourteen of the
covariates used for matching. The inclusion of the covariates helps to reduce bias due
to imperfect matching, while the matching helps to ensure that the model specication
that we use for the covariates is of little import (Ho et al, 2007).
Given the rather modest sample size (less then 400 ex-rebel observations), match-
ing achieves remarkably good balance on this large set of covariates. We cannot
control for region-wide dierences that distinguish the Africare region from the non-
Africare region (i.e. region-wide \xed eects"), as they would coincide perfectly with
our shock to program access. An identifying assumption that we make is that once
the incidental individual-level and community-level dierences have been accounted
for in our sample, there are no remaining region-wide dierences. We think this is a
reasonable assumption given the richness of our covariate set.
4.5.2 Exposure heterogeneity
The disruption in program access in the Africare region occurred after some rein-
tegration programming had already begun. A subset of excombatants came online
to receive reintegration assistance early in the program cycle (shortly after 2004).
To prevent a large backlog from forming, the CNDRR commissioned a collection of
small NGOs to begin administering reintegration packages at around the beginning
of 2005. In the spring and summer of 2006, the CNDRR anticipated a large surge of
ex-combatants coming online to receive assistance, and it was at this time that the
program was centralized and contracts with the three major NGOs|Twitezimbere,
PADCO, and Africare|were struck to handle the surge in cases.
Table 4.3 provides the relevant gures, obtained from the reintegration program
itself. We see that as of the time of our eldwork in July 2007, the program disruption
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aected 53% of designated ex-combatant beneciaries in the Africare region. If we
were to simply measure dierences between Africare and non-Africare ex-combatants,
we would obtain an estimate of the disruption eect that is biased toward zero.
Such bias is attributable to the exposure heterogeneity among Africare-region ex-
combatants. To correct for this source of bias, we use a strategy that weights our
eect estimate by the inverse of the dierence in disruption rates across the Africare
and non-Africare regions. To see how this works, consider the following model,
yi = 0 + 1ti + xi2 + i
ti = + zi + i;
where yi is a latent outcome variable, ti 2 f0; 1g is an endogenous indicator of
exposure to the disruption, zi 2 f0; 1g and x0i 2 Rk are exogenous variables in that
E (ij(zi;xi)) = 0, and 2 is a k  1 vector. For the data considered here, the zi = 1
refers to being in the Africare region, and zi = 0 refers to being in the non-Africare
region. The ti = 1 refers to one's access to the program having been disrupted, ti = 0
means access was not disrupted. The coecient 1 is our estimate of the program
disruption eect. The coecient  measures the expected dierence in the ex post
probability of disruption for those with zi = 1 relative to those with zi = 0. The fact
that ti and zi are binary variables does not aect our interpretation at all (see Angrist
and Pischke, 2008, Ch. 4). We use a latent variable, y, for generality to generalized
linear models that can be expressed in terms of latent variables (e.g. all binary,
ordered, or multinomial probit/logit models; see Long, 1997). The transformations
discussed in this section would then apply to dierences on the latent variable rather
than the observed response. When we are working with a linear model, then y simply
equals the observed response.
We make the following exclusion restriction assumptions:
Assumption A.1: E (ijzi) = 0, and Assumption A.2: E (ijzi) = 0.
If A.1 and A.2 are true, then substituting the right-hand side of the expression for
ti into the right-hand side of the expression for y

i , we can write the the expression
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for yi as follows:
yi = ~0 + 1(zi) + xi2 + ~i;
where ~0 = 0 + 10 and ~i = 1i + i with E (~ij(zi;xi)) = 0. If we know the
population value of  exactly, then we can compute the zi values, and use the
results of a regression of y on zi and xi to obtain unbiased estimates of the eect,
1, with the appropriate standard error.
23
Documentation from the program (MDRP) itself allow us to obtain a value for
the true rates of disruption in the Africare and non-Africare regions. We assume that
these rates are equivalent to the ex post expected probability of disruption conditional
on whether one was located in the Africare region or not. Our discussion with a key
program ocial suggests that this is a reasonable interpretation, as pre-disruption
access seemed to be quite random.24 If one is wary about this, one may take a
conservative position, and assume any estimates based on this interpretation form an
upper bound; a lower bound is available by not correcting for  at all, so informative
bounds can be constructed.
Table 4.3 shows the rates of disruption for the population of demobilized com-
batants registered to receive benets in the Africare and non-Africare regions. Based
on this information, we take :53   0 = :53 as the value of . The MDRP docu-
mentation also provides information on the rate at which beneciaries who were due
to received benets after the NGO transition actually took up the program by the
time of eldwork in July 2007. These rates reect the disruption in the Africare
region: at the time of eldwork, about 66% of these post-transition beneciaries in
23See Murphy and Topel (1985) for properties of estimators such as this that rely on obtaining
\missing" regressors from auxiliary information. In our case, since we are assuming that we know
 exactly, there is no added approximation error, and thus no additional ination of the standard
errors. Another way to look at this is as a two-sample instrumental variable estimator, along the
lines of Angrist and Pischke (2009:147-150), but where the rst stage parameters are known exactly.
24Interview with Marcelo Fabre, MDRP executive oces, February 23, 2009.
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non-Africare regions had already begun their engagement with the program, while
only 16% had begun to do so in the Africare region. We stress that we do not want to
incorporate this information into the construction of . The rate of program take-up
in the non-Africare region reects, to a large extent, self-selection; those who had
not taken up the program by then should nonetheless be considered as having had
uninterrupted access. Individuals in the non-Africare region should have factored the
availability of the reintegration program into their decision-making, and so the eect
of access to the program should be evident even among those who have chosen not
to take it up. The very small number of beneciaries having begun engagement with
the program in Africare regions after the disruption had only recently done so at the
time of eldwork. Considering them to have been subject to the disruption has, at
worst, an eect of biasing our eect estimate toward zero. Thus, to be clear, we are
measuring the eects of disrupted access to a functioning reintegration program. By
disregarding these rates of program take-up, we actually take a more conservative
approach, in that we do not attempt to make the program look more eective by
netting out any dilution due to non-engagement by certain beneciaries despite their
having had access.
The above results are based on a homogenous eects model. If we loosen that
assumption to allow for variable coecients, then we could interpret our estimate of
1 as the eect of the program only on those whose access to the program would
depend on zi (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Theorem 4.4.1). It seems to us that
the estimate under the homogenous eects assumption is probably higher than the
true average eect of the program. This is because people who obtained access to the
program in the Africare region are likely to have been more organized generally about
their personal aairs; therefore, we suspect for them, the program's benets would be
less. For these reasons, we believe that the scaled estimates are likely to be an upper
bound on the true average eect. Reduced form estimates|that, is estimates from
regressions using the unadjusted zi rather than zi|are a lower bound. We report
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both below.
4.6 Data
The ex-combatant data are drawn from the multi-purposeWartime and Post-Conict
Experiences in Burundi survey.25 The survey includes data from interviews with civil-
ians, as well as ex-rebels and ex-army, both demobilized and those integrated into
the new security forces. This paper works with only the demobilized ex-rebel data.
The data were obtained through a multistage random sample from lists of demobi-
lized ex-rebels registered to receive reintegration benets through Burundi's national
DDR program (the CNDRR). The rst stage involved randomly selecting half of Bu-
rundi's 129 communes|Burundi's second-tier administrative unit.26 We then set a
target number of ex-combatant interviews to complete in each commune, with targets
proportional to the national proportion of ex-combatants registered with the DDR
program in the commune. Targets ranged from 2 to 33. Then, we obtained from
the national DDR oce the complete lists of ex-combatants registered as residents
of each of the selected communes. We then drew a simple random sample (with a
random number generator in the software package, R) of the desired number of in-
terviews from each of these commune lists. We created a randomly selected reserve
list for each commune to use in the case of non-response. Selected participants were
contacted and brought to the respective Provincial Bureau by DDR program sta for
interview on a scheduled date by our enumeration team. The rate at which our rst
choice was interviewed was very high|about 90%|and so we assume no need for
further adjustment to account for non-response.27 This very high response rate was
25Details on the survey are available at www.columbia.edu/cds81/burundisurvey/
26See fn. 20.
27Keep in mind that the covariate adjustment that we perform below will reduce any biases
associated with those factors. With such a low non-response rate, it is reasonable to believe that
any residual bias is negligible.
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likely due to a few factors: (1) respondents probably took the interview to be a re-
quirement of the DDR program given that they were contacted by CNDRR program
sta themselves; (2) we accommodated respondents' schedules by setting dates for
interviews well in advance; (3) the eldwork was conducted during the idle interim
period between planting and harvesting seasons, and so respondents working in the
agricultural sector faced few competing demands on their time; and (4) while partic-
ipation was voluntary, a \transport allowance" of about 2 US dollars was provided
to each respondent after they completed the interview, thus making it worthwhile
for respondents to sit through the entire interview. With the observations limited to
former rebel males registered to receive reintegration assistance outside Bujumbura,
the dataset includes 110 ex-rebels registered in the Africare region and 261 outside
the Africare region.
As is common in large scale surveys such as this, the data exhibit occasional miss-
ingness on items. Such missingness is due to \don't know" responses, enumerator
error, or data-entry error. In the subset of data that we used, only once did the item
missingness rate reach 10% for any given variable|such was the case for the mea-
sure of the death rate in an ex-combatant's ghting unit; otherwise the rates of item
missingness were usually 0, but occasionally around 1-2%. Listwise deletion would
nonetheless have implied discarding 23% of excombatant observations. To avoid the
ineciencies and biases associated with listwise deletion, we used multiple imputation
to ll missing values.28 Multiple imputation was conducted using the \mice" package
28In additional to the loss in statistical power, listwise deletion can bias results by either discarding
cases based on the value of the dependent variable or distorting the relationship between the sample
and population in ways that bias approximations (e.g. linear or quadratic) of unknown functional
forms. This is explained in Samii (2010). If multiple imputation is done in a reasonable manner,
it will be considerably less biased and will generate appropriate uncertainty estimates. See King et
al (2001) for some general discussion of multiple imputation methods, and Rubin (1987) and Little
and Rubin (2002) for deeper treatments. Approximation bias is best understood through the lens
of non-random sampling. See, e.g., Korn and Graubard (1999:159-185).
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for the R statistical computing environment (van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn,
2010). \Predictive mean matching" imputation was used for all numeric, binary, and
ordered categorical variables; multinomial logit regression imputation was used for
non-ordered categorical variables. Predictive mean matching (also known as \nearest
neighbor hot deck") is attractive because, when the item-level data exhibit only low
levels of missingness, it is robust to a wide range of misspecications of the impu-
tation model (Little and Rubin, 2002:69). Uncertainty in predictive mean matching
arises in the t of the predictive mean model. With the multinomial logit, uncer-
tainty arises from the t of the model and the fundamental uncertainty inherent in
the outcome being modeled as a random draw from a multinomial distribution. To
account for these imputation uncertainties, multiple imputed datasets should be gen-
erated (hence \multiple" imputation). The analysis should then be run on each of
the datasets, and averaged using the appropriate averaging forumlas. This was the
approach that we took, working with ve imputed datasets.29 Summary statistics for
the ve imputation-completed samples are presented in Table 4.4. The geographic
distribution of respondents is displayed in Figure 4.1. We discuss this summary in-
formation in detail in the section below on covariate balance.
4.7 Inference
For inference, we take covariate and treatment values as xed and base our inference
on presumed sampling variability. On each of the imputation-completed datasets,
we use sandwich estimates of coecient covariances that account for clustering at
the commune-level. We consider communes to be the relevant area within which an
individual's routine economic interactions is conned.30 For the quantile regression
29As Rubin (1987:114) explains, rather few imputations are typically needed to achieve reliable
estimates.
30Refer to fn. 20 for an explanation of communes.
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estimates, we use standard errors from inverted rank-test condence intervals asymp-
totically robust to non-iid sampling (Koenker and Hallock, 2000).31 To combine the
estimates from each of the imputation-completed datasets, we used standard formu-
las based on the properties of mixed normal distributions (known as \Rubin's rules";
Rubin, 1987; King et al, 2001:53). Estimation was conducted in both R and Stata.
In Stata, when possible, we used the imputation combination function provided by
the Clarify software (Tomz et al, 2003). When this was not an option in Stata, and
for the estimation in R, we used our own imputation combination programs.32
4.8 Covariate Balance and Matching
4.8.1 Covariates
A covariate should be considered confounding if it is (1) correlated with the treatment,
(2) correlated with the outcome of interest, and (3) temporally prior to the treatment.
We made the case above that variation in our treatment (in this case having program
benets withheld in the areas serviced by Africare) is due largely to an exogenous
shock. In other words requirement number (1) above is not due to self-selection
or targeting of program beneciaries. However as discussed above, our treatment
is not truly the result of a randomized experiment and incidental imbalances may
exist. Ex-combatants in the Africare areas might be dierent according to important
covariates than their fellows in the other areas of the country. Therefore we have
to be concerned about making inferences from extreme counterfactuals (King and
Zeng, 2006). Since we do not know the true functional form of the relationship
between our covariates and our outcomes of interest we cannot assume that we know
the relationship between a given independent variable over the whole range of a
31Bootstrapped condence intervals are inappropriate on the matched sample (Abadie and Imbens,
2008).
32The programs are available at http://www.columbia.edu/cds81/.
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given the independent variable. By tting a particular function (say linear) for to the
relationship between independent and dependent variables we are implicitly assuming
that the relationship between a given independent variable was the same for very high
levels of that variable and very low levels of that variable. Pre-processing the data
with matching overcomes this problem by making comparisons between treated and
control cases that are very close to each other in terms of the values of their covariates.
This substantially reduces the implications of our functional form assumptions (Ho
et. al, 2007; King and Zeng, 2006)
In what follows we list the variables on which we matched and our reasons for using
them. We divide the set between covariates that measure (i) individual characteristics
versus (ii) community characteristics. We need both types of covariates, because
economic outcomes are a product of one's individual characteristics interacting with
one's economic environment. Community characteristics were measured at the level
of commune.33 There is no concern with post-treatment bias by including these
commune-level covariates, because ex-combatants chose their locale of residence and
registered it with the reintegration program before the disruption in the Africare
region. Accordingly, our sample frame listed ex-combatants by the commune where
they registered and this is what we assign to the subjects in our study. As described
below, our study is limited to ex-combatants residing outside the capital, Bujumbura.
Communes outside the capital range in size from 3,000 to 20,000 households, meaning
that they are quite large and they generally circumscribe the domain of an individual's
routine economic aairs.
4.8.1.1 Individual characteristics
Age We hypothesize that younger ex-combatants will be less well endowed with pre-
existing skills and social networks that are necessary for successful economic
reintegration. Previous studies (Blattman and Annan, 2009) have shown that
33See fn. 20 for more information on communes.
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child soldiers in particular are deprived of the crucial period of their lives when
important human and social capital skills are developed. Thus or expectation
is that younger ex-combatants may experience less economic reintegration than
older ex-combatants.
Hutu We expect dierences in the earning potential for those identifying as Hutu
versus Tutsi (there are no Twa in this sample). The vast majority of those
participating in the rebellion were Hutu. The small number of Tutsi that par-
ticipated in the rebellion are likely those whose relations to their communities
were somehow strained. For those reasons, we expect Tutsi ex-rebels to fair
worse economically than their Hutu counterparts.
Father in Agriculture Prewar An ex-combatant coming from a pre-war farming
household was probably relatively poor compared to those ex-combatants whose
parents had more lucrative non-agricultural jobs. Coming from a non-farming
household is also likely to aect an ex-combatant's ability to nd an occupation
outside of farming.
Years of Education, Pre-War Ex-combatants with more education should have
an easier time nding a productive livelihood and reintegrating.
Prewar Household Wealth Index Because ex-combatants with greater wealth be-
fore the war should, we presume, have higher incomes after the war we include
a scale that captures the value of an ex-combatant's pre-war household assets.
We created the scale based on survey respondents' responses to three questions
about their pre-war household: did their beds have sheets, did they own a radio,
and did they own any cattle. The bed-sheets and radio measures were devised
after focus groups in Burundi, in which these assets were deemed clear markers
of a household having moved beyond basic subsistence in their consumption
level. Ownership of cows is a distinct indicator of wealth in Burundian society.
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We t a two-parameter logistic graded response model on these responses, us-
ing the \ltm" package in R (Rizopoulous, 2006). We then generated a pre-war
wealth index using factor scores from this model, estimated with the imputation
method described in Rizopoulos and Moustaki (2008).34 We t the model on a
pooled dataset that included the ex-rebels and civilians from the same regions
as the ex-rebels. We assume that the factor loadings are common across the
two groups; including the civilians greatly improves the precision of the t.
Out-going Rank Outgoing rank is likely to indicate the ability of the individual.
In addition, outgoing rank determined the monthly reinsertion benet level.35
We use two binary variables to indicate whether the subject's exiting rank
was commissioned ocer or non-commissioned ocer, with rank-and-le as a
baseline category.
Unit Death Rate We are concerned that ex-combatants who experienced the most
mortal combat would be more psychologically traumatized and therefore might
nd it more dicult to return to normal economic activity. Thus we include
the rate of death within subject's units as reported by the subjects.
Years in Faction We hypothesize that ex-combatants who were in combat longer
would nd it more dicult to reintegrate into society. In Uganda, Blattman and
Annan (2009) found that time in the LRA faction was associated with poorer
economic reintegration. Their explanation was that time in the faction robbed
34We also asked respondents about whether they owned land before the war, but we did not
include it in the scale because there was too little variation in the variable (about 95% of respondents
indicated that they possessed land prior to the war). A Mokken analysis of these three indicators
showed that they loaded monotonically and contributed a moderately strong, single dimension signal
(the lowest H score was 0.38; see van der Ark, 2007). We used ANOVA tests to determine whether
a one, two, or even higher order logistic model t the data best, and found that the two parameter
model was optimal.
35Refer to fn. 18.
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individuals from having time to develop economically useful capabilities and
networks.
Family Death Rate Our concern was, again, that more exposure to violence would
make economic reintegration more dicult. With this covariate we capture
exposure to violence in terms of proportion of family members killed in the
war. Furthermore postwar economic opportunities are often supplied by social
networks like the family. Ex-combatants with a large percentage of family
members killed would, we speculate, have fewer contacts with which to pursue
employment.
Non-CNDD-FDD Faction Member While several rebel factions fought in the
war the CNDD-FDD came out the clear winner of the conict. As such CNDD-
FDD members may have better access to economic opportunities than members
of other factions, like the CNDD-Nyangoma, FROLINA, or FNL. Therefore, we
expect CNDD-FDD members to have a more successful economic reintegration
experience than non-CNDD-FDD members. In addition, the factions diered
in there levels of internal discipline. FROLINA and FNL were associated with
more abusive tactics, and so control for this faction helps to address Humphreys
and Weinstein's (2007) nding that more abusive factions have more problems
with social acceptance.
Demobilization Date Ex-combatants who demobilized earlier had a longer period
to reintegrate than did those who demobilized later so we expect ex-combatants
who demobilized later to have less success in economic reintegration. We use
the number of months that elapsed from the start of demobilization to the time
of the subject's demobilization, standardizing the variable to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1 to improve numerical stability.
Propensity Score In order to insure overall balance of our covariates we also matched
on the propensity score. We estimated the propensity score using a logistic
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regression of Africare region status on all of the covariates (including the com-
munity characteristics mentioned below). The specication did not include any
interactions or higher order terms.
4.8.1.2 Community characteristics
Accumulated War Violence, 1993-2004 We hypothesize that communities that
were exposed to more violence may have suered capital destruction that damp-
ens economic opportunities. The accumulated war violence for each commune
is the sum of Gaussian-kernel distances between the commune's geographic cen-
troid and each of the major conict events listed in the Armed Conict Location
and Event Database (ACLED, Version 1), produced by the Peace Research In-
stitute of Oslo.36 We use the sum of kernel distances, rather than simple counts,
to account for the fact that the ACLED data likely under-reports the number
of violent war events, and that such events tend to occur in geographic clusters
that spill over commune boundaries.
Log(2004 Population density) Population density is closely associated with the
economic vibrancy of a commune. More densely populated communes will have
larger markets for products and labor. We use the natural log to account for
extreme skew in the distribution.37
Ruling-Party-controlled Province Provinces with governors aliated with the
ruling CNDD-FDD party would likely be more successful in attracting government-
controlled funds for reconstruction, which is an economic stimulant. We assign
36The dataset is available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/
37Extreme skewness and other departures from ellisoidal distributions make it dicult for any
matching algorithm to ensure that improvement in the balance over any single covariate does not
introduce serious imbalance over other covariates (Rubin, 1976; Diamond and Sekhon, 2005). We
also think the log-transformed value is better for characterizing the distance between subjects.
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a dummy variable for whether the subject's commune is located in a province
with a CNDD-FDD governor.
Bujumbura Bujumbura is the capital city and, given its enormous size and density
relative to the rest of the country, it is clearly a case apart in terms of potential
economic outcomes. Because the Africare region is outside Bujumbura, we sim-
ply exclude ex-combatants from Bujumbura entirely from the analysis. Thus,
the inferences we make below refer are based only on ex-combatants residing
outside Bujumbura.
4.8.2 Balance
Balance statistics for the ve imputation-completed datasets are presented in Table
4.4. As discussed above, we used matching with replacement, and multiple Africare
respondents were matched to common non-Africare respondents in a number of cases.
This is evident from the sample sizes reported in the rst column of the table. We
see that out of the 261 candidate subjects in the non-Africare region, between 63
and 75 were selected as \controls" across the ve datasets. In that way, the matching
algorithm was quite selective, relegating nearly 200 of the non-Africare region subjects
as being too distant from the Africare subjects to be useful for comparison. As
recommended in Ho et al (2009:16), we ensure that each of the matched non-Africare
observations has the appropriate inuence on our analysis by weighting each of them
proportionally to the number of times each is used as a match.38 The balance checks
incorporate these weights. We also use these weights in our estimation of program
eects below.
38The precise weight is ki
NcP
i ki
, where ki is the number of times that i is matched and Nc is the
number of control observations. The normalizing constant, NcP
i ki
, simply ensures that the weights
sum to the number of controls in the sample and does not aect the analysis. These are the weights
produced by default in the R package, MatchIt (Ho et al, 2009), which we used to implement
GenMatch.
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Some of the covariates are well-balanced even without matching. This was the case
for age, Hutu, prewar education, non-commissioned ocer, demobilization date, and
ruling party province. We nonetheless match on them to insure that they remain in
balance even after matching on the other covariates that were not naturally in balance.
The fact that several variables were balanced before matching has implication for how
we interpret the balance statistics after matching. Ho et al recommend looking at
improvement in balance rather than p-scores on t- and KS tests. Their rationale is
that many observations are dropped as a result of matching procedures and so p-scores
can improve simply by virtue of the standard errors increasing as the sample size gets
smaller. Imai et al (2008) recommend, wisely we think, that the researcher also make
sure that balance is actually improving|e.g., means are getting closer together and
observations are getting closer to the 45 degree line in the QQ plots. We agree with
their argument but hasten to point out that it is not necessarily cause for concern
that some covariates' balance worsens as we attempt to achieve balance on other
covariates so long the resulting dataset does not exhibit serious imbalance. For this
reason, we do not nd the occasional losses in balance on certain covariates (e.g. on
age, Hutu, or education) to be reason for concern. In addition, even though t-test
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values do not appropriately reect certainty about
equality of distributions, they remain useful as standardized measures of imbalance
(Diamond and Sekhon, 2005:11).
The statistics in Table 4.4 show that we achieved very good balance after matching,
even with this large set of covariates. The t-tests on dierence of means indicate
that the distribution of our treated and control cases have very similar means, with
only log(population density) exhibiting somewhat low p-values (e.g. below .20). We
inspected density plots for this variable in the matched data, and found that the
Africare respondent communities exhibited bimodality on this variable, while the
non-Africare respondent communities were more uniformly distributed. Thus, the
imbalance was mostly on interior values. This is not of major concern, because
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regression adjustment tends not to be very model-dependent when imbalance occurs
over interior regions (that is, within the convex hull) of the data (King and Zeng,
2006).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests provide a measure of balance on higher order
features of covariate distributions. The tests show that we achieve excellent balance
for about half of the ten variables where the KS test was appropriate. Among those
with rather low p-values, we nd that the t-test p-values tend to be large, and the
ratios of treated and control variances tend to be reasonably close to one over the
imputation-completed datasets. Thus, we have balance on at least the rst two
moments. One variable, the wartime violence index, tends to exhibit rather high
treated/control variance ratios. We inspected density plots for this variable in the
matched data. We found that the problems are attributable to a small mass of 8
Africare respondents with values located just above the maximum of the non-Africare
respondent values. This means that we have to accept some degree of extrapolation
in this range.
Our estimation strategy is to specify a regression model that uses a linear spec-
ication for all covariates. Regression on the matched data provides counter-factual
values at precisely the covariate locations of the Africare observations, helping to over-
come the fact that we cannot matched exactly on all covariates (Rubin and Thomas,
2000). The balance that we have achieved on the covariates substantially reduces the
import of our choice of a linear model. The covariance adjustment also makes the
analysis more ecient to the extent that the covariates are prognostic. Such eciency
is important in our case because we have a small sample size.
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4.9 Programmatic impacts: economic reintegra-
tion
We now present estimates of program eects. We begin with eects on economic
reintegration. As discussed above, these are estimates of programmatic eects in that
the reintegration program provided direct assistance to ex-combatants for realizing
a productive civilian livelihood. From an academic perspective, eects on economic
reintegration are a necessary part of the causal chain outlined above, which proposes
that a boost to one's economic conditions can induce an individual to subscribe
more faithfully to the laws and norms that govern civilian society. Our estimates of
economic eects provide a basis on which we can judge whether these data provide
a good test of this proposition. If we do nd strong economic eects, then we are
in a good position to assess the claim that political integration follows from a boost
to economic well-being. Of course, for well-understood reasons associated with the
study of mediated eects, this kind of analysis can only test the plausibility of such
a two-step causal process (Green et al, 2010).
From a policy perspective, it might seem trivial that there should be some eect on
livelihoods, but remarkably, past studies in Sierra Leone and Liberia (e.g. Humphreys
and Weinstein, 2005; Levely, 2010) raise questions about whether such benets of
reintegration programs are manifest. If we also nd that they are not, then the
implications are that some serious reconsideration needs to go into the design of
reintegration assistance. For example, it might strengthen the case made by some
that individual-level targeting is ineective without strong community-level assistance
(Muggah, 2009). If we do nd substantial eects, then it raises question as to whether
conditions in Burundi were dierent than in Sierra Leone or Liberia, or whether the
latter studies generated biased estimates. As we discussed above, there are good
reasons to suspect the latter.
We present results for two measures of economic reintegration: (1) monthly income
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and, as a consequence of income, poverty incidence; and (2) livelihood, specically
the nature of the occupation that the respondent obtained. We present unadjusted
estimates on the raw data and then regression adjusted estimates on the matched
data. Having the two side by side helps us to assess the bias reduction as well as
potential eciency gains and losses from the adjustment methods. Our primary
estimates of average individual-level eects are the regression-adjusted estimates on
the matched data. As discussed above, a lower bound treatment eect estimate comes
from regressions that do not correct for exposure heterogeneity, and an upper bound
coming from regressions that do. We also present graphs that display estimated causal
eects for the population of ex-combatants serviced by Africare. These show what
would have been the gross impact of the program on the Africare beneciaries had
there been no interruption (that is, the \eect of the treatment on the controls").
4.9.1 Income and poverty incidence
Our outcome measure of income is the natural logarithm of monthly personal income
(in Burundian Francs, or FBu) reported by the responded, with 1 FBu added. We
used the natural logarithm as a variance stabilizing transformation to reduce estima-
tion sensitivity to outliers. We added 1 FBu to handle the few cases of zero reported
income. To check for sensitivity associated with adding 1, we also t a Tobit regres-
sion on log of income with zero-income observations treated as censored; results were
identical and so we do not display them. Inspection of the distribution of log monthly
income variable over the covariates showed that the transformation was eective in
removing heteroskedasticity, although the overall variance of the logged variable was
still quite high.
The left panel in Figure 4.2 shows the income distributions for Africare respon-
dents and the matched controls from the ve imputation-completed datasets. The
gray blocks in the plots show regions of the income distribution below the $1.25/day
poverty line (at purchasing power parity, equivalent to 15,000 FBu/month). The
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 165
dots for the matched controls are scaled proportional to the weight they receive in
the analysis. We see that the Africare distribution is substantially heavier at lower
income values (e.g., below 10,000 FBu/month). Indeed, the most striking visual im-
pression is that the matched control income distribution exhibits a \oor" just below
10,000 FBU/month, whereas this oor is not evident for the Africare respondents.
The Africare respondents also include a cluster of high earners (centered on 100,000
FBU/month) in an area where the matched control distribution is very thin.
We quantify these dierences by examining dierences in means, with linear re-
gression, and then dierences in quantiles, with quantile regression. The linear regres-
sion estimates appear in Table 4.5. The results show that in the raw data, Africare
respondents' monthly income was about 50% lower on average. On the matched
data, before adjusting for exposure heterogeneity, the point estimate for the Africare
coecient very similar as in the raw data (-0.59 versus -0.67), although the p-value
(0.26) is quite large for the matched data. The stability of the coecient estimate
suggests there was little confounding to be removed in this case; the ination of the
p-value reects the rather small sample size in the matched data. When we run a
leaner specication that includes only the unit death rate, war violence index, ruling
party province, and the propensity score, the estimate does not change much (coef-
cient of -0.53 with p-value of 0.29). The next estimate in the table adjusts further
for exposure heterogeneity, providing our upper bound estimate. The adjustment
essentially scales the Africare coecient by about 1.9. This estimate is suggests that
Africare respondent incomes are 70% lower income on average, but with the same
large p-value. Thus, we nd only very weak evidence that reintegration programming
boosts incomes on average in the short run.
Dierences-in-averages often hide important dierences between groups' incomes,
because income distributions can be very poorly behaved in terms of skew or massing
at extreme values even after stabilizing transformations (Koenker and Hallock 2000;
Angrist and Pischke, 2008:269-270). We have already seen visually that there appear
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to be important dierences in the income distributions of the Africare respondents and
their matched counter-parts. We used quantile regression to estimate more general
income eects, including eects on incidence of very low or very high incomes. We
estimated dierences in income deciles 1 through 9. The estimates are shown in Table
4.6. We see large dierences in the decile values, and p-values are quite small (given
the sample size). Thus, while there is essentially equality of distributions for the
rst two deciles, the from the matched data we estimate that the third decile among
program non-recipients in the Africare region is 45% (lower bound) to 68% (upper
bound) than what it would have been had there been no interruption. Interestingly,
these dierences are decreasing over the deciles. By decile 7, the gap narrows to
a dierence of 32% (lower bound) to 52% (upper bound). Thus, we nd that the
income eect is declining in potential income, at least on the log-scale. One reason
for this pattern could be a statistical artifact: if the income eect was, for the most
part, a simple linear shift, then it would appear as a declining percentage shift after
the log transformation. Running the same linear regressions on the raw (not log-
transformed) income measure, we estimate that Africare respondent incomes were
between 7050 (lower bound) to 13,300 (upper bound) FBu/month lower on average,
although the p-value again is high at 0.17. Another explanation may be that the
pattern is a genuine reection of diminishing returns of the program over potential
incomes. The data do not allow us to distinguish between these two stories; it is
reasonable to believe that some combination of the two is at work.
The quantile eects are easier to understand when they are used to plot cumula-
tive log-income distributions. We do so in the right panel of Figure 4.2. The results
indicate dramatic eects on poverty incidence. The actual cumulative log-income
distribution for Africare-region respondents is plotted with the black dots, and tted
values from the quantile regressions are given by the black line. Then, we plots the
lower bound (white dots) and upper bound (gray dots) estimates of what the Africare
respondents' cumulative income distribution would have been had there been no pro-
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gram disruption. The gray area shows the range of incomes below the poverty line.
Poverty incidence among the Africare respondents is shown to be about 60% (the
point where the black line crosses from the gray into the white region). The coun-
terfactual distributions show that this would be an estimated 20 percentage points
(lower bound estimate) to 35 percentage points lower had there been no disruption.
We can see that this dierence is not sensitive to the precise location of the poverty
line. A regression on a poverty incidence indicator (not shown) estimates precisely
the same eect with a p-value of 0.02.
What is the signicance of this income eect relative to the value of the program
benets? An answer helps to assess the material benets of the program against
the costs. Above, we described that the the value of the benet was up to 600,000
FBu. That value was allocated in the form of training, xed or durable assets (e.g.
materials to build a shop, some cows, a scooter, etc.) and immediately sellable assets
(e.g. products, like beer or Fanta, to sell at a new shop). From the cumulative log-
income distribution plot in Figure 4.2, we see that the median earner in the Africare
region was earning about 10,000FBu/month. We estimate that this is about 64%
(lower bound) to 44% (upper bound) of what that person would have earned had there
been no disruption, implying a counter-factual incomes of about 15,500 and 23,000
FBu/month. Thus, the full value of the program benet could not be immediately
converted into income. Rather, the income eects 5,500 to 13,000 FBu/month imply
that it would take 4 to 9 years to recuperate the value of the 600,000 FBu investment.
This recuperation depends on the short-run income dierences that we measure being
sustained over such a period|something that we cannot assess. Future research
might the factors that constrain ex-combatants' ability to convert program benets
into income.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 168
4.9.2 Livelihood
To study eects on livelihood, we examine respondents answers to a question about
what kind of work they did to sustain themselves. We coded their responses as
(1) no occupation, (2) an agricultural occupation, (3) a non-agricultural, skilled sec-
tor occupation (including returning to school, professional position, or skilled labor,
such as automotive repair, electrical technician, etc.) and (4) or a non-agricultural,
unskilled sector occupation (including security guard, manual labor, etc.). The dis-
tribution for the Africare respondents and their matched controls are displayed in
Figure 4.3 (the displays average over the ve imputation-completed datasets). We
see that agricultural occupations dominate in a major way, accounting for about 60-
70% of responses overall. We see some indication that Africare respondents are more
likely to report that they have \no occupation" and less likely to report a \skilled"
occupation. Looking more closely at these dierences, we found that for \skilled"
occupations, the pattern is driven by dierences in attainment of skilled labor occu-
pations, rather than returning to school or obtaining a professional position. Indeed,
there were no Africare respondents reporting having obtained a skilled labor occupa-
tion, whereas the rate among the matched non-Africare respondents ranged from 7%
to 9%.
To quantify these dierences, we t a multinomial logistic regression of the oc-
cupation categories, with agriculture set as the baseline category. The regression
estimates appear in the upper panel in Table 4.7. In the raw data, an Africare re-
spondents' relative likelihood of a job in the skilled sector versus in agriculture was
63% lower than for a non-Africare peer; the association is strong (p-value = 0.03).
Associations for the other categories are not strong as indicated by the high p-values.
In the matched data, the point estimate for this eect remains about the same (rel-
ative risk ratio of 0.39 versus 0.37), but the p-value is quite large (0.23). We t a
model with a leaner covariate set, only using covariates with p-values less then 0.10
in the full specication|this included commissioned ocer, unit death rate, war vi-
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olence index, and log(pop. density). The results barely changed. Thus, we have only
very weak evidence that the program changed the distribution of ex-combatants over
livelihood types. We plotted the gross eects on the distribution of livelihoods in the
right panel of Figure 4.3. The black dots are based on the tted values, and the white
and gray dots show estimated lower bound and upper bound counter-factual values,
respectively. The estimates suggest that the rate of skilled occupation attainment
may have been around 5 to 10 percentage points higher had there been no interrup-
tion, with compensating decreases coming mostly from the agricultural sector and
the segment with no occupation. But given the very low levels of signicance, these
estimates should be considered very rough. It is clear that the strong tendency to
seek agricultural livelihoods overwhelms any potential program eect on occupations.
While there is little to suggest a fundamental transformation in livelihood out-
comes, to what extent can we say that livelihood outcomes generally improved? In
order to measure this, we need to impose some ordering on the livelihood outcomes.
Based on our observations in the eld and discussions with Burundians, we felt the
following ordering made the most sense: \no occupation" would be the least desir-
able category in terms of social status and ability to sustain oneself, \agriculture"
and \non-agriculture, unskilled" occupations would be at the same level of desirabil-
ity, and \skilled" occupations would be to be the highest. We t an ordered logistic
regression to these outcomes on the raw data and then the matched data, using the
same covariate and exposure heterogeneity adjustments as in the above regressions.
From the raw data, we see that overall Africare respondents have 20% lower odds
of being in a higher ranked category than non-Africare respondents. When we re-
move confounding bias through matching and regression adjustment, the dierence
becomes much larger. Indeed, we estimate that the eect of the reintegration program
was such that Africare respondents had between 54% to 77% lower odds of being in
a higher ranked income category. The p-value for this dierence is 0.13, which given
the sample size provides moderate evidence of a genuine dierence between the two
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groups.
4.10 Downstream impacts: political reintegration
To what extent do programmatic economic impacts contribute to political reintegra-
tion? That is, can a boost to one's economic well-being aect one's orientation toward
political order, deepening one's appreciation of norms that govern civilian society?
The empirical analysis thus far shows that the reintegration program substantially
boosted the income of ex-combatants whose earnings would otherwise have been low.
Eects on those with higher potential income were not statistically signicant by any
discriminating standard. Nonetheless, the conditional income eects resulted in large
dierences in poverty. These kinds of concentrated eects may be desirable. The
logic of opportunity costs suggests that it is precisely these low potential-income ex-
combatants who may be most at risk to be induced into action against the state or
crime. Concentrating benets among this segment may be the most ecient way to
contribute to post-conict stability. We nd moderate evidence of eects on liveli-
hood outcomes, with program recipients being somewhat more likely to have a more
desirable occupation. However, these moderate eects do not result in any substantial
change in the overall distribution of ex-combatants over livelihoods.
As described above, we dene political reintegration as an ex-combatant accepting
that violence is not a legitimate means to seek political or personal gain. Such rein-
tegration may be reected in attitudinal changes. These include a favorable view of
civilian life relative to combatant life and attitudes consistent with norms of peaceful
and democratic conict management. Such reintegration should also be reected in
conduct|e.g., in refraining from participation in political violence or using threats
for personal gain. Ideally, one would have measures of both attitudes and conduct.
Unfortunately, our study did not acquire such behavioral measures, and so we can
only examine eects on the expressed political attitudes. Attitudinal questions such
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as these tend to be quite noisy. Thus, we expect this to be a rather low powered test
of political reintegration eects. With those caveats, we consider three attitudinal
measures: (1) responses to a question about whether life was better as a combatant;
(2) responses to a question of whether one is very satised, somewhat satised, or
unsatised with the peace accords, which were ostensibly based on norms of peaceful
and democratic political competition; and (3) responses to a question about whether
Burundians should allow the government as currently constituted to have a lot of
time to sort out the many problems facing Burundian society, or whether Burundians
should start thinking about changing the government.
In studying down-stream political reintegration impacts, we actually focus on
reduced form relationships between Africare status and these outcomes. This may
seem like a strange way to test what is essentially a mediated relationship between
a reintegration program and political reintegration, with economic well-being being
the mediator. The reasons have to do with what our quasi-experiment allow us to
identify. We cannot use Africare status as an instrumental variable for any single
economic outcome, because we have already seen that Africare status is associated
with substantial dierences on multiple dimensions|even if the statistical signicance
of some of these dierences is very low. Recently expounded problems with linear
mediation analysis are so profound (Green et al, 2010) that we see little added value
from such an analysis. Nonetheless, we think our reduced form estimates provide a
useful probe into the plausibility of the claim that economic reintegration contributes
to political reintegration. The reintegration program in Burundi was tightly focused
on individual-level economic assistance. Thus, we see little reason to doubt that any
apparent eects on political reintegration arise through the economic assistance role
of the program.
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4.10.1 Preference for civilian life over combatant life
We asked whether respondents thought life is better as a civilian (=1), with the
alternative (=0) being that life was either better as a combatant or there was no
dierence. About 81% of matched controls indicated that life was better as a civilian
life, whereas only 71% of Africare respondents indicated as such, implying 43% lower
odds for Africare respondents. Thus, the strong tendency overall is to indicate a
preference for civilians life. In depth interviews that we conducted with ex-combatants
alongside the survey, we were told about a general sense of \war fatigue." This is
evident in the data.
More rened estimates of the program eects are displayed in Table 4.8, which
present results from logistic regressions. In the raw data we see that the Africare
coecient is essentially zero. In the matched data however, we estimate that the odds
of stating that civilian life is better are 51% to 74% less among Africare recipients.
However, the p-value of 0.17 is large, indicative of imprecisely we have measured
the eect. None of the other covariates included in the matched data regressions
exhibited a strong relationship to this outcome measure. Nonetheless, we estimated
a leaner specication, including only the Hutu indicator, and it yielded even more
attenuated results (coecient of -0.58 and p-value of 0.26). Thus, the evidence of
eects on attitudes toward civilian versus combatant life is quite weak statistically,
despite the rather estimated odds ratios.
4.10.2 Satisfaction with the peace accords
Our next outcome variable was based on whether respondents said that they were
\very satised" with the peace accords (=1) versus \satised" or \dissatised" (=0).
The proportion responding \very satised" was 68% for both the matched controls
and the Africare respondents. Thus, while there is a reasonable amount of variation
on this question, there is no dierence in rates across the two groups of respondents.
The more rened estimates in Table 4.8 show as such, where the estimated coecients
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are, essentially, 0. Thus, eects on attitudes toward the peace accords appear to be
trivial or non-existent.
4.10.3 Support for current government and institutions
Our nal attitudinal measure of political reintegration was a question about whether
the government should be given more time (=1) to sort out the major problems
facing Burundian society, or whether Burundians ought to consider ways to change
the current government (=0). The question interacts with the political context in a
number of ways that ought to be elaborated. First, the outcome of the war was one
that brought about a fundamental transformation in opportunities for Hutu mobil-
ity, including the ethnic integration of major institutions such as the army, the civil
service, and educational systems. At the same time, more radical Hutu parties, in-
cluding FNL factions, accused the CNDD-FDD of \selling out" far short of achieving
an ethnic balance in public institutions reective of the ethnic balance in society. The
ethnic quota in the military, for example, posited a 50-50 ethnic balance, far from
the 85-14-1 Hutu-Tutsi-Twa balance typically presumed among Burundians. Among
the ex-rebels included in our ex-combatant sample, we presume that expressions of
the need to \consider ways to change the current government" would tend to reect
respondents' sympathizing with the FNL's accusations about the CNDD-FDD \sell-
ing out." In our data, we nd that about 82% of the matched controls indicated that
the government \should be given more time", whereas about 90% of the Africare
respondents indicated as such, indicating the odds of a pro-government response are
about two times higher for Africare respondents. This dierence goes in the opposite
of the hypothesized direction. The logistic regression estimates in Table 4.8 show that
once we take the covariates into account, we estimate that the odds of indicating the
the government should be given more time are two to four times higher, although the
p-value is rather large at 0.24. Thus, if anything, the eect of the programming was
to make ex-combatants more likely express impatience with the government.
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4.11 Discussion
Our ndings suggest that over the rather short duration that we could assess, the rein-
tegration program produced a signicant boost to income among ex-combatants who
would otherwise have been among the worst o, resulting in a substantial lowering
of poverty incidence. The program had a moderate eect on improving the liveli-
hood prospects for ex-combatants, although not enough to transform substantially
the overall distribution of ex-combatants over livelihood outcomes. Agricultural liveli-
hoods dominate, and the program did not aect that. We sought to assess whether
economic assistance of this form can also translate into downstream political reinte-
gration eects, which we measured in terms of respondent attitudes toward civilian
life, the peace accords, and the government. The aim was to test a key proposition
underpinning current reintegration programming: that improvements to one's eco-
nomic well-being may induce a more positive disposition toward political order and
the laws and norms governing civilian society. We do not nd compelling evidence of
such downstream eects.
We recognize that there are a number of limitations to this empirical analysis.
First, we are evaluating program eects within a very short timeframe. Non-Africare
respondents had received their socio-economic reintegration packages no more than
9 months prior to our eldwork. We recognize that there would be greater interest
in an assessment some time later, perhaps years later. The problem is that good
causal identication for such a study would be extremely unlikely. Indeed, in our
case, Africare beneciaries began to receive reintegration packages shortly after we
completed eldwork, thus erasing the discontinuity that we have exploited for our
study. Second, we relied on a relatively small sample. This was due to the need to
remove incidental imbalances for good causal identication. Our matching algorithm
discarded over 70% of the non-Africare respondents, and this after we had already
discarded Bujumbura-based respondents, who constituted 12% of the original sam-
ple. Future research ought to anticipate the need for such balance, and design more
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ecient sampling strategies (e.g., by sampling on already-measured community-level
attributes). Third, related to the sample size issue is the fact that our analysis is
conned to those registered to receive benets outside the capital city. In many post-
conict contexts, rather large numbers of ex-combatants congregate in capital cities,
and so there may be an important part of the picture that we miss here. Nonetheless,
in Burundi, the vast majority of ex-combatants settled outside Bujumbura, and so
we think our study is well-motivated on those grounds, not to mention the fact that
excluding Bujumbura was necessary for good causal identication. Finally, we would
greatly prefer to have had unobtrusive behavioral measures of political reintegration.
Our assessment of political reintegration is only suggestive, and it only gets at the
psychological aspect. Data on criminality and violence behavior would be ideal, if it
were available. We were unable to locate ne-grained enough data for these purposes.
Fourth, the discontinuity that we exploited was regional in nature. This forced us to
make an assumption that, once we had controlled for individual and community-level
attributes, we had achieved exchangeability all the way down to the individual level.
This assumption cannot be tested.
These limitations taken into account, we feel that our study represents progress
in important ways. First, the type of discontinuity that we exploit oers the best
feasible design for measuring the impact of reintegration programs in their totality.
Because these are \emergency" programs in fragile political environments, there is
no realistic hope of a reintegration program being randomized fully or even being
subject to a randomized roll-out design.39 Our advice is that researchers seek these
kinds of discontinuities, often due to program failures. We also advise researchers to
seek opportunities to randomize features of reintegration programs|e.g. dierence
combinations of community-level and individual level assistance and dierent ways of
either promoting or discouraging the creation of associations among ex-combatants.
39This is based on our own eld experiences as well as discussions with many World Bank and
United Nations program admistrators.
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These kinds of within-program experiments could allow us to assess causal mech-
anisms and policy options. Second, while the regional nature of our discontinuity
forced us to make assumptions about exchangeability across regions, it also allowed
us to ensure that broader equilibrium eects were incorporated into our estimates of
program eects. Income, occupation, and political attitudes are all likely to exhibit
substantial local spill-over. If one had attempted to identify causal eects by com-
paring individuals within the same locality, these spill-overs would have been hidden.
Finally, Our adjustment strategy resembles the long line of labor economics research
on the United States National Supported Work program (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999;
Smith and Todd, 2005). Smith and Todd (2005) have shown that program eect es-
timates are quite sensitive to the covariate set that one chooses. This does not seem
to be such an important problem in our case, since in fact, the dierences in the esti-
mates on the raw and matched data are often small, the exception being only for one
of the livelihood outcomes (no occupation). We have used a very rich covariate set
that, unlike other studies, accounts for both individual characteristics and community
characteristics. This is crucial, as economic and political reintegration outcomes are
most certainly the result of an interaction between these two levels.
4.12 Conclusion
Ex-combatant reintegration programming is central in most transitions from civil
war to peace. Considerable sums are expended on such programs worldwide. Peace
researchers and program managers attribute great importance to such programs in
helping societies move past critical barriers in realizing sustainable peace. These
programs provide incentives that ostensibly lure ex-combatants away from the use
of violence to meet their material and psychological needs, and ostensibly re-orient
ex-combatants toward subscribing to norms that govern civilian society. But the
evidence on the impact of these programs is very thin. There is a worrying gap
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between eort, expectations, and evidence.
We make a major contribution in the way of evidence. We use a bureaucratic
failure in the implementation of the ex-combatant reintegration program in Burundi
as a source of exogenous variation to measure the impact of the program. The nature
of the failure was such that one of the implementing partners fell into dispute with the
government for reasons quite independent of the characteristics those ex-combatants
that were due to be served. This groups of intended beneciaries included approx-
imately one-third of the overall ex-combatant beneciary population. Because of
the dispute, this large group of would-be beneciaries had their benets withheld for
nearly a year. During that time, we were able to launch a eld study to measure eects
of reintegration programming. We studied eects on both the proximate economic
outcomes that were directly targeted (\programmatic eects"), as well as second-
ordered eects on political attitudes that were expected to follow from a boost to
economic well-being (\downstream eects"). To achieve good causal identication,
we limited our analysis to former rebel combatants residing outside of the capital
city; this subgroup actually represents the majority of Burundi's ex-combatants. We
matched ex-combatants whose benets were withheld to those that suered no such
disruption on a rich set of individual-level and community-level characteristics. We
used regression adjustment to make up for the fact that the matches were not exact.
We also used an inverse propensity adjustment to make up for the fact that a minor-
ity segment of ex-combatants in the region suering the disruption had been able to
access program benets prior to the disruption.
Our assessment of \programmatic" eects is important, because past research
has raised questions about whether even these proximate impacts are manifest. We
nd that they are. The program eected a substantial boost to the income of those
who would otherwise have been among the worst o, leading to a large reduction in
poverty incidence. In addition, there is moderate evidence that the livelihood and
occupation outcomes were improved, although the program did not eect any sort
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of transformation in the overall distribution of ex-combatants over occupations. We
do not nd compelling evidence for \downstream" eects of such economic assistance
on political reintegration, at least as measured through attitudes. While we found a
moderate eect on ex-combatants' sense that civilian life was preferable to combatant
life, there was no eect of either increasing levels of satisfaction with the peace accords
or increasing levels of support for current governing institutions. Thus, literature
suggesting that a boost to economic well-being can induce a more positive orientation
toward stability and norms governing civilian society may be too hopeful. Most
probably, more direct interventions, via media or counseling, are probably required
to shift these attitudes.
We hope that our research sets provides an example for research designs that suc-
cessfully exploit unusual programmatic discontinuities to estimate important causal
eects. Sometimes these discontinuities happen by design, as when programs are
rolled out in a random fashion. Sometimes the discontinuities happen by accident,
as in the program we study in this paper. We suspect that bureaucratic failures,
halts to service delivery, and other such unanticipated sources of variation in pro-
gram performance exist all over the place. These provide excellent opportunities to
measure program eects, particularly if the disruptions are ones that last for a long
time. Such studies should be designed to ensure adequate power, and should attempt
to incorporate unobtrusive behavioral measures to improve the tangibility of ndings.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 179
References
Abadie A, Imbens GW. 2008. \On the Failure of the Bootstrap for Matching Esti-
mators." Econometrica. 76(6):1537-1557.
Alden C. 2002. \Making old soldiers fade away: Lessons from the reintegration of
demobilized soldiers in Mozambique." Security Dialogue. 33(3):341-356.
Angrist JD, Pischke JS. 2008. Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Annan J, Patel AC. 2009. Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration: Bal-
ancing Justice, Psychological Well Being, and Community Reconciliation. Pa-
per prepared for the First International Congress on Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion, and Reintegration, Cartagena.
Baare A. 2006. An Analysis of Transitional Economic Reintegration. Swedish Ini-
tiative for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR). Ministry
of Foreign Aairs, Sweden.
Blattman C, Annan J. 2009. \The consequences of child soldiering." Review of
Economics and Statistics. Forthcoming.
Bosho H, Vrey W. 2006. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Dur-
ing the Transition in Burundi: A Technical Analysis. Pretoria: Institute for
Security Studies, Monograph Number 125.
Boutros-Ghali B. 1995. An Agenda for Peace. New York, NY: United Nations
Bryden A, Hanggi H, eds. 2005. Security Governance in Post-Conict Peacebuilding.
New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers.
Castillo G. 2008. Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenges of Post-Conict
Reconstruction. New York, NY. Oxford University Press.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 180
Colletta N, Kostner M, Weidehofer I. 1996. The Transition from War to Peace in
Sub-Sahara Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Collier P, Hoeer A. 2004. \Greed and grievance in civil war." Oxford Economic
Papers. 56(4):563-595.
Collier P. 1994. \Demobilization and insecurity: A study in the economics of the
transition from war to peace." Journal of International Development. 6(3):343-
351.
Cousens E, Kumar C, Wermester K. 2001. Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating
Peace in Fragile Societies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Dehejia R, Wahba S. 1999. \Causal eects in nonexperimental studies: Reevaluat-
ing the evaluation of training programs." Journal of the American Statistical
Association. 94(448):1053-1062.
Diamond A, Sekhon JS. 2005. \Genetic matching for estimating causal eects:
A general multivariate matching method for achieving balance in observational
studies." Typescript, Harvard University and University of California, Berkeley.
DiNardo J, Lee DS. 2010. \Program evaluation and research designs." NBER
Working Paper. Number 16016.
Douma P, Gasana JM, Specker L. 2008. Reintegration in Burundi: Between Happy
Cows and Lost Investments. Typescript, Conict Resolution Unit of the Nether-
lands Institute of International Relations, \Clingendael."
Doyle M, Sambanis N. 2006. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Feil S. 2004. \Laying the foundations: Enhancing security capabilities." In Orr RC,
ed. Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conict Reconstruction.
Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 181
Fortna P. 2008. Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil
War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Geenen S. 2007. \Former combatants at the crossing: How to assess the reintegratoin
of former combatants in the security and development nexus? Case study:
Ruyigi (Burundi) and Kinshasa (DRC)." Typescript, University of Antwerp.
Green DP, Ha SE, Bullock JG. 2010. \Enough already about `black box' experi-
ments: Studying mediation is more dicult than most scholars suppose." The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 628(1):200-
208.
Hanson S. 2007. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa.
Backgrounder. http://www.cfr.org/publication/12650/
Ho D, et al. 2007. \Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing model
dependence in parametric causal inference." Political Analysis. 15:199-236.
Ho D, et al. 2009. \MatchIt: Nonparametric preprocessing for parametric causal
inference." Typescript, Stanford University and Harvard University.
Humphreys M, Weinstein J. 2007. \Demobilization and reintegration." Journal of
Conict Resolution. 51(4):531-567.
Jennings K. 2007. \The struggle to satisfy: DDR through the eyes of ex-Combatants
in Liberia." International Peacekeeping. 14(2):1-15.
Jennings K. 2008. \Unclear ends, unclear means: Reintegration in postwar societies|
the case of Liberia." Global Governance. 14:327-345.
King G, Zeng L. 2006. \The dangers of extreme counterfactuals." Political Analysis.
14(2):131-159.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 182
King G, et al. 2001. \Analyzing incomplete political science data: An alterna-
tive algorithm for multiple imputation." American Political Science Review.
95(1):49-69.
Kingma K, Pauwels N. 2000. \Demobilization and reintegration in the `downsizing
decade."' In Pauwels N, ed. War Force to Work Force: Global Perspectives on
Demobilization and Reintegration. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Kingma K. 1997. \Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their
reintegration into civilian life." Policy Sciences 30(3):151-166.
Koenker R, Hallock KF. 2000. \Quantile regression: an introduction. [Long ver-
sion.]" Typescript, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Korn EL, Graubard BI. 1999. Analysis of Health Surveys. New York: Wiley.
Kumar K, ed. 1997. Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for Inter-
national Assistance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Levely I. 2010. \Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration in
Post-War Liberia: A failed approach or simply a failed program?" Typescript,
Charles University, Prague.
Little RA, Rubin DB. 2002. Statistical Analysis with Missing Data, 2nd Edition.
New York: Wiley.
Long JS. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
McMullin J. 2004. \Reintegration of combatants: were the right lessons learned in
Mozambique?" International Peacekeeping. 11(4): 625-643.
Muggah R. 2005. \No magic bullet: A critical perspective on disarmament, de-
mobilization and reintegration (DDR) and weapons reduction in post-conict
contexts." The Round Table. 379:239-252.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 183
Muggah R. 2009. Security and Post-Conict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters
in the Aftermanth of War. New York, NY: Routledge.
Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program [MDRP]. 2007. MDRP
Quarterly Progress Report, April-June 2007. Washington, DC: MDRP Secre-
tariat.
Murphy KM, Topel RH. 1985. \Estimation and inference in two-step econometric
models." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 3:370-379.
National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration [CN-
DRR]. 2005. Ganuka: Lettre d'information. No. 1. January, 2005.
Nindorera W. 2007. \Security sector reform in Burundi: Issues and challenges for
improving civilian protection." Centre dAlerte et de Prevention des Conits
and North-South Institute Working Paper. Bujumbura: CENAP. Available at
www.nsi-ins.ca
Paes WC. 2005. \The Challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
in Liberia." International Peacekeeping. 12(2): 253-61.
Paris R. 2004. At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conict. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Pouligny B. 2004. The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Programs. Paris: CERI/SGDN.
Pugel J. 2009. \Measuring reintegration in Liberia: assessing the gap between
outputs and outcomes." In Muggah R (2009).
Reno W. 1999. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Republic of Burundi. 2004. Joint Operations Plan for Pre-Disarmament, Disarma-
ment, Combatant Verication, and Demobilization. [Ocial document, Bujum-
bura, November 9, 2004.]
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 184
Rizopoulos D, Moustaki I. 2008. \Generalized latent variable models with non-linear
eects." British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. 61(2):415-
438.
Rizopoulos D. 2006. \ltm: An R package for latent variable modeling and item
response theory analyses." Journal of Statistical Software. 17(5).
Rubin DB. 1976. \Multivariate matching methods that are equal percent bias re-
ducing, II: Maximums on bias reduction for xed sample sizes." Biometrics.
32(1):121-132.
Rubin DB. 1987. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York:
Wiley.
Rubin DB, Thomas N. 2000. \Combining propensity score matching with additional
adjustments for prognostic covariates." Journal of the American Statistical
Association. 95(450):573-585.
Rubin B. 2003. Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobi-
lization, and Reintegration in Afghanistan. New York: Center on International
Cooperation.
Samii C. 2010. \Missing data." To appear in Badie B, et al. International Encyclo-
pedia of Political Science. New York: Sage.
Sekhon JS. 2009. \Opiates for the matches: Matching methods for causal inference."
Annual Review of Political Science. 12:487-508.
Sekhon JS. n.d. \Multivariate and propensity score matching software with auto-
mated balance optimization: The Matching package for R." Journal of Statis-
tical Software. (Forthcoming.)
Smith JA, Todd PE. 2005. \Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of nonex-
perimental estimators?" Journal of Econometrics. 125(1-2):305-353.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 185
Soderstrom J. 2010. Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Liberia - An Opportunity for
Democracy? Unpublished thesis. Uppsala University.
Spear J. 2002. \Disarmament and demobilization." In Stedman et al, 2005.
Spear J. 2006. \From political economies of war to political economies of peace: The
contribution of DDR after wars of predation." Contemporary Security Policy.
27(1):168-189.
Specker L. 2008. The R-Phase of DDR processes. Netherlands Institute of Interna-
tional Relations 'Clingendael' Conict Research Unit.
Stedman SJ, Rothchild D, Cousens EM, eds. 2002. Ending Civil Wars: The Imple-
mentation of Peace Agreements. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Tajima Y. 2009. Background Paper on Economic Reintegration. Prepared for the
First International Congress on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegra-
tion, Cartagena.
Tomz M, et al. 2003. \Clarify: Software for interpreting and presenting statistical
results." Journal of Statistical Software. 8(1).
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2000. Sharing Ground in Post-
Conict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Support of Reintegration Programmes.
New York:UNDP.
United Nations. 2000. The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration. Report of the Secretary-General to the Secu-
rity Council, S/2000/101. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2006. Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
Strategies (IDDRS) 2.10: The UN Approach to DDR. New York: United Na-
tions.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 186
Uvin P. 2007. Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How
They Fared. Washington, DC: Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration
Program/World Bank.
van Buuren S, Groothuis-Oudshoorn K. 2010. \MICE: Multivariate imputation by
chained equations in R." Journal of Statistical Software. Forthcoming.
van der Ark LA. 2007. \Mokken scale analysis in R." Journal of Statistical Software.
20(11).
Walter B. 2001. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
World Bank. 2002. Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and
Reintegration. Report No. 238669-AFR. Washington, DC: World Bank and
MDRP Secretariat.
World Bank. 2003. Breaking the Conict Trap. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2004a. Position Paper: Targeting MDRP Assistance: Ex-Combatants
and Other War-Aected Populations. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2004b. Technical Annex for a Proposed Grant of SDR 22.2 Million
to the Republic of Burundi for an Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and
Reintegration Program. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2009. Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Emergency Recovery
Grant in the Amount of SDR 10,1 Million to the Republic of Burundi for an
Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
CHAPTER 4. REINTEGRATING REBELS INTO CIVILIAN LIFE:
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI 187
Tables
Table 4.1: Estimated Sizes of Armed Forces as of January 2004
Name of Force Estimated Size
Forces Armees Burundaises (national army) 45,000
CNDD-FDD I (Nkurunziza faction) 25,000
CNDD-FDD II (Ndayikengurukiye faction) 3,000
FNL-PALIPEHUTU I (Rwasa faction) 3,000
CNDD (Nyangoma faction) 1,000
FNL-PALIPEHUTU II (Mugabarabona faction) 1,000
FROLINA (Kalumba faction) 1,000
PALIPEHUTU (Karatasi faction) 1,000
Total 80,000
Source: World Bank (2004), p. 17.
Not a party to the peace process until September 2008.
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Table 4.2: Military Status of Surviving Civil War Combatants as of June
2007
Of which from
Status Number rebel forces
In Forces de Defense Nationale (new national army) 28,390 approx. 9,000
In Police Nationale approx. 20,000 approx. 8,000
Demobilized 23,185 approx. 14,000
In FNL-PALIPEHUTU (active factions) approx. 6,500 approx. 6,500
Totals approx. 78,075 approx. 37,500
Sources: MDRP (2007), Nindorera (2007), World Bank (2009).
 Approximately 9,000 out of an initial 14,000 demobilized in a rst phase (prior to 2004)
were from the rebel groups. Of the remaining approximately 9,000 that were demobilized (to
generate the 23,185 total), personal communications from program sta suggest that about
5,000 of them were from the rebel groups, although this has not been documented to our
knowledge.
This gure is based on the demobilization targets in World Bank (2009), which were
estimated some time after June 2007. There has been some controversy as to whether this
overstated the number of \true" FNL-PALIPEHUTU ghters that remained into 2008-9 by
a few thousand. Without any other evidence, this is our best estimate, but it may be biased
slightly upward.
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Table 4.3: Program Access in Africare and Non-Africare Regions, Before
and After NGO transition in Fall 2006 and as of the Time of Fieldwork in
July 2007
Pre-transition cases Remaining ...% subject to Overall
Region completed by 12/06 caseload... disruption disruption rate
Africare provinces 1,982 2,257 100% .53
Non-Africare provinces 3,213 5,925 0% 0
Sources: World Bank and Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
(MDRP), Quarterly Reports, October-December 2006 and April-June 2007, and Africare
Annual Report, 2008. Africare provinces include Cankuzo, Gitega, Karuzi, Muramvya,
Mwaro, and Ruyigi. The table refers only to ex-combatants who are (1) male, constituting
97.5% of ex-combatants in the reintegration program, and (2) registered to receive program
benets outside Bujumbura.
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p-value Mean Diff. eQQ Mean
Imputation 1 Age 34.37 33.31 1.20 0.34 0.20 34.37 33.20 1.58 0.39 0.27 -10.39 -60.92
Sample sizes: Hutu 0.95 0.96 1.08 0.89 0.95 0.96 1.23 0.77 -174.74 0.00
Africare Father in agriculture, prewar 0.82 0.69 0.70 0.01 0.82 0.82 0.99 1.00 100.00 53.09
n=110 Prewar education 4.75 5.10 0.85 0.24 0.42 4.75 4.93 1.24 0.62 0.60 48.10 -37.45
Non-Africare Prewar wealth -0.05 0.10 1.18 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 1.07 0.80 0.81 84.37 62.11
Before matching Non-comm. officer 0.72 0.66 0.91 0.26 0.72 0.72 0.99 1.00 100.00 76.55
n = 261 Comm. officer 0.11 0.18 0.65 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.82 0.60 63.55 17.91
After matching Unit death rate 0.09 0.13 0.59 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.08 1.46 0.48 0.79 73.18 67.38
n = 67 Years in faction 9.60 10.71 0.62 0.00 0.00 9.60 9.88 1.81 0.46 0.07 74.50 20.56
Family death rate 0.15 0.18 1.05 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.13 1.76 0.46 0.17 43.58 27.42
Non-CNDD-FDD 0.09 0.22 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.99 1.00 100.00 64.82
Demob. Date (std.) -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.27 0.87 -0.05 -0.08 1.13 0.57 0.51 67.83 67.34
War violence index 5.17 9.31 0.32 0.00 0.00 5.17 5.16 1.96 0.99 0.00 99.88 54.07
Log(pop. density) 5.63 5.76 1.20 0.01 0.00 5.63 5.72 1.21 0.14 0.03 30.97 12.49
Ruling party province 0.65 0.59 0.94 0.21 0.65 0.65 0.98 0.90 86.70 -2.61
Propensity score 0.40 0.25 1.53 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.38 1.54 0.50 0.11 88.75 57.29
Imputation 2 Age 34.37 33.31 1.20 0.34 0.19 34.37 33.29 1.30 0.45 0.26 -1.83 -52.22
Sample sizes: Hutu 0.95 0.96 1.08 0.89 0.95 0.96 1.23 0.77 -174.74 0.00
Africare Father in agriculture, prewar 0.81 0.68 0.72 0.01 0.81 0.82 1.03 0.88 92.85 64.82
n=110 Prewar education 4.75 5.10 0.85 0.24 0.37 4.75 4.63 1.00 0.76 0.98 66.27 46.55
Non-Africare Prewar wealth index -0.06 0.10 1.19 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.04 1.04 0.31 0.07 38.31 1.38
Before matching Non-comm. officer 0.72 0.66 0.91 0.26 0.72 0.74 1.04 0.79 69.28 53.09
n = 261 Comm. officer 0.11 0.18 0.65 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.99 1.00 100.00 79.48
After matching Unit death rate 0.09 0.12 0.57 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.07 1.62 0.37 0.66 61.40 54.24
n = 67 Years in faction 9.60 10.68 0.61 0.00 0.00 9.60 9.95 1.83 0.36 0.13 67.12 19.28
Family death rate 0.15 0.18 1.05 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 1.30 0.89 0.12 88.49 -23.30
Non-CNDD-FDD 0.09 0.22 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.99 1.00 100.00 53.09
Demob. Date (std.) -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.26 0.74 -0.05 -0.07 2.76 0.55 0.30 73.87 66.21
War violence index 5.17 9.31 0.32 0.00 0.00 5.17 4.97 2.09 0.77 0.00 95.21 56.54
Log(pop. density) 5.63 5.76 1.20 0.01 0.00 5.63 5.69 1.19 0.31 0.05 51.46 27.62
Ruling party province 0.65 0.59 0.94 0.21 0.65 0.65 0.99 1.00 100.00 38.43
Propensity score 0.40 0.25 1.47 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.38 1.46 0.40 0.04 85.63 50.29
Imputation 3 Age 34.37 33.31 1.20 0.34 0.19 34.37 32.81 1.93 0.22 0.16 -47.18 -93.92
Sample sizes: Hutu 0.95 0.96 1.08 0.89 0.95 0.97 1.63 0.52 -449.47 NA
Africare Father in agriculture, prewar 0.89 0.69 0.69 0.01 0.82 0.84 1.08 0.75 86.26 69.01
n=110 Prewar education 4.75 5.10 0.85 0.24 0.42 4.75 5.16 1.42 0.23 0.34 -19.37 -4.49
Non-Africare Prewar wealth index -0.05 0.10 1.18 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 1.12 0.77 0.71 81.87 51.75
Before matching Non-comm. officer 0.72 0.66 0.91 0.26 0.72 0.75 1.09 0.59 38.55 77.87
n = 261 Comm. officer 0.11 0.18 0.65 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.99 1.00 100.00 80.63
After matching Unit death rate 0.09 0.12 0.61 0.03 0.28 0.09 0.07 1.55 0.19 0.39 33.29 35.34
n = 71 Years in faction 9.60 10.78 0.56 0.00 0.00 9.60 9.90 1.40 0.46 0.03 74.53 33.44
Family death rate 0.15 0.18 1.05 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.12 1.35 0.40 0.67 32.57 30.06
Non-CNDD-FDD 0.09 0.22 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.99 1.00 100.00 88.93
Demob. Date (std.) -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.27 0.65 -0.05 -0.08 2.27 0.45 0.19 65.32 58.23
War violence index 5.17 9.31 0.32 0.00 0.00 5.17 5.29 1.90 0.86 0.00 96.93 52.36
Log(pop. density) 5.63 5.76 1.19 0.01 0.00 5.63 5.71 1.24 0.16 0.01 33.84 9.91
Ruling party province 0.65 0.59 0.94 0.21 0.65 0.65 0.99 1.00 100.00 80.63
Propensity score 0.39 0.26 1.46 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.38 1.56 0.50 0.07 88.69 58.77
Imputation 4 Age 34.37 33.31 1.20 0.34 0.15 34.37 33.30 1.41 0.44 0.35 -0.97 -41.41
Sample sizes: Hutu 0.95 0.96 1.08 0.89 0.95 0.96 1.23 0.76 -174.74 0.00
Africare Father in agriculture, prewar 0.81 0.69 0.72 0.01 0.81 0.82 1.03 0.88 92.63 65.34
n=110 Prewar education 4.75 5.10 0.85 0.24 0.36 4.75 4.70 1.25 0.90 0.37 87.03 5.95
Non-Africare Prewar wealth index -0.06 0.10 1.18 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 1.00 0.99 0.68 99.21 53.79
Before matching Non-comm. officer 0.72 0.66 0.91 0.26 0.72 0.71 0.98 0.90 84.64 53.78
n = 261 Comm. officer 0.11 0.18 0.65 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.99 1.00 100.00 79.78
After matching Unit death rate 0.10 0.12 0.68 0.07 0.28 0.10 0.08 1.39 0.52 0.99 58.52 74.28
n = 68 Years in faction 9.60 10.77 0.59 0.00 0.00 9.60 10.05 1.89 0.24 0.05 61.93 12.22
Family death rate 0.15 0.18 1.05 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 1.52 0.54 0.05 51.23 -58.19
Non-CNDD-FDD 0.09 0.22 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.99 1.00 100.00 65.34
Demob. Date (std.) -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.27 0.75 -0.05 -0.07 1.83 0.67 0.42 79.32 76.21
War violence index 5.17 9.31 0.32 0.00 0.00 5.17 4.88 2.03 0.68 0.01 93.11 61.81
Log(pop. density) 5.63 5.75 1.18 0.01 0.00 5.63 5.70 1.23 0.23 0.05 42.77 29.23
Ruling party province 0.65 0.59 0.94 0.21 0.65 0.64 0.97 0.81 73.39 -21.32
Propensity score 0.39 0.26 1.47 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.38 1.60 0.47 0.15 87.86 62.25
Imputation 5 Age 34.37 33.31 1.20 0.34 0.19 34.37 32.87 1.50 0.28 0.22 -41.19 -71.79
Sample sizes: Hutu 0.95 0.96 1.08 0.89 0.95 0.95 0.99 1.00 100.00 0.00
Africare Father in agriculture, prewar 0.81 0.69 0.72 0.01 0.81 0.81 0.99 1.00 100.00 64.82
n=110 Prewar education 4.75 5.10 0.85 0.24 0.36 4.75 4.82 1.24 0.84 0.85 79.24 23.64
Non-Africare Prewar wealth index -0.06 0.09 1.19 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.11 1.06 0.55 0.83 62.75 66.83
Before matching Non-comm. officer 0.72 0.66 0.91 0.26 0.72 0.73 1.01 0.90 84.64 76.55
n = 261 Comm. officer 0.11 0.18 0.65 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.99 1.00 100.00 79.48
After matching Unit death rate 0.08 0.12 0.61 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.07 2.19 0.20 0.80 47.94 45.50
n = 67 Years in faction 9.60 10.74 0.62 0.00 0.00 9.60 10.13 1.46 0.19 0.01 53.57 4.34
Family death rate 0.15 0.18 1.05 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 1.29 0.92 0.25 91.76 5.90
Non-CNDD-FDD 0.09 0.22 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.91 0.84 93.08 64.82
Demob. Date (std.) -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.28 0.71 -0.05 -0.10 1.83 0.26 0.32 43.94 70.11
War violence index 5.17 9.31 0.32 0.00 0.00 5.17 5.38 1.78 0.77 0.00 94.90 47.88
Log(pop. density) 5.63 5.75 1.17 0.01 0.00 5.63 5.72 1.16 0.15 0.04 27.35 25.44
Ruling party province 0.65 0.59 0.94 0.21 0.65 0.65 0.99 1.00 100.00 58.96
Propensity score 0.40 0.25 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.38 1.46 0.42 0.04 86.23 55.76
% ImprovementBefore matching After matching
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Table 4.5: Estimates from OLS regressions on log(income/month + 1)
coef. s.e. p -val. coef. s.e. p -val. coef. s.e. p -val.
Africare -0.67 0.33 0.04 -0.59 0.53 0.26 -1.12 1.00 0.26
Age -0.06 0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.04 0.14
Hutu 3.31 2.10 0.12 3.31 2.10 0.12
Father in agriculture, prewar -1.18 0.74 0.11 -1.18 0.74 0.11
Prewar education 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.22
Prewar wealth index 0.52 0.50 0.30 0.52 0.50 0.30
Non-comm. officer -0.19 0.51 0.71 -0.19 0.51 0.71
Comm. officer 0.07 0.88 0.93 0.07 0.88 0.93
Unit death rate 6.30 3.40 0.07 6.30 3.40 0.07
Years in faction 0.09 0.17 0.62 0.09 0.17 0.62
Family death rate 1.84 1.25 0.14 1.84 1.25 0.14
Non-CNDD-FDD 0.60 1.07 0.58 0.60 1.07 0.58
Demob. Date (std.) -0.83 0.63 0.19 -0.83 0.63 0.19
War violence index 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.09
Log(pop. density) -0.14 0.68 0.84 -0.14 0.68 0.84
Ruling party province -1.19 0.59 0.04 -1.19 0.59 0.04
Propensity score 8.67 5.34 0.11 8.67 5.34 0.11
Constant 9.37 0.20 0.00 4.15 6.61 0.53 4.15 6.61 0.53
N from imputed datasets
No adjustment Matching & regression
Matching, regression, & 
het. exposure adjustment
371, 371, 371, 371, 371 177, 177, 181, 178, 177 177, 177, 181, 178, 177
Standard errors computed with clustering at commune level.
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Table 4.6: Estimates from quantile regressions on log(income/month+1)
Matching, regression, &
No adjustment Matching & regression het. exposure adjustment
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
Decile 1 -0.92 2.89 0.75 -1.01 2.24 0.65 -1.90 4.22 0.65
Decile 2 -0.69 0.24 0.00 -0.54 0.98 0.59 -1.01 1.85 0.59
Decile 3 -0.69 0.16 0.00 -0.60 0.31 0.06 -1.14 0.58 0.06
Decile 4 -0.41 0.17 0.02 -0.51 0.28 0.07 -0.97 0.52 0.07
Decile 5 -0.64 0.17 0.00 -0.44 0.24 0.07 -0.83 0.45 0.07
Decile 6 -0.60 0.21 0.01 -0.43 0.18 0.02 -0.80 0.34 0.02
Decile 7 -0.41 0.14 0.00 -0.39 0.18 0.03 -0.74 0.33 0.03
Decile 8 -0.51 0.18 0.00 -0.37 0.22 0.11 -0.70 0.42 0.11
Decile 9 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.35 0.21 0.10 -0.66 0.40 0.10
N from imputed datasets 371,371,371,371,371 177,177,181,178,177 177,177,181,178,177
Standard errors computed using robust inverted rank test intervals. Regressions on matched
data include the covariates in Table 4.5. The coecients on these covariates are not dis-
played to save space.
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Table 4.7: Estimates from multinomial and ordered logistic regressions on
occupation categories
Unordered outcomes
(multinomial logit) coef. RRR s.e. p -val. coef. RRR s.e. p -val. coef. RRR s.e. p -val.
No occ. vs. agr. -0.57 0.56 0.43 0.18 1.02 2.78 1.22 0.42 1.93 6.86 2.30 0.42
Skilled occ. vs. agr. -1.00 0.37 0.46 0.03 -0.94 0.39 0.78 0.23 -1.78 0.17 1.46 0.23
Unskilled occ. vs. agr. -0.33 0.72 0.47 0.48 -0.52 0.59 0.56 0.35 -0.99 0.37 1.06 0.35
Ordered outcomes




-0.23 0.80 0.20 0.25 -0.77 0.46 0.50 0.13 -1.46 0.23 0.95 0.13
N from imputed datasets
No adjustment Matching & regression
Matching, regression,
& het. exposure adjustment
371, 371, 371, 371, 371 177, 177, 177, 181, 178, 177 177, 177, 177, 181, 178, 177
Multinomial logit standard errors are not clustered at commune level because of constraints
in our imputation combination software. But we estimated the models on each of the
imputation-completed datasets with and without clustered standard errors, and then com-
pared results. They were nearly identical and no inferences changed. Regressions on matched
data include the covariates in Table 4.5. The coecients on these covariates are not dis-
played to save space. \RRR" refers to relative risk ratio and \OR" to odds ratio.
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Table 4.8: Estimates from logistic regressions on political attitudes out-
comes
Outcome coef. OR s.e. p -val. coef. OR s.e. p -val. coef. OR s.e. p -val.
i. "Life better as civilian 
than combatant"
-0.06 0.94 0.29 0.83 -0.72 0.49 0.51 0.17 -1.36 0.26 0.96 0.17
ii. "Very satisfied with 
peace accords"
0.05 1.05 0.23 0.83 -0.02 0.99 0.39 0.97 -0.03 0.97 0.74 0.97
iii. "Government should have
more time to solve problems"
0.19 1.21 0.35 0.60 0.74 2.11 0.68 0.29 1.41 4.08 1.29 0.29
N from imputed datasets
No adjustment Matching & regression
Matching, regression, & het. 
exposure adjustment
371, 371, 371, 371, 371 177, 177, 181, 178, 177 177, 177, 181, 178, 177
Standard errors computed with clustering at commune level. Regressions on matched data
include the covariates in Table 4.5. The coecients on these covariates are not displayed
to save space. \OR" refers to odds ratio.
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The gray region in the maps is Africare's domain of responsibility for the reintegration
program. The boundaries shown on the maps are commune boundaries. The left map shows
the locations of subjects in the raw data. The right map shows the locations of subjects
in the matched data. The radii of the non-Africare points are proportional to the weight
these subjects receive in the analysis. Observations from all ve of the imputation-completed
datasets are shown together in the maps.
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Figure 4.2: Dierences in log-income distributions and estimated eects on
















































The gure on the left shows the distribution of income (on the natural log scale) for Africare
and matched control (non-Africare) observations. Distributions are shown for each of the 5
imputation-complete datasets. The size of the points for the matched controls is proportional
to the weight assigned to that observation after matching. The gure on the right shows the
cumulative log-income distribution for Africare respondents, and then predicted counter-
factual distributions. The gray zone corresponds to points below the 15000FBu/month
($1.25/day at PPP) poverty line.
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The left graph shows the livelihood outcome distribution for the matched controls. The
right graph shows estimated counterfactual outcomes imposed over the outcome distribution
for the Africare-region ex-combatants. The estimated eect is the dierence between the
modeled \actual" outcomes (the solid black dots, which show in-sample tted values) and the
estimated counter-factual outcomes. The white dots show the lower-bound counter-factual
estimates, and the gray dots shows the upper bound counter-factual estimates.
